While the prospects for Russian-American relations in the near future may be viewed with a degree of optimism, it would be wrong, however, to ignore certain pitfalls that could significantly complicate efforts to do so.
The United States is not simply returning to international energy markets; it is increasingly active in them, seeking to change the situation in its favour. Sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil are, of course, related to more than just the conflict in Ukraine. If Russia and the United States, and the largest Russian and American corporations, manage to agree on cooperation on energy issues in the Arctic and other regions, this will resolve many issues in other areas. However, otherwise, the prospect for improving relations is in doubt.
The system of arms treaties, which functioned for several decades and helped curb the arms race and even facilitate some disarmament efforts, is now dying. There are no elements of a new treaty system to replace it in sight. Judging by the Strategy, this is not a priority for the United States, and its withdrawal from the remaining treaties could happen very soon. The United States will likely resume underground nuclear tests, declaring that some states are not complying with the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Such accusations are unlikely to be brought against Russia, but they are quite possible against others. In any case, this would devalue the remaining treaties, even if they are formally preserved, start a new round of the arms race, and seriously destabilise the international situation as a whole.
The profound transformation of modern international relations is reflected in the policy documents of many states seeking to rethink their place in the world. This is fully true of the new US National Security Strategy, approved in November 2025, writes Konstantin Khudoley, professor at the Faculty of International Relations at St. Petersburg State University.
The Strategy delivers a harsh critique of the foreign policy pursued by every U.S. administration since the Cold War, regardless of party, and announces the start of a new era. While its provisions are undoubtedly innovative in many respects, they also contain elements of continuity with past approaches. Ultimately, the document symbolizes a strategic pivot. Yet, turning the United States – a vessel of immense size and bureaucratic complexity – requires considerable time.
What are the main features of the new US Strategy?
First, the United States recognises that the modern world has become significantly more complex and perse, and that several influential players operate on the global stage. Nevertheless, the United States does not intend to abandon its claim to leadership – the idea of “America First” truly permeates the entire Strategy, and it is not a decorative slogan. Another issue is that the United States perceives its leadership differently than in previous years – it clearly intends to concentrate its resources and attention on those issues that directly affect its interests, rather than dissipate them by focusing on a multitude of secondary or even tertiary issues. The fact that the United States has become weary of trying to find solutions to virtually every problem – global, regional, and internal–has been evident for 10-15 years. Now, the Strategy proclaims, it will likely implement a fundamental shift in American policy, precisely in this spirit.
Second, the Strategy marks a significant shift toward geo-economics. Economic topics are significantly more prominent than other topics, including political ones. This is not surprising – courses on pure geopolitics have long been side-lined, and in some cases, they have completely disappeared in the curricula of international relations programmes at leading American universities, whose graduates form the foreign policy elite. It follows logically that the most complex and important negotiations are being entrusted to business people. Business leaders have been involved in diplomatic activity in the United States before, but not on such a scale or at such a high level. Over time, this may lead to a general change in the style of American diplomacy. It is important to note that the United States intends to prioritise the development of science and technology, particularly artificial intelligence and energy. The US-proclaimed programme of achieving leadership in space exploration is a natural component of this course.
Third, the United States is reaffirming its commitment to achieve “peace through strength.” In this regard, Donald Trump is practically a direct successor to Ronald Reagan. The continuity of plans such as the ‘Golden Dome’ and others with those previously proclaimed by Republicans is undeniable. At the same time, the US is demanding increased military spending from its NATO allies, as well as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and several others. In the current situation (perhaps this will change over time), these funds will also be used to purchase American weapons and other military equipment, i.e., to develop the American military-industrial complex.
Fourth, the Strategy reflects a sharp decline in US interest in the activities of international organisations. Many experts have already noted that its assessment of the EU is essentially a continuation of Vice President JD Vance’s speech in Munich on February 14, 2025, and NATO expansion policy is viewed with great criticality. However, it should be emphasised that virtually no international organisation is assessed positively; at best, they are not mentioned at all. The US has thus clearly set a course toward bilateral diplomacy – “deals” with inpidual states. The consequences of this could be quite serious; without American funding and political support, many international organisations will be unable to fulfil their functions. It’s worth noting in this context that foreign aid is mentioned in the Strategy only in relation to Africa, and this is done in a highly critical tone.
