A New Era for the Kurdish Question

Since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established Turkey on October 29, 1923, the Turkish government has not endeavored to establish a democratic republic based on the principle of ethnic equality. The Turkish state's most notable obsession is still the Kurdish question, even after these people have lived in both peace and war together for hundreds of years. The Turkish government's objective has been to defeat the Kurdish freedom movement, which aims to restore Kurdish political and cultural rights, build democracy, and achieve their claims for equality and independence. Article 66 of the Turkish constitution states: “Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.” This approach has affected Turkey's political and economic situation, cementing in the minds of the Turkish people the idea that “Turkey's existence is linked to the end of the Kurdish existence.” The Turkish government has failed to stop the Kurdistan Freedom Movement despite multiple NATO-backed military operations against its strongholds.

The Middle East has been experiencing an upheaval ever since the Second Gulf War. At the start of the twentieth century, Britain and France established nation-states with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. However, after a century, the system is no longer beneficial to the West, becoming a burden because of the significant changes in international affairs and the rise of nations that compete with the United States in the current world order.

By revising its internal policies, the Turkish government is attempting to strengthen its ties with the Kurdish Freedom Movement. One of the most crucial Middle Eastern concerns on which the West, led by Israel and the United States of America, may rely in order to reconstruct the Greater Middle East is the Kurdish question.

Can Turkey's Leadership Make Peace with the Kurdish Freedom Movement?

Since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established Turkey on October 29, 1923, the Turkish government has not endeavored to establish a democratic republic based on the principle of ethnic equality. The Turkish state's most notable obsession is still the Kurdish question, even after these people have lived in both peace and war together for hundreds of years. The Turkish government's objective has been to defeat the Kurdish freedom movement, which aims to restore Kurdish political and cultural rights, build democracy, and achieve their claims for equality and independence. Article 66 of the Turkish constitution states: “Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.” This approach has affected Turkey's political and economic situation, cementing in the minds of the Turkish people the idea that “Turkey's existence is linked to the end of the Kurdish existence.” [1] The Turkish government has failed to stop the Kurdistan Freedom Movement despite multiple NATO-backed military operations against its strongholds.

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The Middle East has been experiencing an upheaval ever since the Second Gulf War. At the start of the twentieth century, Britain and France established nation-states with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. However, after a century, the system is no longer beneficial to the West, becoming a burden because of the significant changes in international affairs and the rise of nations that compete with the United States in the current world order.

By revising its internal policies, the Turkish government is attempting to strengthen its ties with the Kurdish Freedom Movement. One of the most crucial Middle Eastern concerns on which the West, led by Israel and the United States of America, may rely in order to reconstruct the Greater Middle East is the Kurdish question.

The Turkish leadership opposed the Kurdish Freedom Movement and attempted to put an end to it through unsuccessful military measures rather than employing the language of dialogue and bringing about internal peace. Without considering all outcomes, Turkey targeted Abdullah Ocalan, the head of the Kurdistan Workers Party. The plan, beginning on October 9, 1998 – and culminated in Ocalan's kidnapping and arrest on February 15, 1999 – was a pivotal moment in the development of the Greater Middle East. However, by 2005, the Turkish government discovered that Kurdish identity was more alive and thriving than previously. In addition to complicating Turkey’s internal situation, these actions extended the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. The dominating powers (the West) used a strategy of “running with the hare and hunting with the hounds,” as Abdullah Ocalan clarified in his defense.

Turkey’s Double-Edged Sword: Protect Kurds or Sow Discord?

States in the Middle East understand change is coming their way. This is especially true for the countries involved in the Kurdish crisis—Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. The winds of change transformed Iraq from a centralized Baathist administration to a federated one, leaving only Iran and Turkey. Syria is now doing the same. The Turkish government uses these reforms as a response to the Kurdish question, viewing itself as a protector of the Kurds in the "Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood." The Turkish state's policy, led by nationalist movement leader Devlet Bahceli and supported by the Justice and Development Party, does not necessarily reflect a desire for peace; rather, it contributed to the growing discord among Kurdish parties, especially in northern and eastern Syria, hence justifying its military presence in the region.

