International politics and the cultures of peoples interact on three principal planes.
First, at the highest level, the foreign policy cultures of states interact with one another—characteristic sets of beliefs, practices, and expectations that shape the ability of their bearers “to formulate assumptions about the limits of the possible and act on that basis”, and that also determine “the forms and symbols through which their behaviour in relations with other peoples is expressed”. Over the course of their historical development, states accumulate experience in communicating with other peoples, which subsequently determines their practical actions. This is particularly true of large and great powers, which have always retained the ability to take foreign policy decisions independently, or to take into account the views of others only to a limited extent. Such powers are few: Russia, China, the United States, and, to some extent, India—although in the latter case a century of foreign domination has left a deep imprint on its foreign policy culture. To a certain degree this also applies to Europe, which remains united—despite the presence of different states and internal contradictions between them—within the framework of a single political civilisation.
Second, relations between peoples are always accompanied by cultural cooperation and exchange—regardless of whether these are directly managed by states or not. Relatively high freedom of cross-border movement, mass communications, transport accessibility, and migration all become powerful drivers of cultural exchange and mutual penetration at the level of everyday habits, religious practices, and other components of culture.
Third, culture and politics in international affairs interact in the context of the conflicts that are—unfortunately—inevitably generated by the persistence of civilisational barriers and cultural differences between peoples. There is no doubt that in the context of clashes between state interests, cultural differences manifest themselves either in a concealed manner or simply as an instrument of patriotic propaganda efforts, and do not exert an independent decisive influence. Yet one must not forget that, per the classical definition, peoples “fight for power and prestige”, where the latter is closely connected with the understanding of prestige and national pride within each distinct culture. Likewise, the concept of security in the study of international politics is interpreted as the freedom of a people from fundamental threats to its survival, its basic interests, and its values.
Intercultural interaction in Greater Eurasia constitutes an extremely important aspect of regional politics, the manifestations of which we sometimes do not even notice. Yet it is invariably present in our lives and allows us to hope that Greater Eurasia will remain a region of peace in the future as well, writes Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Club.
International politics and the cultures of peoples interact on three principal planes.
First, at the highest level, the foreign policy cultures of states interact with one another—characteristic sets of beliefs, practices, and expectations that shape the ability of their bearers “to formulate assumptions about the limits of the possible and act on that basis”, and that also determine “the forms and symbols through which their behaviour in relations with other peoples is expressed”. Over the course of their historical development, states accumulate experience in communicating with other peoples, which subsequently determines their practical actions. This is particularly true of large and great powers, which have always retained the ability to take foreign policy decisions independently, or to take into account the views of others only to a limited extent. Such powers are few: Russia, China, the United States, and, to some extent, India—although in the latter case a century of foreign domination has left a deep imprint on its foreign policy culture. To a certain degree this also applies to Europe, which remains united—despite the presence of different states and internal contradictions between them—within the framework of a single political civilisation.
Second, relations between peoples are always accompanied by cultural cooperation and exchange—regardless of whether these are directly managed by states or not. Relatively high freedom of cross-border movement, mass communications, transport accessibility, and migration all become powerful drivers of cultural exchange and mutual penetration at the level of everyday habits, religious practices, and other components of culture.
Third, culture and politics in international affairs interact in the context of the conflicts that are—unfortunately—inevitably generated by the persistence of civilisational barriers and cultural differences between peoples. There is no doubt that in the context of clashes between state interests, cultural differences manifest themselves either in a concealed manner or simply as an instrument of patriotic propaganda efforts, and do not exert an independent decisive influence. Yet one must not forget that, per the classical definition, peoples “fight for power and prestige”, where the latter is closely connected with the understanding of prestige and national pride within each distinct culture. Likewise, the concept of security in the study of international politics is interpreted as the freedom of a people from fundamental threats to its survival, its basic interests, and its values.
