Is There a Future for Arms Control and the Regime of Nuclear Non-Proliferation?

In the current circumstance of seemingly endless turbulence at all levels and tracks of international relations, a logical question arises: what methods and means can ultimately ensure a stabilizing effect, as well as the necessary level of predictability and restraint, previously provided largely by arms control instruments that have since fallen into oblivion? Before attempting to answer this question, let me look into the state of play in several specific areas of non-proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability in general.

I suggest that we start with the situation around the NPT. Since its entry into force back in 1970, this Treaty has remained one of the central elements of international security. We consider the “alarmism” regarding the future of the NPT, as expressed in the media and in some statements by politicians, to be exaggerated, to put it mildly. The Treaty is, in fact, beneficial to all its Parties. Its eventual collapse would trigger destructive processes around the world that would lead to adverse consequences for everyone.

At the same time the situation is far from being cloudless. Recently, the resilience of the NPT has been subjected to serious tests. Unprovoked, unjustified, and illegal attacks by Israel and the United States on Iran have come as heavy blows for the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. These acts of aggression are per se a flagrant manifestation of the course to abuse the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the NPT as its cornerstone, and misuse it as a pretext for military actions against “unwanted” foreign governments with the aim of overthrowing them, or even destroying the very States they govern. And it is not a figure of speech – the goal of toppling Iran’s legitimate government was directly and openly proclaimed by Israel and the United States. Not only were peaceful nuclear facilities bombed – which is completely unacceptable by all measure – but other civilian targets, including educational and scientific institutions, were also struck, and virtually the entire top leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran was assassinated.

(Moscow, April 16, 2026)

Dear colleagues,

I am really glad to appear before you here today and attend this useful and forward-looking format. I appreciate the work being done by the team of PIR-Center, and the cooperation that has been established with relevant institutions to better understand the challenges we face and to identify opportunities for navigating the rough waters of today’s world.

First of all, let me warmly greet all the participants of today’s meeting. The “Trialogue” Club International has established itself as a very well known and respected platform that provides an opportunity for a frank exchange of views on pressing issues on the international security agenda.

The title of today’s meeting is rather challenging, if not a provocative one. But the fact of the matter is that we have indeed witnessed the dismantling of many international legal instruments in the area of arms control and related arrangements, including those that served as key pillars of the international security and strategic stability for decades. As a result, the world has found itself in a discomforting post-INF, post-New START, post-JCPOA times, and so on – the list can be filled with many more. This is almost a cemetery of international agreements that we visit every day. It’s a long and very mournful list of agreements that have either been deliberately dismantled or allowed to expire without any kind of substitution and, moreover, without any kind of understanding what to do further.

It must be acknowledged that, in recent years, this destructive process has gained particularly strong negative momentum, and got into a troubling resonance with many conflicts between states and groupings of states continuously and increasingly manifesting itself today around the world. However, the origins of these developments, which have been detrimental to arms control and non-proliferation, lie in a period when the overall level of international tensions was by orders of lower magnitude if compared to how things are nowadays. It was precisely during that time, shortly after the end of the Cold War, that the United States and the “collective West” set a course towards seeking overwhelming military-strategic supremacy and, accordingly, getting rid of any restrictions that could hinder the achievement of this objective. Let me recall that the first victim of this self-serving course was the ABM Treaty, which was discarded by Washington despite the direct risks of severely undermining strategic stability.

Now I truly believe that many of you or at least some of you came here in anticipation of hearing from me “the regular Russian litany of complaints”, “the regular Russian melody of finger pointing” to some around that in our view were at the bedrock of the current demise of the international security architecture. I cannot but use some of the references to earlier developments, but rather I would focus on how we see things today. And definitely I will try to be as factual as possible without overloading the audience with any ideological or quasi-ideological conclusions.

I think still it’s almost undeniable that the Western pursuit towards decisive military advantage as a tool for consolidating its global dominance has, among other things, clearly got in conflict with the fundamental principle of equal and indivisible security, as well as with the imperative of mutual acknowledgement and respect for each other’s core interests. Yet it is precisely these principles that are intended to serve as the basis for the development and implementation of mutually acceptable, effective, and viable frameworks and arrangements, including in the field of arms control.

In the current circumstance of seemingly endless turbulence at all levels and tracks of international relations, a logical question arises: what methods and means can ultimately ensure a stabilizing effect, as well as the necessary level of predictability and restraint, previously provided largely by arms control instruments that have since fallen into oblivion? Before attempting to answer this question, let me look into the state of play in several specific areas of non-proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability in general.

