The New Balance of Power, Adequacy of Elites and Western Sanctions and Goals

The GRANI Project’s Oleg Yankovsky interviews special guest Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, PhD in Political Science.

In the interview they discussed:

• The role of states in international relations
• The evolution of the world system following the end of the Cold War and its consequences
• The conflict in Ukraine as a manifestation of accumulated contradictions within the world system
• Rationality and pragmatism of today’s elites
• Western perceptions of the crisis in Ukraine
• The “confrontation” between the global majority and the “collective West”
• The role and impact of sanctions and the consequences of Russian asset expropriation.

The GRANI Project’s Oleg Yankovsky interviews special guest Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, PhD in Political Science.

In the interview they discussed:

• The role of states in international relations
• The evolution of the world system following the end of the Cold War and its consequences
• The conflict in Ukraine as a manifestation of accumulated contradictions within the world system
• Rationality and pragmatism of today’s elites
• Western perceptions of the crisis in Ukraine
• The “confrontation” between the global majority and the “collective West”
• The role and impact of sanctions and the consequences of Russian asset expropriation.

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Oleg Yanovsky: Hello and welcome to the Grani project with Oleg Yanovsky. With us today is a very special guest, Ivan Nikolaevich Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council. I’d like to start off by asking a rather conventional but personally concerning question: what’s going on in the world today?

Ivan Timofeev: Greetings, Oleg! It’s a good question. In my opinion, I think every generation is tempted to believe that something special and extraordinary is transpiring at any given historical moment. Just look at your memoirs, diaries—in every era something unique has occurred. Twenty years ago, we had the 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan, turbulence in the Middle East, etc. If we go back a little more, another ten years—it was the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union; a major shift. Go back another ten years to the early 1980s—Afghanistan....

Oleg Yanovsky: Star Wars.

Ivan Timofeev: Right, Star Wars. In 1983, we barely escaped a nuclear missile strike. Every era has something special happen. We are tempted to say that today we are witnessing “tectonic shifts” in the world, or a major historic transition. But I think we should avoid overexaggerating our reality. We live under normal conditions because something is happening somewhere all the time. Yes, there are serious conflicts around the world, growing competition for resources, constant struggles for influence and power. However, international relations are still anarchic, or what Hobbes describes as “the struggle of all against all”. True, the scenery has changed, as have our institutions to a certain extent. What we now call the “international community” has emerged. But at the core of international relations, things have not changed all that much. Competition has not gone anywhere, the struggle for power has not gone anywhere, national interests have not gone anywhere, and—most importantly—state competition has not gone anywhere.

Oleg Yanovsky: So, the nation state is still the main actor in international relations?

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, of course. This also raises a very good—perhaps even fundamental—question. I remember when I started my career as an expert in international relations in the early 2000s, it was all the rage to believe that the national state was losing its place to corporations, various networks, non-state actors, etc., as the key actor in international relations. I think COVID more or less put things in perspective. Afterall, who fought the pandemic? Nations did. Who was able to mobilize the required resources to restrict the movement of people, to produce a vaccine, to conduct this massive campaign? Only nation states. No company, corporation or international criminal network could do that. Moreover, even the poorest nation states—relatively poor, with institutions and a monopoly on violence—could “cut off the oxygen” for a successful and wealthy company if had the desire and political will to do so. Now, we see rivalries become more and more aggressive, like between Russia and the collective West, China and the United States, as well as persistent tensions between China and India. Nation states continue to be key players in international relations and there is no escaping it.

Oleg Yanovsky: What is the state of the world today? How do you see it? Opinions vary widely, from those who see an impending World War III scenario or a second Cold War, to those who think there will be a complete change in world order as nation states may completely disintegrate or, on the contrary, there will be a single totalitarian state. How would you assess the current situation?

Ivan Timofeev: Let’s start at the end—nation states won’t go anywhere for one simple reason: nothing else has been invented to replace the nation state. Not because the state is something good or bad, but simply because there’s nothing to replace it with. We have already stated that criminal organizations are certainly a lame replacement for various reasons, ranging from legal to ethical questions. Corporations—also no. What is the difference between a corporation and a nation state? A corporation’s objective is to make money. It’s great for a state to have ample financial resources, and when it earns money, but the state has greater interests than profits. We see that in certain situations the state puts its political interests above financial, willing to go to the end in pursuit of certain political interests. In other words, the state cannot be reduced to some commercial component. What about associations or civil society institutions? No—they don’t have a monopoly on violence, which is a crucial instrument in this regard. Supranational structures? Also no—they lack legitimacy. The UN is the only universally acclaimed international organization. It has institutions which can theoretically force nations to take certain actions via Security Council decisions, but even such an organization cannot unconditionally enforce these decisions. This is one of the greatest problems the UN faces. Thus, there is no substitute for nation states at this moment.

I also do not see any prospects for nations to converge into a single superstate. First, there is no desire on the part of major actors to absorb other states. A powerful actor like the United States can theoretically be capable of doing this, as it possesses the military power and the means to act like a vacuum and suck in other nation states. Yet it does not do so, because there is a legitimacy problem—a problem of control. It is easier to deal with sovereign states, to build relations with them, establish US dependence on different grounds without “overpaying” for control. China is one of the most powerful states, but it does not seek any imperial territorial expansion. Russia is the largest nation state geographically, but we do not aspire for imperial expansion either. The Ukrainian conflict is a special case—very specific—caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the historical “time mines” that had been laid years ago and are only now exploding. Therefore, I do not foresee a plethora of states converging into a superstate. This is what fantasy or sci-fi authors—specifically, science fiction from the 1960s onwards—describe, the emergence of large conglomerates, for example.

Oleg Yanovsky: Even Herbert George Wells toyed with this idea.

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, indeed. But it would be premature to discuss this type of scenario in our case.

Oleg Yanovsky: That is, we have returned to the era of realism, where everything that happens can be seen as a struggle for resources and influence; a “tug-of-war” so to say. If that’s the case, what is going on now, given that nations continue to be the main actors in international politics? Have we reshuffled our deck of cards to deal them out for a new game? Do we have to decide once again what belongs to whom?

