The Stabilizing “Basic Principles”: Moscow Reduces Options for Pre-Nuclear Escalation

On November 19, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Executive Order Approving the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. The new nuclear doctrine incorporates the changes announced by Mr. Putin at a meeting on nuclear deterrence on September 25, 2024. What is the main difference between the new doctrine and the previous version? How can the new doctrine affect strategic security? What reaction will the US have to the publication of this doctrine? Answering these questions are Russia’s leading experts in arms and international security: Oleg Krivolapov, Head of the Department of Military-Political Research at the Institute for US and Canadian Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dmitry Stefanovich, Research Fellow at the Center for International Security, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS); Vadim Kozyulin, Head of the Center for Global Studies & International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Pyotr Topychkanov, Head of Section for New Challenges in South and Southeast Asia at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS); Dmitri Trenin, Academic Supervisor of the Institute of World Military Economy and Strategy at HSE University, RIAC member; and Prokhor Tebin, Director of the Center for Military-Economic Studies, IWMES HSE University.

On November 19, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Executive Order Approving the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. The new nuclear doctrine incorporates the changes announced by Mr. Putin at a meeting on nuclear deterrence on September 25, 2024. What is the main difference between the new doctrine and the previous version? How can the new doctrine affect strategic security? What reaction will the US have to the publication of this doctrine? Answering these questions are Russia’s leading experts in arms and international security: Oleg Krivolapov, Head of the Department of Military-Political Research at the Institute for US and Canadian Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dmitry Stefanovich, Research Fellow at the Center for International Security, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS); Vadim Kozyulin, Head of the Center for Global Studies & International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Pyotr Topychkanov, Head of Section for New Challenges in South and Southeast Asia at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS); Dmitri Trenin, Academic Supervisor of the Institute of World Military Economy and Strategy at HSE University, RIAC member; and Prokhor Tebin, Director of the Center for Military-Economic Studies, IWMES HSE University..

Dmitry Stefanovich:
What Will Change in a New Edition of Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine?

What Are the Main Differences Between Russia’s New And Old Nuclear Doctrines?

Oleg Krivolapov, Head of the Department of Military-Political Research at the Institute for US and Canadian Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences

Some argue that ambiguity in nuclear deterrence is necessary in order to leave potential adversaries unaware of actual red lines, thus preventing them from making reckless moves that could lead to a nuclear war. This approach is fully shared, for example, by the United States, which does not specify the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, reserving the right to decide what constitutes the exceptional circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons based on a broader situation.

Russia does not reject ambiguity in nuclear deterrence either. For example, the doctrine mentions the massive launch of missiles and other means of aerospace attack. What is to be considered massive and on what targets attacked might necessitate a nuclear response, the Russian leadership will make respective decisions according to circumstances.

However, the fact that the Russian leadership further details its vision of the main military dangers, and the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, should convey to potential adversaries that (1) Moscow will not use nuclear weapons except in response to the specified forms of aggression against Russia, and (2) Moscow is confident in its ability to inflict irreparable damage on the aggressor under any turn of events. According to the nuclear deterrence theory, this confidence should prevent the adversary from taking steps that it could have taken in the mistaken belief that Moscow is about to use nuclear weapons.

Some new wording incorporated in the new the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence became known as early as September 2024.

The essence of nuclear deterrence:

— Aggression against Russia and/or its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state will be considered as a joint attack.

Conditions for the use of nuclear weapons:

— Aggression against the Russian Federation and/or Belarus using conventional weapons that poses a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity. This likely explains the notion of a “threat to the very existence of the nation”, which was earlier used in this paragraph.

— Information about a massive launch of strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles, UAVs, hypersonic and other aircraft and their crossing of the Russian Federation’s state border.

Other changes were not made known until after publication.

The essence of nuclear deterrence:

— Aggression of any state from a military coalition against Russia and/or its allies is to be construed as aggression of this coalition in its entirety.

This is likely to be a clause on the inadmissibility of using troops by any single NATO member country in hostilities against the Russian Federation or Belarus, presenting it as a private initiative of this country without any coordination with Brussels. Thus, Moscow is reducing the options for escalation at the pre-nuclear level.

Major military dangers have been added:

— Anti-satellite assets in space.

In addition to the references noted in the previous doctrine to the danger of missile defense and strike systems in space:

— Actions of a potential enemy aimed at isolating any part of Russia’s territory, including blocking access to vital transportation communications.