I suggest that we start with the situation around the NPT. Since its entry into force back in 1970, this Treaty has remained one of the central elements of international security. We consider the “alarmism” regarding the future of the NPT, as expressed in the media and in some statements by politicians, to be exaggerated, to put it mildly. The Treaty is, in fact, beneficial to all its Parties. Its eventual collapse would trigger destructive processes around the world that would lead to adverse consequences for everyone.

At the same time the situation is far from being cloudless. Recently, the resilience of the NPT has been subjected to serious tests. Unprovoked, unjustified, and illegal attacks by Israel and the United States on Iran have come as heavy blows for the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. These acts of aggression are per se a flagrant manifestation of the course to abuse the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the NPT as its cornerstone, and misuse it as a pretext for military actions against “unwanted” foreign governments with the aim of overthrowing them, or even destroying the very States they govern. And it is not a figure of speech – the goal of toppling Iran’s legitimate government was directly and openly proclaimed by Israel and the United States. Not only were peaceful nuclear facilities bombed – which is completely unacceptable by all measure – but other civilian targets, including educational and scientific institutions, were also struck, and virtually the entire top leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran was assassinated.

The strikes against Iran were carried out primarily in the interests of Israel, a State that has historically ignored the NPT, while reserving the right to raise accusations concerning non-proliferation obligations against other countries. The United States, which supported this aggression, was one of the founding fathers of the NPT and remains to be one of its depositaries.

The cynicism of the situation lies in the fact that the Israeli-U.S. attacks on Iran were carried out under the cover of negotiations or talks, whatever you would call it, that were aimed at agreeing on voluntary measures implemented by Iran. Let me emphasize, that these talks were supposed to hammer out voluntary measures, going beyond the NPT and designed to additionally confirm the exclusively peaceful nature of Iranian nuclear program.

Generally, it must be noted that the trend towards the abuse of the NPT by a group of Western States and their allies in their own opportunistic political interests has been evident for a long time. During previous review cycles of the Treaty, we have repeatedly observed attempts to level accusations against a number of countries both on the substance of the NPT and on very different issues completely unrelated to its subject matter. Now we see that this approach has led to further abuses on the part of these States.

This is only one of many serious problems accumulating at the NPT forum, exposing deep divides within the community of States Parties to the Treaty. There are others. I will not dwell on each and one of those contradictions today, but I cannot but highlight a recently uncovered development, which is profoundly destructive for the NPT – namely the idea of covert transfer of nuclear-weapons-related components to the Kiev regime entertained by some in the United Kingdom and France. Such a reckless and wholly unacceptable step would constitute a critical threat both to our security and to the non-proliferation regime, with far-reaching negative consequences. We hope that the disclosure of relevant information by our relevant agencies has made it possible to halt this dangerous venture at an early stage and, as they say, decisively nip it in the bud before it could develop further.

Thus, the NPT States Parties are approaching the 11^th Review Conference, which begins at the end of April, with a very heavy burden. The situation is complicated by the fact that the two previous Review Conferences ended without the adoption of final documents. The key problem was that many States sought to make such documents as “ambitious” as possible from their own perspective, insisting on including provisions unrelated to the NPT. While this approach might have worked in the past – as a number of States, including Russia, were willing to make concessions to reach agreed final documents at Review Conferences – it has ceased to function over the past decade due to the growing tensions between states and due to more disruption and tension in international relations.

We cannot agree with far-fetched alarmist arguments that a third consecutive “failure” to agree on a final document would cause irreparable damage to the Treaty itself and the international non-proliferation regime as a whole. We are convinced that the Conference’s final document is undoubtedly an important element of the overall picture, but it cannot be regarded a goal in itself for the Review Process. We believe the most important thing upon the completion of the current review cycle is to make sure that the NPT continues to fulfill its functions and that its States Parties remain committed to their obligations. If we do wish to reach agreement on the final document on the forthcoming Review Conference, then, given the current international security situation and the level of tensions within the NPT community, we will have to draft it on the basis of the lowest common denominator, taking into account the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty and avoiding wording that is understood to be unacceptable even before it is suggested.