Ivan Timofeev: In international relations, these situations—when new cards are dealt, or the house of cards collapses—are normal. Time after time, world order transformations do happen, and any international relations construct is temporary. The Yalta-Potsdam system, based on the results of the Second World War, is quite a long-lived system. We still exist in this system in one way or another, in its legacy. However, the latter is being destroyed in front of our eyes; somewhere it has already completely crumbled. At the same time, new sprouts are forcing their way through. Part of this legacy was attempted to be replaced with elements of a unipolar world order, but then that also began to collapse. Meanwhile all these changes—in the balance of power, in potential ratios, as well as the emergence of ambitious players who want more or want a more equitable and favorable distribution of resources—are quite normal. We are now living in the midst of this crisis. To be honest, this happens all the time; processes of accumulation or accrual are in place. On the one hand, contradictions are being stacked. On the other hand, the needs of actors within the current system are being accrued and at some critical juncture these “break throughs” are concentrated in some notable event. To us, it seems that this point is a revolutionary threshold, but this is not so. All the above-mentioned factors have been accumulated on a daily basis—the bubble just never “burst” all at once.

We are now living in unfamiliar conditions because for the last two years, we have been in a state of severe and intense rivalry with the West. But this concern over international relations is also unevenly distributed. For Russians, we feel that the game has become more difficult. But suppose you are in India—there is a completely different rhythm of foreign policy and life there, completely different tasks set. China is also facing growing competition with the United States, but in a completely different way. Latin America has its own problems, as does Africa. This “nerve” that currently pervades our foreign policy, along with higher turnovers, tougher stances and a tougher reality is felt quite differently in other parts of the world. What is a major existential challenge for us today, is just another episode of international political events for others. We used to find ourselves in a similar situation: when the fates of other nations were at stake, everything was more or less calm in our country. So, one way or another, this is a normal situation, but the fact that it is relatively normal does not mean that we should relax. For us specifically, serious historical challenges—problems that we must deal with—have converged at this one point. So, when these challenges are seriously referred to as “existential problems”, this is a slight exaggeration. Although the saying, “Today’s Russia is experiencing a crucial historical moment”, seems to be legitimate, I believe it is an over-exaggeration.

Oleg Carnovsky: So, the situation only appears to be so dire because it concerns us directly?

Ivan Timofeev: Exactly, because it concerns us directly. Several aspects have converged at one point for us. On the one hand, the problems that arose at the end of the Cold War have manifested over the years. When the Soviet Union collapsed, we assumed that the new states—the former Soviet republics—would maintain a friendly or at least neutral attitude towards Russia. This was the fundamental premise of why the Russian leadership agreed to the emerging status quo; in hindsight, it became clear that this was a mistake in 2022-2024. Yet back in 1990-1991, this negative scenario was not predetermined. So, to accuse the decision-makers of that era of failing to predict the future and prepare for everything would be wrong. Back then, people lived in very harsh circumstances—they experienced a catastrophic economic crisis. I remember the realities of 1990-1991: that was the most severe economic, financial, value-based and moral crisis our nation ever experienced, and it arose from various reasons and from accumulated factors that have been building over a very long time, for years. This was not some accidental or unexpected “burst” –preconditions had existed for several decades and only in the late 1980s—early 1990s had the overaccumulation of these factors led to the bubble “bursting”. Back in those days, avoiding military confrontation and reducing the burden of military expenditures was seen, to some extent, as an existential task. Those who made decisions back then had to consider their own reality. Later, our Western counterparts decided to take advantage of the situation: once Russia had been weakened and was no longer a threat, they perceived it as a sign that an onslaught of Russia’s security space that disregarded Russia’s interests was justifiable. For a long time, we were “patted on the shoulder” and told “we have indivisible equal security”, “we live in a new era”, etc. But then, NATO gradually expanded into the East. We all know this too well. Russia demonstrated great strategic patience, which started to deplete in 1999 during the Balkan crisis and the gradual erosion of what had been preserved from the Cold War. The 2022 crisis did not happen in a day; it did not strike us out of the blue. This has been a general trend for at least twenty-three years, maybe even more. Perhaps, since 1994. Russia came to understand that the West was only ready to hear Russia’s concerns, nothing more. Therefore, we did not arrive at this point in one go. The force with which the situation erupted in 2022 reflects just how long the grievances had been accumulated for and how deep they are.

Oleg Yanovsky: To sum up, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and throughout all these years, a set of contradictions and complex political inconsistencies have been accumulated, reaching a level that the system simply could not tolerate any longer. In turn, this resulted in a regional conflict, clashing theories of international relations and—consequently—a need to turn to some sort of status quo.

Ivan Timofeev: A new reality will take shape, as returning to the "old" status quo is impossible. Contradictions have been piling up for a long time and we made several attempts to resolve them. These were quite systematic attempts; let’s recall the speech of the Russian President in the Bundestag back in 2001. It was very constructive, and it carefully emphasized the existing security problems of the time. He made a very tactful and polite appeal to pay attention to these concerns. Can you remember President Vladimir Putin’s first term? It was a time marked by comprehensive dialogue with the United States, general support for the United States and the West in its fight against international terrorism, intense cooperation on security issues, comprehensive cooperation with the EU, particularly the UK. Additionally, the Russia-NATO Council was established, which started to take shape even before then. Then we witnessed these relations gradually cooling down, which was not expedited by our side. We can recall President Medvedev’s initiative on European security as evidence; it was simply ignored, and rather cynically at that. True, the concept had its flaws, but there was clearly an opportunity to work together despite those flaws. Yet it was completely ignored by the West. Then came 2014, Crimea’s reunification with Russia and the conflict in the Donbass region, when the situation really went downhill. Conflict escalation with the West began to heat up, and Ukraine became the “nerve” of all these contradictions. It was possible to try to reverse this dynamic, but I think few people in the West believed that Russia would dare to surgically remove that abscess.

Oleg Yanovsky: This is an important point. From your perspective, is the situation today objectively an accumulated set of problems in international affairs that resulted from unresolved problems after the “first” Cold War? There are other theories as to why this is happening that focus more on the personal aspect, that some people—certain elites and the managerial class—have lost strategic perspective; their eye is no longer on the ball; they are no longer able to perceive the situation strategically. Does this mean that we need to change how we communicate with these individuals?

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Ivan Timofeev: I think this personal factor does matter indeed, although personality is very much molded by the environment, institutions, bureaucratic and corporate structures, and informal rules of the game. The military, intelligence, diplomatic corps—these are different cultures, and they coexist within the same deep state, constantly competing. The state is not a monolith, with a “monarch” at the head who decides everything alone. The state is a community, a collective body. It has a leader, but there is also a very powerful machine—an apparatus—and associates behind this leader. I’d say that it is difficult to talk about degradation, because we are not talking about individual personalities, but about the totality of these personalities.