Likely, this is a warning against any attempts to cut off Kaliningrad. It can also be seen as a reduction of escalation options at the pre-nuclear level.

— Actions of a potential adversary to destroy environmentally hazardous facilities in Russia.

This refers to the inadmissibility of attacks on nuclear power plants, hydroelectric power plants and other similar facilities, whose destruction might lead to mass casualties.

— Planning and conducting large-scale military exercises near the Russian Federation’s borders

This can also be seen as a reduction of escalation options at the pre-nuclear level.

Among the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons:

— Use of WMD strikes on the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies, on military formations and/or facilities of the Russian Federation outside its territory.

The latter likely refers to the inadmissibility of attacks on Russian forces and assets still stationed in Syria and Russian war ships in the world ocean in order to use them as an escalation step within the limited use of nuclear weapons.

Dmitry Stefanovich, Research Fellow at the Center for International Security, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS)

The main difference, perhaps, is the formalization of “threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity” rather than “threats to the very existence of the state” as something that nuclear deterrence is called to prevent and that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, this phrasing has been used before in relation to the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. Also worth mentioning is the introduction and rather detailed listing of various means of aerospace attacks, in which nuclear weapons can be used in response. The disappearance of the phrase “arms control” from the “Basic Principles” is also worth noting, although in general, international treaties and norms of international law have been retained. The issues of allied obligations have also expanded, along with mentioning a full-fledged “nuclear umbrella” over Belarus combined with an emphatic preservation of control over nuclear weapons outside the national territory. At the same time, “nuclear immunity” is removed from non-nuclear countries that could attack Russia with the support of nuclear powers, as well as from non-nuclear participants in “nuclear alliances”, up to the phrase “an attack by one means an attack by all.” The mention of strikes using nuclear weapons or other types of WMD against Russian bases or forces outside Russian territory, which could also lead to the use of Russian nuclear weapons, also catches the eye. The previously existing principle of nuclear deterrence continuity up to the use of nuclear weapons has remained intact. What may come after such use is still a matter of question, but it is unlikely to be anything good.

Vadim Kozyulin, Head of the Center for Global Studies & International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

While the 2020 doctrine described the use of nuclear weapons in a hypothetical conflict, the 2024 doctrine has been reworked and finalized from the position of a nation involved in an acute conflict and that faces a harsh unfriendly environment. Under the new conditions, it became necessary to specify the deterrence objects more exactly, as well as the list of “major military dangers” that significantly expanded.

Particularly noteworthy is the added scenario of using nuclear weapons, according to which the condition for the transition to the use of nuclear weapons could be “the receipt of credible information about the massive launch (takeoff) of aerospace attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial assets) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation. In fact, it is possible to recall situations from the recent past that could serve as such a pretext.

Behind the new nuclear “Basic Principles” one can see specific addressees. This is especially clear in clause 11: “Aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear power shall be regarded as their joint attack”.

Pyotr Topychkanov, Head of Section for New Challenges in South and Southeast Asia at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS)

Much has already been written by representatives of the government and expert circles about the main differences between the old and new nuclear doctrines. According to the new edition of the doctrine, Russia has broadened its understanding of the threats that can be countered by nuclear deterrence. The text combines threats against Russia and Belarus. The authors of the doctrine point to the possible use of nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear states as well, if they engage in aggression with the support of nuclear powers. A large part of the doctrine highlighting military dangers, which in themselves are not a reason to use nuclear weapons, but “which, depending on changes in the politico-military and strategic situation, may develop into military threats”, is notable. Some of these dangers describe the current situation, and some of them describe probabilities that do not look fantastical under current conditions. Perhaps the purpose of listing the dangers is to send a signal to Western nations about what Russia considers as dangerous phenomena and trends that could lead to nuclear escalation. One of the central elements inherited from previous versions of the doctrine is the assertion that the use of nuclear weapons is an extreme and compulsory measure, and that Russia is doing everything possible to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent the aggravation of interstate relations that could provoke nuclear conflicts. The repetition of this element is important because it confirms the fact that Russia shares the view with other nuclear powers that nuclear weapons are “doomsday weapons”. This reaffirmation serves as a stabilizing factor for nuclear deterrence relations between Russia and its nuclear rivals, especially amid domestic and foreign discussions justifying the use of nuclear weapons either on the battlefield or for precautionary purposes.