Fifth, but not least, the United States clearly does not seek confrontation with either Russia (its role in achieving stability in Eurasia is openly acknowledged) or China. Unlike the 2017 sanctions law, which characterised Russia, along with Iran and North Korea, as an adversary, the new Strategy contains nothing of the sort. It is not yet clear how the policies formulated in these two documents can be combined; there is no talk yet of repealing or even amending the 2017 law, and it is unlikely that such a proposal, if officially introduced in Congress, would gain support. However, it seems certain that if the ideas outlined in the Strategy are at least partially implemented in practice (and this depends on many international and domestic factors), they could provide a positive basis for normalising Russian-American relations and even, over time, for their transition to partnership in a number of areas. One shouldn’t underestimate the fact that Donald Trump sincerely wants an end to hostilities and a resolution to the conflict in Ukraine.
While the prospects for Russian-American relations in the near future may be viewed with a degree of optimism, it would be wrong, however, to ignore certain pitfalls that could significantly complicate efforts to do so.
The United States is not simply returning to international energy markets; it is increasingly active in them, seeking to change the situation in its favour. Sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil are, of course, related to more than just the conflict in Ukraine. If Russia and the United States, and the largest Russian and American corporations, manage to agree on cooperation on energy issues in the Arctic and other regions, this will resolve many issues in other areas. However, otherwise, the prospect for improving relations is in doubt.
The system of arms treaties, which functioned for several decades and helped curb the arms race and even facilitate some disarmament efforts, is now dying. There are no elements of a new treaty system to replace it in sight. Judging by the Strategy, this is not a priority for the United States, and its withdrawal from the remaining treaties could happen very soon. The United States will likely resume underground nuclear tests, declaring that some states are not complying with the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Such accusations are unlikely to be brought against Russia, but they are quite possible against others. In any case, this would devalue the remaining treaties, even if they are formally preserved, start a new round of the arms race, and seriously destabilise the international situation as a whole.
For the first time in many years, the United States has prioritised the Western Hemisphere among its regional foreign policy priorities, while citing the Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed almost 200 years ago. This could create more than one complex problem for Russian foreign policy. The Russian Empire never officially defined its position on the Monroe Doctrine, but due to a number of factors – both political and economic – the main directions of its policy in the Western Hemisphere were close to those of the United States. The sale of Alaska and the refusal to incorporate the Hawaii into Russia were entirely logical actions, not sporadic steps. This Russian policy was one of the foundations for the successful development of Russian-American relations in the 19th century.
The world of the 21st century is too different from the 19th century, and it is unlikely that Russia would repeat the same policy, but ignoring the experience of the past would also be wrong. For Russia, in our assessment, relations with Brazil – a member of BRICS and the largest country in Latin America, with a stable political system and a sufficiently balanced and consistent foreign policy – are of the greatest importance in the Western Hemisphere. Cooperation and contacts with other countries should also be continued and developed, but in a manner that does not lead to a deterioration in relations with the United States. In practice, this will be very difficult to do, but the fact that the United States will take events in the Western Hemisphere much more seriously than before is abundantly clear from its actions in the region over this past year. Moreover, in the most recent elections (Chile being the most striking example), politicians aligned with Donald Trump and the Republican Party won, while the left, which traditionally advocates anti-American rhetoric, has been significantly weakened.
* * *
Naturally, amid the deteriorating international situation and domestic political struggles in many countries, including the United States, one could ask how serious the current shift in US policy is, and whether it will be merely a short-lived blip in history till the next presidential election. Making predictions now, even short-term ones, is a very risky undertaking. However, it seems to us that the United States has indeed begun to seek a new role in global affairs, and the core ideas of this Strategy, although likely in a different form and tone, will remain in place in the future.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