Oleg Yanovsky: We can even talk about a general decline: in culture, intellectual aspects, and strategic thinking and it’s not limited to these spheres. One could even point to poor rational planning and their general responses or reactions to various actions.

Ivan Timofeev: I would say that in the West—the United States, UK, and some EU countries –there are many high-skilled professionals within various spheres. These people are not just well-educated and knowledgeable; they also have ample information and are generally quite rational and adequate. In other words, we cannot say that crazy “freaks” have seized power there.

Oleg Yanovsky: As they are often portrayed in our country.

Ivan Timofeev: This is not the case. I think this trend to portray them this way is very dangerous because we would be underestimating our rival.

Oleg Yanovsky: You have prefaced my next question. Do we have an adequate assessment of the opposing party?

Ivan Timofeev: We are dealing with a well-trained and professional apparatus in our current rival countries. This apparatus is not always perfect, as it malfunctions occasionally, but it is characterized by a rather high level of self-discipline and a fairly low level of corruption. In terms of manageability, we are dealing with well-organized, well-built, rational systems. Yet the human factor enters certain corrections in these systems. Afterall, people continue to play an integral role. These people have their own generational idiosyncrasies, their own experiences. For example, the people who were in power 20-30 or more years ago were people who have experienced war. President Bush Senior, for example, was involved in war. Brezhnev was involved in war. In one way or another, the big war mindset even caught on to those who did not take part in war directly.

Oleg Yanovsky: People with a military mindset.

Ivan Timofeev: A mindset characterized by the understanding that there could be a big catastrophe with very serious consequences. They saw this with their own eyes, at least millions of deaths, the mobilization of industry, millions of orphans, enormous resource constraints—all of that became part of their reality. They were direct witnesses. The older members of the current generation of leaders learned from these people directly, while for the younger ones, the connection is less obvious. To some extent, this already sets up a Pandora’s Box situation.

Oleg Yanovsky: So, people are no longer afraid?

Ivan Timofeev: Some are no longer afraid; some simply lack experience. They have no experience in steering through a serious crisis. Even though I just discussed how something happens locally all the time, these individuals never directly went through a truly great catastrophe. Nothing of the kind has happened for at least 70-80 years. It’s really a factor to be reckoned with.

Also, I think people’s competencies are changing. The new generation is simply reading less and reading fewer texts. Let’s take Donald Trump during his presidency, for example. For him, supposedly Twitter was a more important source of information than CIA intelligence briefs which were presented to the US President every day. It was just one page of text covering the most important events taking place around the world. Can you imagine? US intelligence is a huge structure, consisting of professionals who write and verify intelligence briefs every day so that they may present it to the president, only to have him throw it in the trash, opting for Twitter instead. This shows the emergence of a different attitude to obtaining information, a different attitude to text. This is a different level of intellectual development. A person used to be able to read a large text, but now that is not always the case. Why? When you have a social network, you develop clip thinking; you are shown a funny picture, not a text. We have yet to know what the possible outcome of this transformation might be.

Oleg Yanovsky: And many wonder why the deep state acts separately, on its own.

Ivan Timofeev: People in the deep state are usually not stupid; in fact, they usually have an above-average IQ. Though it may be a bit speculative, I think the future stratification of those who govern and those who are governed will conditionally run along the lines of those who can read a long text and those who can’t. Those who read and write, and those who don’t. The minority will be able to write and read as before, and the majority will live in a world of memes and funny pictures.

Oleg Yanovsky: Setting us some five or six centuries back?

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, at best. Nobody knows how this will impact may manifest, what it may “spark”. There are a lot of unknowns here, not so much at the level of international relations as we understand them—as competition, national interests, and so on—but rather in a broader context: what type of people will we be dealing with? Who are the future leaders who will come to power? How will these people act or make decisions? What information will they perceive as legitimate or illegitimate?

Oleg Yanovsky: And permissible in terms of ethics and morality.

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, in terms of ethics and morality, as well as how this morality will generally be perceived by society; what society wants and what it doesn’t want. So, I believe we have a lot of unknowns simply because of this “revolution”.

Oleg Yanovsky: In terms of how elites are perceived, as you just said, we do not actually have an entirely adequate perception of who we are dealing with. This is more related to socio-political discourse. Do you think we have a sufficient level of awareness of who we are dealing with in terms of the academic and analytical environment? Do we understand the opponents we are currently confronting?

Ivan Timofeev: We still have a decent school for regional studies, specialists who speak foreign languages and those who have extensive knowledge about different countries and their individual nuances. During the last couple of decades, it has become increasingly common to hear people say: “Why study rare language or even Chinese? Just use Google Translate and you’ll be fine”. I am one of those people who believes that languages define us. This is classical structuralism: a language, its structure, determines how we think. Until I started learning Chinese, I had not properly understood this axiom. It was only when I started learning the language that I started to better grasp why my Chinese colleagues do things this way and not that way. It became easier for me to look at how the English language is structured and understand how language shapes the minds of our counterparts in the US and UK. Therefore, having such competencies, including linguistic ones, is crucial for a professional in international relations. It’s impossible without them. You simply will not understand the thinking processes transpiring in other people’s minds. I wish we had more specialists in certain areas, because in some spheres there are only a few. You can literally count them all on one hand. But at least they do exist; there are many countries that do not have any experts at all. It has become fashionable to talk about sovereignty—which is important, and I am glad that the sovereignty discourse has become so agile—but it’s important to emphasize that it also includes the sovereignty of knowledge. It is one thing when a country has its own experts who know all the nuts and bolts on a topic, including factual information, but it’s quite a different story when it does not have them, and leaders have to rely on the knowledge of the Big Four or someone else. It’s their knowledge. Even though we pick on each other, criticize each other, the important thing is that we have an inner circle that discusses and disputes issues.

Oleg Yanovsky: We have already discussed that there is a certain Russian perspective on the events taking place in the world today. For us, it hits a certain nerve. In many ways this is an existential threat that has developed because of the accumulated contradictions in the international system. There are several theories regarding how current events are perceived by the West, our “collective” rival. One of these theories incorporates neocolonialism, specifically the redistribution of resources. There is a lot of appeal in Russian political discourse that we are experiancing an ideological conflict, that our rivals are driven by the idea of neoliberal expansion. According to an alternative view, they are seen as globalists who want to dominate the international arena. What is your view on how the other side perceives the ongoing standoff?