Dmitri Trenin, Academic Supervisor of the Institute of World Military Economy and Strategy at HSE University, RIAC member

The new version of the “the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” is the Russian military and political leadership’s response to the challenge of an indirect proxy war of the West against Russia. The previous version of the doctrine, approved in 2020, was based on different ideas about the nature and content of wars in which modern Russia could participate. A war in Europe, for example, was seen as unlikely at the time. It was also believed that Russia’s impressive arsenal of nuclear deterrence practically excluded aggression against it by NATO states.

It turned out, however, that the holy fear of nuclear weapons, which had prevented World War III between the USSR and the United States, largely dissipated in the years following the end of the Cold War. Moreover, during the Ukrainian crisis, the US and Western nations demonstrated extremely risky behavior that they had not allowed themselves to do with respect to the USSR.

For example, in the 1960s-1980s, it did not occur to Western strategists and policymakers to declare the goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, as this was considered a sign of insanity at the time.

Thus, in the course of the SMO, Russia felt the need to strengthen deterrence in order to enhance the effect of intimidating the enemy, depriving it of any illusions of impunity for its actions. The changes made to Russia’s nuclear doctrine serve this very purpose.

The updated doctrine expands the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. An attack on Russia by a non-nuclear state acting in concert with a nuclear power will henceforth be seen as a joint aggression.

Furthermore, an aerospace attack with the massive use of ballistic or cruise missiles, UAVs, etc.—regardless of their capabilities—will be considered as an ample condition for a nuclear strike.

Finally, aggression against Belarus—with the use of nuclear or only conventional weapons—presupposes a nuclear response to the aggressor’s actions from the Russian side.

Backed by a live test of the Oreshnik missile system, these innovations are a more serious warning to Russia’s adversaries than the cautions Moscow issued in the past.

Prokhor Tebin, Ph.D. in Political Science, Director of the Center for Military-Economic Studies, IWMES HSE University

The need for certain adjustments to the “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” has long been overdue. The recent doctrine does not bring any revolutionary changes. All innovations are rather evolutionary in nature. The changes reflect the transformation of the international landscape, political-military, military-strategic and military-technical factors. First of all, this concerns the ongoing indirect conflict between Russia and the collective West led by the United States. Given the problems the AFU is facing in its military operations, the West—especially the Kiev regime—is nevertheless ready for further escalation. The nuclear threshold in the new version of the “Basic Principles” has been lowered, but this has been done in a very restrained and responsible manner, taking the recent events into account.

The key changes were announced as early as September 25, at the Permanent Meeting of the Security Council on Nuclear Deterrence. Particularly worth noting is the provision on nuclear guarantees to Belarus in the event of aggression, even if only using conventional weapons.

Apart from the additional conditions for Russia’s transition to the use of nuclear weapons announced on September 25, the rest of the new provisions in the latest edition of the “Basic Principles” address rather narrow and specific issues, but it is good that they have been clarified in the new version. This concerns the included list of military dangers that are to be neutralized by nuclear deterrence, such as: hitting environmentally sensitive facilities, isolating part of Russia’s territory, blocking access to vital transport communications, as well as the deployment of medium-range and short-range missiles, hypersonic weapons, and so on. The replacement of the phrase “the very existence of the state is jeopardized” with “a critical threat to sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity” is commendable.

In general, the new version of the “Basic Principles” contributes to improving the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, corresponds to the nature of changes that have occurred since the adoption of the previous version of the document in 2020, and performs an important role in raising awareness for potential adversaries, as well as Russia’s allies and partners. Many issues have been explained and clarified, but at the same time the document retains a significant degree of ambiguity, representing an important principle of nuclear deterrence that makes planning more difficult for adversaries while giving greater decision-making flexibility to Russia’s leadership. It is worth noting that the United States adheres to the same approach.

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How Can Russia’s Updated Nuclear Doctrine Affect Strategic Security?

Dmitry Stefanovich, Research Fellow at the Center for International Security, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS)

Lowering the nuclear threshold is unlikely to have a positive impact in itself; however, in the context of acute confrontation between Russia and the “collective West”, the collapse of the arms control system, and the quantitative and qualitative development of the nuclear arsenals by many powers, the role of the updated “Basic Principles” may prove to be stabilizing. Nuclear weapons have returned as a central factor in international military-political relations; it has been demonstrated that this is not a theoretical subject, but a practical, “living” and evolving realm that could be of some practical use. This is again an excellent pretext for discussing doctrinal guidelines—for example, in the format of the Nuclear Five.