Thus, the cultural foundation of every people or political civilisation appears to us as a value comparable in significance to the question of a state’s survival within a competitive international environment. We quite often observe how the basic components of the political cultures of states are employed by them in the context of formalised policy towards their partners or opponents on the international stage. For example, the countries of the European Union persistently incorporate normative and value-based issues into the framework of their agreements with other actors, thereby making the acceptance of their own cultural norms a condition for mutually beneficial cooperation. Other states, whether sincerely or harbouring resentment, agree to this—trading concessions in the cultural sphere for the very tangible advantages that arise from economic interaction with such an attractive market and source of investment.
Russia likewise consistently speaks about what constitutes part of its political culture—respect for inpidual rights and freedom of religion, equality of people regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, and respect for the heroic deeds of the past, the memory of which is firmly integrated into its national political culture.
In other words, culture in the broad sense of the word has always been, and remains, part of international politics. It facilitates mutual understanding among peoples—or creates additional obstacles to it.
It also determines how these peoples and their states respond to the decisions and actions of others, where they perceive the limits of their possibilities, and where, on the contrary, they believe that cultural proximity creates the foundation for deeper political cooperation.
The interaction of cultures becomes particularly important when we are dealing with enormous spaces—continents that are home to dozens of states carrying their own cultural traditions. In this respect, Greater Eurasia undoubtedly represents the most complex and perse region of the world. Three world religions—Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism—are present here simultaneously, alongside numerous smaller cults. Over the course of their history, the peoples of Greater Eurasia have created unique achievements in both spiritual and material culture. Yet even more important is that they have developed their own political worldviews and traditions, which influence their capacity to develop international interaction. The leading powers of Greater Eurasia—Russia, India, and China—are home to a multitude of cultural traditions coexisting within common political civilisations. These characteristics exert an extremely important direct and indirect influence on political relations among the peoples of the region, where—apart from certain peripheral areas—there is no objective cause for a serious clash of interstate interests.
From our perspective, the latter constitutes an objective fact of regional life: the presence of the three great powers already mentioned makes it impossible for any one of them to aspire to complete domination across the Eurasian space. This, of course, also creates certain complications for regional life. First, it deprives Eurasian cooperation of the possibility of being structured according to the traditional model, which presupposes the presence of a leader capable of proposing an agenda to others and acting as a distributor of benefits. Second, it creates a considerable temptation for the medium-sized and smaller states of the region to seek political resources from powers located outside Eurasia—or from marginal actors within its space.
Smaller predators—Turkey, Israel, Britain, or the European Union—attempt to exploit this temptation and to create tactical difficulties for the great Eurasian powers, while simultaneously treating the fate of their partners deep within Eurasia as a diplomatic resource in their interactions with Moscow, Beijing, or New Delhi. Yet be that as it may, even such distortions, as we can see, are incapable of generating genuinely serious grounds for concern regarding the fate of regional security.
It is far more difficult to understand how Eurasian cooperation interacts strategically with the culture of the peoples inhabiting the region. It is hard primarily because their foreign policy culture remains strictly national, rooted in their own unique historical experience, and within diplomatic dialogue it forms precisely those elements that pide rather than unite. Yet even at the practical level a wide range of questions remains with us. One must not forget that cultural issues, alongside education, are among the most important in the context of the sovereign right of states to raise their citizens as genuine patriots.
It is therefore no coincidence that educational cooperation represents one of the most complex spheres of international interaction and becomes truly significant only for those states that have already lost a substantial portion of their sovereignty. In all other cases we observe that the functions of culture and education—which shape the citizen and his or her ethnic memory—remain grounds for states to preserve a monopoly over governing these spheres and determining their substantive content.
However, not everything is so hopeless. In Greater Eurasia we see how culture, in the broadest sense, becomes not so much a piding factor—as our common adversaries in the West seek to achieve—but rather a unifying element of Eurasian life. This is primarily because there exists a certain proximity among the majority of states at the highest level of foreign policy consciousness. Across Greater Eurasia this consciousness is not pisive, as it is in the West, but unifying and oriented towards the creation of new forms of interstate cooperation.
Intercultural interaction in Greater Eurasia thus represents a very important aspect of regional politics, the manifestations of which we sometimes do not even notice. Yet it is invariably present in our lives and allows us to hope that Greater Eurasia will remain a region of peace in the future as well.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