Ivan Timofeev: I think that reducing this situation to the machinations of globalists, neoliberals or anyone else overgeneralizes things to a certain extent. Here I wonder, who specifically are you referring to? What is neoliberalism? Who are the globalists? What are their names?

Oleg Yanovsky: Some mention Hillary Clinton, for example.

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, but who stands behind her? What “drive belts” are there? And I don’t mean the myths about Rothschilds and Rockefellers, but something more specific. I am a person who needs facts, who needs information backed up by specifics. Now when I start to understand these specifics, I realize that reality is much more complex. We tend to oversimplify things; the same problem cripples our opponents, especially in terms of seeing some omnipotent decision-making center brooding over its ominous plans.

Oleg Yanovsky: It seems that many of us would like to believe in this mysterious center.

Ivan Timofeev: For some, it might be easier to imagine that there are some all-powerful bosses you need to submit to, a certain club of elites.

Oleg Yanovsky: That way we would understand the people we are directly dealing with.

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, an “obkom” or a group of people that act like a suzerain would; they command everyone, make decisions, and sooner or later may realize that they made a mistake or run into some serious problems. Unfortunately, reality is much more complicated. It is more difficult to manage the world, in part because some people or incompetent. What kind of people call the shots? Degraded or not? Smart or stupid? The fact of the matter is that the distribution of these people is more or less evenly spread out. There is some amazing talent out there, intelligent people, who are offset by your typical career climbers, mediocrities, “rookies”. However, the overall system is relatively less corrupt than in other places. It is well organized, but just because something is well organized does not mean that it is rigidly centralized and reduced to some very clear line or a set of goals and means. Sometimes we are just dealing with spontaneous coincidences. Of course, we know that there are bureaucracies, clearly formulated ideologies, certain interests, etc. However, inside this black box, things become muddled. We must delve into what is in the black box to understand exactly where, what and who thinks and considers what they do. To understand where there are gaps, where they have expertise and where they do not. Where speculations drive decision-making and where there is a reliance on facts. Where the role of ideology proves vital and where decisions are simply based off commercial interests. This is what we need to unpack.

Oleg Yanovsky: How do our adversaries view things? What is happening now from their perspective?

Ivan Timofeev: I think there are different theories regarding Russia. Even if we take the US expertise and expert community, there are completely different experts out there. There are frankly “badass” individuals who perceive everything in very rigid ideological undertones—in a radically liberal way. Other people are more realistic: yes, Russia is an adversary, but at least it acts rationally.

Oleg Yanovsky: Whose theory dominates discourse?

Ivan Timofeev: That’s a good question. I think, situationally, the former group dominates in some situations, while a more sober point of view prevails in others. There are different views on Russia and the US-Russia rivalry. Some believe that it would be better to destroy Russia and get rid of this thorn in American’s side. This is a crazy minority, and it can eventually become very influential. Social revolutions and movements are generally driven by minorities; no revolution has ever been led by a majority.

Oleg Yanovsky: An organized minority?

Ivan Timofeev: Absolutely—the minority is usually better organized than the majority. There are those who believe that, yes, Russia is a rival, but this rival should be weakened to then negotiate things on our own terms. Then there are those who believe—also a minority—that what is happening now, this conflict with Russia, is a fundamental problem for the West because it politically failed when it lost Russia as an ally. Afterall, Russia was an ally and a partner in the 1990s, and now it is an adversary.

Oleg Yanovsky: And they pushed us into the arms of China.

Ivan Timofeev: Absolutely. Now in their rivalry with China, they also must deal with Russia. So, there are very different opinions.

Oleg Yanovsky: In other words, this can be viewed as a strategic failure for the United States?

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, it is not just a mistake—it is a defeat. It is a very serious strategic defeat to lose Russia, to have it as an adversary that cannot be coped with. Since they can’t, they are dispersing their already limited resources to fight a more serious adversary—China. There are some proponents of this school of thought as well. I would say that this was supported by a minority back in 2018, and only now have others gradually come to realize their own fallacy, if not stupidity. However, we can’t change anything now. We’ve been wondering what our new reality might be: will we find a way back to the old status quo? I do not believe we will return to the way things were, but based on the results of what is now happening in this conflict with the West, we’ll eventually see some new reality form. The overall task of our diplomacy and foreign policy is to make this reality as favorable for us as possible.

Oleg Yanovsky: So, will there be another rules-based order? Will it be based on different rules?

Ivan Timofeev: There will be an order based not on rules, but on a new balance of power—on a new situation.

Oleg Yanovsky: Can there be both contradictions that have been resolved and new contradictions?

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Ivan Timofeev: With new contradictions and some of the old ones. The contradictions won’t necessarily be resolved, but at least there will be a world order that would nullify old contradictions and beget new ones in the process. A new reality will emerge and this new reality, we’ll need to push for a most favorable position for our nation.

Oleg Yanovsky: Should we sit at the negotiating table with our opposition and write the new rules together with the West, or should we impose our own rules, perhaps together with someone else?

Ivan Timofeev: It is unlikely that we’ll be able to write them together. We could have imagined this thirty years ago, when we were jointly writing these rules with other countries. But why did this conflict happen? Because these rules were perceived differently by those writing them. In the West, they were perceived more as some sort of Russia’s “honorable surrender”: we are sitting at the same table with you, but we will write the rules. You just sit there and write your signature, but the rules are ours and you must follow them. Our perception differed; we thought that since we are writing new rules together, we have a joint project to which we are equal sides. We wanted to be viewed as equal. In response, they said: “No, you tend to make things more complicated than they are. Let’s play by our rules and accept that Ukraine goes wherever it wants and everyone goes wherever they want”. However, by “wherever they want” they meant Western structures. That’s the heart of the issue. If the rules are going to be written together again in a similar way, that’s a big problem. Thus, maybe it would be much better if instead of rules, some new reality would emerge based on the objectively existing situation taking place in the military operations.

Oleg Yanovsky: Would this be equivalent to a just world order?