Vadim Kozyulin, Head of the Center for Global Studies & International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The threshold for using nuclear weapons has been noticeably lowered, but at the same time, the “Basic Principles” have become more specific, and the “red lines” have been clearly defined in the latest version of this doctrine.

Moscow is sending very clear signals. This clarity relieves strategic security of some uncertainty that had existed before. At the same time, there are absolutely no free rungs left on the “escalation ladder”. Thus, the parties to the current conflict must exercise extreme caution.

It is noteworthy that the new version drops the phrase “compliance with international arms control obligations” as one of the nuclear deterrence principles.

Pyotr Topychkanov, Head of Section for New Challenges in South and Southeast Asia at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS)

The tentative title of the new doctrine could be “Nuclear Doctrine of the SMO Era” because it reflects the increased range of dangers and threats characteristic of the time of an armed confrontation in Europe, defining the role of nuclear weapons in meeting these challenges. It is hardly possible to assess the doctrine's impact on the state of strategic stability in its regional and global dimensions in isolation from developments in the situation. For example, the test launch of the new Oreshnik system capable of carrying nuclear weapons in combat conditions on November 21 “highlighted” the nuclear doctrine in terms of the possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states whose aggression is supported by nuclear powers. Since the situation keeps changing, the role of this doctrine will further evolve. For example, before the aforementioned test launch, a number of Western experts were critical of the doctrine’s text. After November 21, more voices called for closer attention to the signals from Moscow, including those reflected in the doctrine.

Regardless of the situation, there is one aspect of the doctrine that has obviously had a positive impact on strategic stability. It is transparency, to the extent possible, in the process of preparation, approval and publication of the updated doctrine. Rather than piling more uncertainty, provoking likely adversaries to speculate about the nuclear doctrine, or creating fertile ground for erroneous assessments of Russia’s nuclear capabilities, intentions, and plans, Russia has opted for transparency in the preparation, approval, and publication of the updated doctrine.

Dmitri Trenin, Academic Supervisor of the Institute of World Military Economy and Strategy at HSE University, RIAC member

The updated Russian doctrine is designed to break the escalation strategy that our adversaries in Ukraine have been pursuing since 2022. If we do not limit Western involvement in the war now, a direct clash between NATO member states and Russia would be inevitable. This clash could lead to a global catastrophe, which our leadership seeks to prevent. If the enemy does not come to its senses, the next rungs of the escalation ladder will be to strike sensitive targets of the states whose weapons are used against Russia.

Prokhor Tebin, Ph.D. in Political Science, Director of the Center for Military-Economic Studies, IWMES HSE University

The hope that the new version of the “Basic Principles” will do its part in preventing the indirect conflict between Russia and the West from further escalation and help sober up decision-makers in some Western countries remains. At the same time, the rather restrained nature of the “Basic Principles” opens opportunities for dialogue with the new Trump administration, if the latter feels like entering into a pragmatic, constructive conversation about the current situation, taking into account Russia’s national interests and national security. It is equally important to convey Russia’s transparent nuclear doctrine to Russia’s partners in global majority countries. Providing a full-fledged nuclear umbrella to Belarus will contribute to strengthening the security of the Union State in the western strategic direction.

It should be remembered that the “Basic Principles” is only one and quite specific instrument of nuclear deterrence. It ought to be bolstered by other instruments, such as specific measures and activities, including those of a signaling nature. This includes the testing of the Oreshnik nuclear-free hypersonic ballistic missile and Vladimir Putin’s explicit statements on November 21. There is a need for a further progressive advancement of the Russian Armed Forces within the framework of the SMO, aimed at achieving the political and military goals of the operation. Also, an update of Russia’s Military Doctrine and National Security Strategy is long overdue. The long-term strengthening of strategic nuclear forces, non-strategic nuclear weapons capabilities and conventional forces is required, taking into account the potential of Russia’s economy as well as dynamic scientific and technological progress in our country.

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How Might Washington React to Russia’s Updated Nuclear Doctrine?