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Was the Turkish leadership worried about the impending winds of change that would increase Turkey's reliance on the West? Is this why Turkey was willing to accept Ocalan's help and sought to achieve its goals through Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood? Or perhaps did Turkey recognize that its failure to put an end to the Kurdish Freedom Movement was a strategic mistake that deepened the country's divisions? Are Devlet Bahceli's Nationalist Movement Party and Erdogan's Justice and Development Party engaged in constitutional or presidential-related work? The most important of these is Erdogan's demand for Kurdish support to pass constitutional modifications that would permit third presidential terms.

Regardless of the intentions of Turky’s leadership, the country now has a rare opportunity to pursue a more prosperous future. Given that this opportunity may not present itself again in the near or medium term, Turkey could pursue certain steps to show its seriousness and good intentions, such as freeing Kurdish detainees, removing the Kurdistan Freedom Movement's terrorist designation, and releasing Abdullah Ocalan.

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The United States, Israel, and other Western nations have made the Kurdish issue their main concern. International changes, particularly in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, have created several challenges that threaten their global system. Some Middle Eastern countries have become a project in themselves, becoming an obstacle to that system. This contrasts with the Sykes-Picot and Lausanne agreements, which divided the Middle East and established a state system that serves their interests. Given Israel's involvement in the region, the global intensification of the Kurdish recession, or (especially since October 7) the failure of certain Turkish policies, Turkey should consider the winds of change blowing in the region. With no other options, Turkey has two choices:

First: Turkey can make accommodations for the Kurds by enacting large and drastic internal reforms, including the liberation of Ocalan, genuine and long-term opening to the Kurdistan Freedom Movement, and constitutional amendments to protect Kurdish rights. This approach would help Turkey avoid danger and rebuild the state and society using democratic principles. However, such an approach may prove difficult given the opposition from some nationalist parties. Therefore, the resolution of the Kurdish crisis should be linked to the adoption of a new constitution by leveraging the Kurdish vote, allowing Erdogan to run for president. The opposition will be forced to accept this constitution, which will be voted on as a single, undivided bloc, as they will be accused of obstructing the path to a settlement of the Kurdish question.

Second: Turkey can continue its current strategy of assumingly pushing for change, either to buy time to pass its ideas under the pretense of the Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood, or to take on the role of regional terrorism combatant. However, Turkey should use its geopolitical position and NATO membership to negotiate with the West to defend its government and prevent instability from blowing into Turkey. The Turkish government may currently decide to travel this route, but even if it would help Turkey in the near term, it would not necessarily solve all of Turkey's internal problems, perhaps even complicating matters further. It is clear from today’s recent events and developments that Turkey has and will continue to face domestic pressure from various groups within the country, given diverging beliefs and identities.

In every way, the Turkish Republic is about to find itself at a crossroads as it will regrettably find itself in the middle of a more dire and oppressive situation due to its (Turkish) animosity towards the Kurds, which is being directed once more by the UK and its ally – the U.S. Initially, Turkey was pushed towards the war against the Kurds by the UK. This deadlock was a source of perplexity during the final thirty years of the Second Republic. In other words, it was not merely a "low-level war." Instead, it represented its infiltration and breakdown, even among the most fragile cells of social beliefs. A societal breakdown and fragmentation occurred, which is more serious than state collapse or disintegration. The will that organizes itself into a Gladio (Turkey) network [2] can represent any dark regime; however, the republican system cannot be represented by it. The Turkish branch of Operation Gladio was Counter-Guerrilla, a covert anti-communist campaign supported by the United States as an expression of the Truman Doctrine. Regarding the insistence on war, Gladio's last-ditch effort is the only explanation; only by moving actions out of the “operations room” [3] and into the open will prevent that.

Instead of confronting their own failure to achieve peace with the Kurdish Freedom Movement, Turkish political leaders have tried to place the blame elsewhere. [4] Erdogan, for example, often refers to an invisible "mastermind" who organizes the PKK. The use of such language is intended to profit on the widespread fear and concern about national security that some sections of Turkish society have.