Ivan Timofeev: We are not talking about justice here; this is an objective world order or even a regional order, since this problem is currently localized in Europe. We are likely to end up in a situation of mutual deterrence, asymmetric bipolarity with Russia and the West being two opposing poles, but at least it will be based on a new status quo. What we had before will be a qualitatively different past. This situation will be uncomfortable for many people, especially for those who have lived in that environment for a long time, but that will be a different new reality which is to be managed. If you conduct foreign policy and deal with international relations as a professional, you are like a doctor: you cannot be upset because your patient has died. You feel sorry for him, but you can’t compromise your professional acumen and gut feeling because of that. It’s the same here; international relations are ethically a difficult and complex process. Not everything is defined by ethics. There are wars, intelligence services, industrial competition, industrial espionage. Everything is very difficult here.

Oleg Yanovsky: Plus, there’s the threat of annihilation.

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, and the threat of annihilation. You can say all you want, that we are living in the 20^th century or in the 21^st century. Yes, we are living at a different stage of civilizational evolution, but there is still this struggle for survival. If you are a professional, you must realize that this is serious, and you must take this reality—this whole “kitchen”—as it is and act in the best interests of your nation.

Oleg Yanovsky: Since you mentioned the organized minority, I can’t help but ask a question about the well-organized minority and the not-so-well-organized majority. In public and international political discourse, there tends to be a clear divide that separates the world into two camps. On the one side, we have—as we now call it—the collective West. It includes a group of states and a certain horizontal structure of institutions, nations, bureaucracy, and business. They all act as a united front, all dictating unified rules to obey. On the other hand, we have the Global South, who consists of the global majority, a group of sovereign nations that don’t quite want to accept Western influence or have them dictated to them. However, they accept certain things anyway, because they don’t really have any other options. So, is the collective West equivalent to this organized minority that opposes the disorganized Global South majority? Or is there no majority, only Russia and China? Are Russia and China truly working together?

Ivan Timofeev: Sometimes I use the term “collective West” and have even referred to it in this interview. However, the situation when it became collective is, strictly speaking, a historical anomaly. For centuries, the West has been politically divided. It consists of different camps who have a long history of standing on a pile bones, their own bones. A constant internal, “intra-Western” civil war had been raging for centuries, and Russia had been playing this civil war quite skillfully, occasionally supporting different sides.

Oleg Yanovsky: Classic geopolitics.

Ivan Timofeev: Absolutely, and we did it quite skillfully too. We can say that Napoleon’s invasion of Russia was an invasion of all continental Europe. Back then, England opposed Napoleon and was our ally.

Oleg Yanovsky: But then we immediately turned against England.

Ivan Timofeev: That was later, yes - together with Prussia and Austria. Then we clashed with both England and France in the Crimean War. Fortunately, our diplomacy managed to keep Austria and Prussia from entering the conflict. Yes, they acted with hostile neutrality, and over time this neutrality became more and more hostile. However, they did not become part of the anti-Russian coalition back then. Who should be given due credit? Our diplomacy, among other things. World War I: once again we see two camps, and we were balancing one party against the other. World War II: German invasion, German allies—allies of Nazi Germany—also half of Europe, if not more, working for the Reich. But it’s not all the West: we acted in concert with the Americans, the British, French underground forces. The fact that the West is consolidating today—Western and Eastern Europe, the United States, Canada—should be taken quite seriously and is an exceptional moment.

Oleg Yanovsky: So, are we to blame for this exceptional “collectivity” and are they to blame for our rapprochement with China?

Ivan Timofeev: The fact that Russia and China are now very close partners—if not allies—is a definite defeat for the West, a very serious one at that. I think we played a lesser role in uniting the West, but we definitely put some skin in the game. Western “collectivization” did happen during the Cold War. During this time, we tried to divide the West in a different way than how we had done before. We used to play on contradictions between countries and in the 20^th century we tried to play on ideological contradictions.

Oleg Yanovsky: That’s when the bloc mentality emerged, didn’t it?

Ivan Timofeev: Not only bloc mentality - but we also became the head of the leftist movement. Look at the history of Soviet intelligence. So many people in the West were recruited for ideological reasons. We did not blackmail them or play dirty or lure them in by record paydays. We just used our ideology and our soft power. The Soviet Union was indeed a leader and an ideological authority. The USSR created a leftist camp, but this didn’t help us divide the West. Eastern Europe was part of the Soviet bloc but in the end, it proved to be too weak a project. After the end of the Cold War, we even contributed to cementing this collective West; we were complicit in that process, believing that we too would become part of that community. But we did not. Now the big question for me personally is whether this consolidation is done on an anti-Russian basis. If so, then how durable is it? That’s the question.

Oleg Yanovsky: This certainly does not apply to China.

Ivan Timofeev: China is different; it’s playing its own game. Look at how skillfully the Chinese are at playing with Europe and the European Union: they pursue a separate policy there that is very different from their US policy. We have also tried to play this card, but let’s just say that not everything has worked out. It is not certain that everything will work out for China, but such an attempt is now being made. Therefore, indeed, the West is currently quite a well-organized entity: in terms of institutions there is NATO, in terms of the financial system there are banking transactions and a high intra-bloc discipline. The discipline is less vertical and more horizontal. In this respect, the modern West is a rather unique phenomenon, but this won’t last forever.

Oleg Yanovsky: What do you think about the global majority? Do you believe in it?

Ivan Timofeev: This is a good question, because we often use this concept now-a-days. There is an illusion that the global majority—the world majority—is a consolidated bloc that wants to free itself from the “yoke of the West”. We are allegedly the vanguard, and we are looked upon as a beacon of light. I would be only glad if this were true, but unfortunately while working closely with others from world majority nations, I realize that it is not the case. These countries also have different elites, different movements. If we take China, there is a part of the Chinese elite that is quite solidly integrated into global supply chains and financial transactions; it is not pro-Western, but it is more globalist. There are also a more nationally oriented elites who have their own movements, their own internal competing ideas over the direction of China’s foreign policy. There is also a part of India that is quite Western-oriented, especially with the younger generation.

Oleg Yanovsky: Which sees the US as a strategic partner.

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, many view the United States and the European Union as strategic partners. A certain part of India’s elite is more nationally oriented towards them. Each country of the world majority has its own relations with the West. Out of all major world nations, Russia is the only one who has entered an open and serious conflict with the West, because of the contradictions that have been brewing since the Cold War and the changing dynamics of our relations with the West. Unfortunately, this struggle for rights or for fairer positions is not shared by the global majority currently. However, India, China, and Brazil do say that they are also in favor of a multipolar world, and they so want to see the emergence of different poles rather than a unipolar world. If you look at certain US publications, even Americans themselves write that the world is already objectively multipolar. This is stated by quite respectable people.