Oleg Krivolapov, Head of the Department of Military-Political Research at the Institute for US and Canadian Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences

Washington will surely accuse the Russian leadership of using the nuclear threat. Furthermore, the United States may conclude that the room for raising the stakes in the context of the Ukrainian crisis has shrunk. This does not mean that Washington and Brussels will abandon escalation per se. In theory, the outgoing Biden administration could take steps other than authorizing Kiev to use ATACMS missiles against facilities deep inside Russian territory. However, it is less likely that these will be steps explicitly mentioned in the new version of the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.

Dmitry Stefanovich, Research Fellow at the Center for International Security, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS)

I think we will see an emphatic downplaying of the doctrine’s importance for the time being, but the next US administration will most likely prepare an updated Nuclear Posture Review as early as 2025, which will certainly include references to our new doctrine. In practical terms, I hope that our overseas adversaries will “try on” the relevant provisions of the “Basic Principles” for their current and planned actions, but there is little hope of “rolling back” any decisions or revising their military buildup plans. Again, it will be very interesting to look at the actions taken by the Trump administration, given its somewhat different views on the priority areas for the development of the American military machine, including in the nuclear domain. We can assume some “swaps,” including in the format of unilateral steps and statements clarifying both Russian and American approaches.

Vadim Kozyulin, Head of the Center for Global Studies & International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Washington prefers to pretend that there is nothing fundamentally new in the new doctrine. Many Western experts are exercising their wits, and their comments are often ironic. However, everyone realizes that the risks are growing, and the publication of the “Basic Principles” will certainly cool the heads of those who were eager to play with fire. Especially after Moscow backed up its words with a spectacular presentation of the “Oreshnik” missile system with its separating warheads with individual guidance units.

Pyotr Topychkanov, Head of Section for New Challenges in South and Southeast Asia at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS)

Until the new US president takes office, which is just over a month away, the US response may be disorderly and limited. What is important to emphasize is that the US will not react to the doctrine per se, but to the doctrine coupled with Russia’s actions.

Dmitri Trenin, Academic Supervisor of the Institute of World Military Economy and Strategy at HSE University, RIAC member

A unique and extremely dangerous situation now exists in Washington. The outgoing administration of President Joe Biden is ratcheting up tensions in the Ukrainian theater of war, seeking to shirk upon President-elect Donald Trump the responsibility for Biden’s reckless policy toward Russia. Moreover, there are reasonable doubts regarding Biden’s mental faculties. Decisions made in his name are prepared and implemented by people who do not bear any responsibility.

Unfortunately, there is no certainty that this group of individuals will act rationally and refuse to take actions that provoke a direct clash between the US and Russia. It cannot be ruled out that in the weeks remaining before the transfer of power, Russia will be hit again by US long-range weapons, in which case Moscow will have to act in accordance with its updated nuclear doctrine. It may thus be that mankind, six decades after the Cuban Missile Crisis, will have to look into the abyss once again.

Prokhor Tebin, Ph.D. in Political Science, Director of the Center for Military-Economic Studies, IWMES HSE University

Washington reacted to the updated “Basic Principles” with notable restraint. The prospects for improving US-Russia relations should not be exaggerated, but they should not be completely disregarded either. The new administration should be allowed to make its move. In any case, the United States will continue its current policy aimed at containing Russia and China, as well as Iran and the DPRK. The role of the nuclear factor in the US national security strategy has increased. Washington will continue to modernize its strategic nuclear forces and nuclear weapons complex. However, the updated “Basic Principles” should play a role as a tool to simultaneously strengthen deterrence and reduce nuclear risks.

In the future, Russia and the United States need to have a dialogue aimed at least at clarifying that both parties understand the current strategic landscape, along with the new political, strategic, and technical factors affecting strategic stability. At most, they can aim to enhance strategic stability in a broader sense. The Biden administration proposed to go for compartmentalization and to renew the dialogue on strategic arms control. Yet under a proxy conflict between Russia and the West, the constant probing of the enemy’s “red lines” and creeping escalation below the nuclear threshold, compartmentalization of strategic stability issues in the narrow interpretation of this concept is unacceptable for Russia, as the Russian Foreign Ministry has repeatedly stated.

The protracted, destructive and bloody character of the SMO is primarily due to the actions of the West, which unleashed an indirect conflict against Russia in Ukraine. Russia must neutralize the military threat posed by the current Kiev regime on favorable terms, minding Russian national security priorities. At the same time, the US and NATO should be deterred from directly engaging in an open large-scale conflict with Russia, which would inevitably turn into a catastrophe for the entire human race. Approving the updated version of the “Basic Principles” was just one small but important step along this path.