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This has been dubbed the "Sevres syndrome" in reference to the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which established Kurdish sovereignty and signaled the end of the Ottoman Empire. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which recognized the Republic of Turkey at the expense of Kurdish rights, replaced the treaty, which was never put into effect. The general fear that the Treaty of Sevres would be resurrected and that the Turkish state is surrounded by adversaries who wish to undermine and divide the nation is essentially reflected in this syndrome, which is also known as "Sevres Paranoia." [5]

During his most recent press conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated, "some European politicians told me at meetings just recently that after the First World War the Kurds were promised their own state, they were deceived, and so on." This underscores European politician apathy of their historical omission regarding the Kurdish nation question. Therefore, the issue of power and exclusion must be considered to better comprehend the Kurdish-Turkish conflict. It began when the Ottomans tried to abolish the 300-year-old autonomy of Kurdish principalities in Kurdistan in the middle of the 19th century. [6] All the new nation states that subsequently arose—Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran—inherited their own Kurdish conflict after this struggle for autonomy was not settled during the time of the Ottoman Empire. Together, the Turks and Kurds defeated the Allied forces in 1919 in a successful fight of independence. [7] However, a Turkish identity was promoted as a unifying factor of the newly formed Republic of Turkey in 1923, at the expense of the political, social, and cultural distinctions within the community.

In addition to progressively consolidating political power in Ankara, the ethnic, Turkish, and Sunni majority's dominance became the standard. The choice to establish a centralized, homogeneous nation-state was carried out in a brutal, top-down manner. This decision planted the seeds for the long-term issues that the Turkish and Kurdish communities face today. This new social and political system was opposed by several Kurdish groups through various uprisings, revolts, and acts of resistance, all of which were brutally put down. Later, repressive assimilation measures were put in place to convert the Kurds into "secular, civilized Turks," [8] all of which had the support of some Western powers.

Turkey’s second path will involve repaving the county’s foundation with the same democratic unity that was evident throughout the National Liberation War (May 19, 1919 – July 24, 1923). After all, it is the alliance of all people that won the National Democratic War between 1919 and 1923, and it is this same alliance that makes the Republic of Turkey truly a republic.

1. Kemalism – a Turkish ideology of the new political elite tied to the single-party regime. Albeit triumphalist, it expresses the need for a connection to deeper roots and is followers made a huge effort to legitimize Anatolia as the national home of the Turks using historical physical anthropology.

2. The Gladio network, which stands in for Turkish leadership, is unable to represent the republican system; instead, it symbolizes a system of conspiracy and coup-mongering. Gladio's "Counter-Guerrilla" includes the Turkish force Ozel Kuvvetler Komutanligi (the Special Forces Command), or the OKK, which has taken part in covert operations for Western interests. According to the Turkish military, the Special Forces Command of the OKK is responsible for averting a potential occupation. The Guerrilla Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which the Turkish deep state has considered a serious threat to its existence since its founding, was the essential target of the Counter-Guerrilla after the Soviet Union broke up. Counter-Guerrilla, the Turkish equivalent of Operation Gladio, was a clandestine anti-communist action backed by the U.S. as an illustration of the Truman Doctrine. In 1999, the OKK used technology provided by the Netherlands to arrest Abdullah Ocalan.

3. This is the Gladio (Counter-Guerilla) branch in Turkey. The military coups in 1971 and 1980 are thought to have been impacted by it. The Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit acknowledged its existence in Turkey in 1973 after it was made public in 1971. Throughout the Warsaw Pact days, its groups were ultimately answerable to NATO and the CIA rather than their own governments, as it was part of the larger Gladio operation network throughout Europe. Survivors of the Ziverbey tragedy first acknowledged the existence of Counter-Guerrilla in 1971, and Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit formally announced it on September 26, 1973. Since 1990, the Turkish parliament has brought up the topic at least 27 times, although no probe has been effective. In every administration, the incumbent party's deputies consistently cast dissenting votes.

4. Fatma Muge Goçek. The Transformation of Turkey. Bloomsbury Publishing, 28 Feb. 2011.

5. Bjorn Moller. Oil and Water: Co-Operative Security in the Persian Gulf. Bloomsbury Academic, 12 Apr. 2001.

6. Hakan Ozoglu. Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State. State University of New York Press, 1 Feb. 2012.

7. Aslan, Senem. Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco: Governing Kurdish and Berber Dissent. New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 2015.

8. Aslan, Senem. Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco: Governing Kurdish and Berber Dissent. New York, Ny, Cambridge University Press, 2015.