Oleg Yanovsky: The British have written this into their foreign policy strategy.

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, they have. So, it’s as if they are promoting our views.

Oleg Yanovsky: It’s as if we won the information war.

Ivan Timofeev: Well, we are still a long way from winning. Russia has done much in this regard. There is a massive information war raging in this realm.

Oleg Yanovsky: Most definitely, especially for the global majority.

Ivan Timofeev: Yes, the global majority too—for people’s minds. This requires many resources, and I would say that in recent years we have rethought the importance of this problem. That is, we are approaching this problem much more seriously as a nation, dealing with it in a more systematic manner. The fact that there is a struggle, that the influence of the Western narrative can be discerned in world majority countries, this is absolutely certain. People often ask me what we should do about it. What can be done to counteract misinformation? On the one hand, it seems only rational to come up with our own narrative, but not only this. Our mission as scholars is not just to reproduce some pro-Russian narrative. Our mission is to counter the information, the propaganda that is aimed against us with facts. For example, I work with sanctions. When I visit large world majority countries and meet with their bankers, they often say: “We are afraid of secondary sanctions, we will not work with you”. In turn, I say: “I understand secondary sanctions and know the specific of sanction cases. I have personally studied them all. Let’s look at where exactly secondary sanctions pose a threat to transactions, what we can and cannot do. We have no desire to push you into any risky ventures. Let’s look from a factual perspective where we can cooperate”. Here, the conversation immediately takes a different turn. It moves away from the clichés they read in the news to the language of specifics. Then there are experts and specialists who may know some things but do not know everything. We explain everything with facts in hand. The approach to work then becomes completely pragmatic. This is our mission. People ask me, what’s the use of scholars? Now, you see now how scholars can help. This is our very serious foreign policy task—to use the language of facts to communicate with our foreign partners and counterparties on another level, to move it from the imposed language of clichés to a more pragmatic language.

Oleg Yanovsky: In the context of sanctions, I remember, there was quite a famous report published in 2018, “Measuring Geopolitical Risks”. It had an interesting point: the threat of geopolitical instability—or any threat for that matter—has a much more destabilizing effect on businesses and economic sustainability than the realization of a fait accompli. One of the tools the West uses in the context of sanctions, especially secondary sanctions, is the threat that these sanctions may destroy everything, instead of directly imposing those sanctions. Since we discussed the global majority, keeping in mind that secondary sanctions are primarily directed against these nations, what does their current sanctions policy look like? It is probably one of the main tools used by the West. What are the differences between primary and secondary sanctions? What is happening in the realm of secondary sanctions?

Ivan Timofeev: The term “secondary sanctions” is used by everyone, with a clear tone of apprehension, especially by those in the business community.

Oleg Yanovsky: Businesses fear them most.

Ivan Timofeev: This is natural and is absolutely justified, because if blocking sanctions are imposed on a company, it will either die or will face big problems. If sanctions are focused on global supply chains, on some transactions or foreign economic activity, they will bring a significant toll on this company.

It is this fear that makes people obey US law, or state law. But when we start talking with businesspeople—representatives of banks and companies—I ask them: what do you mean by secondary sanctions? Where do your laws cover this concept? What are they? EU Council Regulation 833? Or Regulation 269? Or is it Executive Order 14-02, or another US presidential executive order? There are elements of what we call secondary sanctions, but the concept itself is not unpacked. The conversation stops there because this concept is absent from legal documents. That is, we are dealing with a kind of artificial concept.

Oleg Yanovsky: A psychological game?

Ivan Timofeev: It is not a psychological game, but a certain intellectual construct that exists. You must understand that it did not legally come into existence, but rather from practice. The very fact that you pose such a question brings people out of fear and stupor; it makes them think. I believe one of the most important aspects of talking to our friends and partners abroad is to rationalize their fears, as well as ours. When you are afraid of something and you rationalize that fear, you start to think things through—what’s the reason for that fear, what exactly is the threat? You start breaking it down into components; the brain turns on and you simply don’t have time to be afraid.

Oleg Yanovsky: Diplomatic psychotherapy?

Ivan Timofeev:
Ending Western Domination Is Key to the Emerging World Order. Here’s What Needs to Be Done to Achieve It

Ivan Timofeev: It’s psychotherapy, its rationalization, a lot of psychology is involved. People then have a completely different working attitude. We have defined what we mean by secondary sanctions. How are they applied? Are there any precedents? Against which countries? What kind of companies fall under these secondary sanctions? Are there any major players that fall under secondary sanctions? Practically no. There is another hypothesis—that only “bogus firms” or shell corporations can be hit by secondary sanctions, or some small companies. Yet even here I would argue that such is not the case. We have analyzed US secondary sanctions over the last year and a half—their number has grown significantly—about 400 cases. What kind of companies are affected? True, some are specifically designed to circumvent the sanctions, but there are also many “middle firms”. Medium-sized businesses in China, for example, operational industrial technology companies fall under these secondary sanctions. Next, we look at which industries are most often hit by sanctions. We have an answer to that question: companies working with dual technologies, military products, as well as a broader range of goods have not been crippled by secondary sanctions so far. This does not mean that they will never be targeted, but so far secondary sanctions have not been used against them. People ask me: what should we do? Again, I distinguish between different companies and industries because each specific case is to be considered separately and no universal recipe exists. Globally, at the national level, we have taken several correct steps. This includes the creation of a national payment system, a system for transmitting financial messages. Such macro solutions allow us to mitigate the effects of sanctions. In each industry, business, and transaction we need to look at the specifics and then determine what to do based on the information we have on secondary sanctions. This should be the result of impartial academic research, not some high-brow abstract theory, a specific study of each case of their application and not speculation.

Oleg Yanovsky: Do we have any goals to create some kind of alternative institutional framework that can exist outside the Western system? Not to fight sanctions, not to conduct “explanatory work”, but just create a new system where these problems will simply not exist? Obviously, sanctions won’t be lifted any time soon.

Ivan Timofeev: It would be great if that happened. We realized that there should have been an alternative system put in place even before 2022. It’s also clear that Russia cannot create this system alone.

Oleg Yanovsky: Are there those who would like to work with us in creating this system or not yet?

Ivan Timofeev: We are now in the most difficult position, because we are at the forefront of the current crisis. The rest of the world majority countries are waiting to see how Russia will get out of this mess, how the whole thing will end. In turn, we tell them: “You can be next. Let’s think about creating a new system”. Their response: “Let’s do it, but we have our own relations with the West, and we benefit from the dollar”. We are now promoting the idea of alternative financial settlements via BRICS—a non-confrontational idea. It should not be to the detriment of the arrangements other nations already have in place with the West, but in parallel to them. Objectively, these requests for an alternative framework are emerging. On the one hand, they are born out of our new relations with China and India, out of settlements in national currencies. This is something that is happening and is objectively emerging outside the West. Not in large volumes yet, but it’s there. The Russian experience of trading under sanctions will show that it is possible to work with a large country without Western involvement. This experience is being gained. As for what to do next: that remains to be seen. I think that the real craftsmanship that is required of us, since there is no other way out, is not to make this revolution on our own and by our own efforts. Rather, we must utilize these global trends, flows and requests of major world players. In other words, “harness” those trends. There are US technological sanctions imposed on China. In response, China created a double circulation system. There is some opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative. These are all processes that do not come from Russia. Can we somehow use them? Of course we can, and we need to get involved.

Our partners also have pragmatic interests and concerns. For example, India buys large volumes of Russian crude oil. Yes, at a discount, but if this market did not exist, it would be much worse. Oil is refined in India and some of those petroleum products are then supplied to the European market. We can use this pragmatic interest of our Indian partners to promote our own interests. This is a win-win situation.

Oleg Yanovsky: Nice example. Something else that interests me is the emergence of a parallel structure. Major problems of this structure are linked human resources and the fact that it is in the “gray zone”, so to say. The fleet that we have created, as well as the deliveries and how they occur largely bypass various regulatory aspects. In turn, this generates, first of all, new prices for the product. As for the fleet: there is also the issue of insurance and safety. Another concern involves staffing: if you work in a firm that interacts with Russia, you won’t get a job in a “decent” company afterwards, plus you’ll be paid less. If you work for a bank that handles these payments, then no “decent” bank will ever employ you. In your opinion, how can we make this system legitimate and take it out of the “piracy” zone?

Ivan Timofeev: Piracy for whom? For the West and West-centered systems. The global insurance market is mainly in the UK. For objective reasons, we cannot use its insurance services, because sanctions have closed them for us. We have no other option but to create an alternative mechanism with our partners. Markets, banking transactions—we cannot use dollars to the extent we did earlier. We must look for something else, we have no other way out.

Russia has a large economy, you can speculate all you want about the 2% of GDP, etc., but objectively, in terms of volume, Russia is a huge country with a large market, and we are a major player in supplying resources. Of course, it is not comparable to China or the US, but we are a big enough player not to be ignored. As a major player we are building relationships, adapting to the hostile environment. That is why for British insurance firms, our fleet is seen as a “shadow fleet” but isn’t for us. For Russia, it is just our fleet, our ships. We are forced to hide their identification numbers, because international structures are politicized; they are not impartial as they were meant to be. Through them, data is learned and obstacles to our supplies are mounted. We are forced to adapt to this situation. For us, the “shadow fleet” is just a fleet; a means to get our goods from point A to point B. The main thing is for our regulator to know where which ship is currently located, what particular vessel this is, etc., so that taxes are paid to our treasury. That way these “shadow fleets”—now a tool in adapting to sanctions—are not so “shadow-like” for our government. That way, everything is transparent to us.

Oleg Yanovsky: If our government does not know and there is no transparency, it means we have submitted to Western logic in a way.

Ivan Timofeev: If our government lacks knowledge, we’ll lose a lot as a nation. As for work prestige, working in Russia and cooperating with Russia is indeed a stigma that is now actively exploited in the West. Many people do it without any manipulation—here is your “white ticket” and please do not knock on the doors of our “decent house” anymore. But given that our country is very large, with a huge market—and by no means exotic—there are people who realize that it is possible to work and earn simple money here. Some people—so far only a few—come here for work, like farmers, etc. For now, there are isolated success stories, but they do exist. I know of many more cases where people simply want to earn money here: to develop our market, to sell their goods here, to build their supply chains in Russia. The Western market is much more divided, and it is much harder to break into it. There are more and more people who agree to work in the Russian market to the detriment of the Western market. True, it is not all that easy in Russia either; you cannot earn capital easily, but with a certain amount of energy and perseverance, it is possible. Russia is a country of opportunities. In many ways, Russia is a market that has not been fully discovered yet. There are many cliches about Russia, but we have a lot of opportunities.

Oleg Yanovsky: Most of these myths are supported in the West.

Ivan Timofeev: These myths are self-replicating. The West would be happy to colonize our market; we have even been promoting this colonization for thirty years. Now this colonization has stopped for objective reasons and the West itself is winding it down. Today there is an opportunity to develop the Russian market in a different way. Those willing to do this will keep coming in at even greater numbers. Russia remains to be a “normal country” in terms of day-to-day life. There is no excessive adherence to some marginal ideology here; people want to be happy, to live in prosperity, to have their own homes, to be normal people. There is no utopian bizarre ideology in Russia that is thrust upon the Russian people. There is no wage-leveling or oppression on any grounds. Russia has a very tolerant society, one that is quite mobile but with its own complexities– a society that leaves a lot of room for autonomy. This is a paradox: to some extent, there is less autonomy in Western societies than in ours. It is commonly believed [in the West] that “there is autocracy in Russia, while democracy exists only in their nations. Yet it turns out that the “pockets” for autonomy and self-fulfillment are wider in Russia.

Oleg Yanovsky: What is the overall situation with sanctions? Is a full-scale trade blockade possible?

Ivan Timofeev: A lot of things have already been imposed on us. I would say that in terms of our trade with the West. Many sectors are blocked: supplies of our resources, supplies of dual-use goods to Russia—in this alone there are hundreds of sanctioned trade items. It would be easier to name what has not yet been banned. Though are case is not like in Iran, when the United States completely banned exports and imports to and from the country, but nevertheless, the conditions are rather squalid. The West, however, will not succeed in imposing a global trade blockade on Russia. They were able to impose a partial oil blockade on Iran, threatened secondary sanctions to those who would buy Iranian oil. The same could be imposed on Russia, but they are afraid to do so. Yes, there are many sanctions, but it will be difficult to isolate Russia globally for all the above reasons: we have a larger economy, a larger country, a huge market. Russia will simply not be isolated. In sanctions literature, there is a concept known as “black knights”—a country that works with a nation which is the target of a sanction regime, that helps defy the countries which impose sanctions. Given that the world remains competitive, these “black knights” will also appear for Russia—they already exist.

Oleg Yanovsky: Objectively, have these anti-Russia sanctions worked? What about in terms of undermining the Russian society?

Ivan Timofeev: Much depends on what the purpose is. We can answer this question in terms of political theory. One school of thought says that sanctions are effective if they have affected the orientation of the country’s policy. From this perspective, sanctions against Russia are ineffective, because we have not changed our foreign policy, but tightened and toughened it instead. Another purpose of sanctions might be to instigate discontent or civil unrest within the country. Many sanctions have been imposed against Russian business, contributing to its repatriation. Prior to sanctions, large businesses used to earn money in Russia and take it abroad to keep the money there. In a sense, “global Russian businesses” were common; you earn money in Russia, but live elsewhere. There was an opinion that hitting real estate and capital would rally Russian businesses against the government, but it turns out that they actually hit the tool that Russia could have used to manipulate these wealthy people. We even joke and say that those in the West who came up with the idea to take such measures should be decorated with Russian orders and medals, because no Russian statesman could have done more to repatriate businesses and make them flee from the West and move back to Russia than those very measures. Of course, sanctions have inflicted economic damage and severed ties, but Russian business elites never took the steps that the West expected of them. Where before many elites considered Russia to be some kind of dangerous jurisdiction, now Russia is the only safe harbor to they can return to and to keep their money in.

Oleg Yanovsky: Where else are Russian businesses safe from persecution, either morally or in terms of capital?

Ivan Timofeev:
Hybrid War and Hybrid Peace

Ivan Timofeev: You can go to other non-Western markets, but a person who has escaped having their assets frozen or seized will be scared anywhere they go. It is very hard to endure psychologically. In this respect, there has really been a revolution.

In terms of damage, sanctions have caused damage and continue to do so. There should be no illusions here. Of course, we’ve managed to stabilize the macroeconomic situation. Special credit should be given to the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, our economic bloc which operated very skillfully. At the most critical moment in February-March 2022, they were the ones who stabilized the situation and gave it their all. It was not only them, of course, but regardless, the damage was done, even though this had a sobering effect to a certain extent. There was an initial shock in 2022, but in 2023, adaptation commenced: businesses either died out or sought new markets, new suppliers, new everything. Our businesses were on the lookout, active and robust and it’s been finding ways out of current predicaments. There is a perception that our emerging products are more expensive and are of lower quality, but this is better than nothing. Sooner or later, they will become less costly and quality will improve.

Oleg Yanovsky: Another situation like sanctions involves the seizure and expropriation of Russian assets. For a very long time, the United States did not agree to this, as did Europe and the IMF generally objected. Yet in time, it happened. What does this mean for the system per se? In essence, it seems like the West is shooting itself in the foot, as the system is based on trusting Western institutions to ensure the safety of capital in any event. Will this trigger a reaction from the global majority? Will they also be afraid that their capital might be taken away from and withdraw it? Or is it because of that fear of seizure that they follow the West’s lead?

Ivan Timofeev: This is a very important question, and we need to approach it from a “know your options” perspective. The situation is in different stages of development in different countries. Canada has a tool it may use to confiscate the frozen property of individuals and countries under sanctions and to transfer it to Ukraine. The legislation does not specify Ukraine per se, but it says, “to the country that suffered as a result of military action”. That is, Canada has a mechanism, and it is being further developed, but there are few confiscation precedents. They confiscated assets—worth USD 28 million—from a major businessman, and even confiscated Russian aircraft, but for now they have not gone further than that. In the European Union, the first outlines of this mechanism have appeared, but so far there is only a tool that can be used to seize interest generated by Russian sovereign assets, not the assets per se. Otherwise it would be necessary to revise critical EU documents and policies, as well as the constitutions of some EU member states. Overall, confiscation has partially appeared and perhaps it will be further developed.

Some in the EU have proposed to seize Russian sovereign assets and send them to Ukraine to avoid sending taxpayer money there. The EU has more Russian sovereign assets than anyone else, over USD 200 billion worth. The US has recently passed an act that authorizes the head of state to seize Russian sovereign assets and transfer them to Ukraine. This act gives the president fairly broad powers to enforce it. It does not oblige him to do so, but it gives him a free hand. Confiscation may last twenty years, or it can be accomplished at one go. There is some uncertainty about how the law will be enforced. But the US only has about USD 5 billion worth of Russian assets and clearly there will be no more. Those assets are finite. Let’s say they do transfer these assets to Ukraine. Given the scale of current military operations, it wouldn’t affect anything. Current aid to Ukraine amounts to USD 60 billion, so it would not solve any problems here either. The EU does not yet have a mechanism to withdraw Russian assets worth over USD 200 billion, and Europeans will think twice before doing anything like given the legal obstacles and fears of losing Chinese investors, Saudi investors, etc. This does not mean that we can relax. We need to prepare for the worst-case scenario; that tomorrow the confiscation tool will snap into action and these sovereign assets will be confiscated. But these funds can be kept frozen for centuries without confiscation. We must proceed from the reality that we simply won’t get those assets back in the coming decades and that’s what really matters. The other question is whether these will be transferred to Ukraine. Regardless of how things turn out, we will not see this money. We’ve lost USD 300 billion. We need to understand it clearly and cautiously warn our colleagues in friendly countries that a similar situation may happen to their assets as well so that they understand this and take it into account. The Russian case has crept into the consciousness of all investors. What will be the consequences? I don’t think there will be a revolution in global finance because of this, but this is something that everyone has clearly taken note of.

Oleg Yanovsky: As for our final question, we have tried to appeal to reason and facts and use a scholarly approach in addressing this crisis. With this in mind, what does victory look like to you?

Ivan Timofeev: Actually, the matter is rather complicated. We can talk about victory in military terms, but we can also talk about it in a broader sense regarding our relations with the West. Since military action is the result of a broader palette of factors tied to our relations with the West, I would start from what we are unlikely to see and what we should have no illusions about. We should be under no illusion that we will be able to form common rules of the game with the West. The practice of mutual deterrence will continue in the decades to come, and we will continue to live in a state of confrontation. With this confrontation, victory for us will take the shape of a good economy, a strong society, and our nation succeeding outside Western-centric globalization. If we manage to ensure long-term macroeconomic stability, a normal life, and functional markets—and do so by working with the world majority to circumvent Western-centered global system—this will be our victory.

Video (In Russian)