The situation evolving in the area of arms control, including with regard to voluntary measures aimed at ensuring predictability and restraint, is equally a challenging one, to put it mildly. In particular, it is regrettable that, amid persistent tensions between nuclear powers, the United States has categorically rejected to support the initiative by the Russian President Vladimir Putin suggesting that Parties to the New START Treaty assume reciprocal and symmetrical self-restraints with respect to continued compliance with the central quantitative limits set forth in the Treaty. Instead, Washington has effectively welcomed the “demise” of the agreement, openly stating that it no longer met current U.S. requirements for such agreements – neither in scope, nor in numerical ceilings, nor in the composition of its parties. As is well known, constructive Russian post-INF proposals were equally dismissed earlier under untenable and far-fetched pretexts.

We are convinced that our pragmatic proposals could help buy time and facilitate generating the prerequisites needed for further constructive steps. However, the U.S. has hastily opted for a complete freedom of action and assertive promotion of inherently unrealistic and vaguely formulated alternatives. In particular, the U.S. has raised the issue of launching so-called “multilateral negotiations”, which, as was declared, the United States intends to conduct exclusively on its own terms, as being said – “from a position of strength”, and solely on nuclear weapons. At the same time, Washington has firmly anchored any prospects for such efforts to the mandatory involvement of China.

As we analyze the US approach in aspects of principle for Russia, we note a clear desire to sidestep the issue that is imperative for us – notably the involvement of the United Kingdom and France in any hypothetical “multilateral negotiations”. We also note the absence of any indication that Washington is prepared to undertake comprehensive effort to reduce conflict potential in a holistic manner, taking into account all factors affecting strategic stability. At the same time, we have carefully noted Washington’s declared readiness to immediately begin expanding its nuclear arsenal beyond the New START limits and proceed with nuclear tests counter to the CTBT provisions “on the first order” of the U.S. President.

In general, it appears that the U.S. proposals are largely declarative in nature and serve to create additional pretexts for going further in implementation of Washington’s aforementioned overarching strategy, aimed at seeking decisive superiority for the United States and its allies “over any adversary” that would cement the already existing cumulative advantage of the “collective West” in overall military power. It is to be noted, that even if we consider only NATO member states, the Western camp still unconditionally and by a wide margin outweighs any other state or group of states in terms of aggregate military budgets, the size of its armed forces, and their deployment capabilities.

But this doesn’t prevent Washington, which remains obsessed with an idea of total and undisputed dominance, from breaking annual records in the scale of relevant appropriations and, with the support of its allies, from intensifying the implementation of military-technical programs that pose an ever-growing threat to strategic stability. Suffice it to recall the deeply destabilizing programs to build a global U.S. missile defense system in the form of the “Golden Dome”, the forward deployment of ground-launched INF-range missiles, and plans to weaponize outer space, turning it into a warfighting domain.

As to the statements from Washington on the possible resumption of full-scale nuclear tests, fraught with fatal consequences for the CTBT, we are convinced that such a step would initiate a kind of self-sustaining chain reaction in this area, leading to the return of a number of countries with military nuclear capabilities, and not only those that are Parties to the NPT, to full-scale explosive tests of nuclear weapons.

Russia on its part has strictly adhered to the national moratorium on nuclear tests, which was declared back in 1990. However, if the United States or other countries conduct such tests, Russia’s response will undoubtedly be appropriate and proportionate.

In a broader strategic context, we must not forget that one of the most pressing security challenge remains unaddressed. NATO’s aggressive military expansion toward Russia’s borders runs counter to the principle of equal and indivisible security, which I have already touched upon today, and poses a direct threat to our core interests.

NATO countries have long ago officially declared their bloc to be a “nuclear alliance”, and the U.S. weapons forward deployed for “nuclear sharing” are effectively treated as part of a common pool for joint employment against Russia by both nuclear and nominally non-nuclear NATO member states. Further development of “nuclear sharing” frameworks and capabilities is underway, including the expansion of the geographic scope of the U.S. nuclear posture in Europe and the range of countries authorized to deliver the U.S. nuclear gravity bombs to assigned targets. Military-nuclear cooperation within the North Atlantic bloc is also advancing in other areas, including efforts to significantly strengthen the European component of the overall NATO nuclear capabilities, complementing Washington’s “nuclear umbrella.” To this end, the United Kingdom and France have announced plans to increase their arsenals, as well as to enhance coordination in planning for the employment of nuclear weapons and the joint conduct of related operations. Nominally non-nuclear NATO member states are also getting increasingly involved into conventional support for such missions, while elements of French nuclear forces may now be deployed on their territory. All of this is being carried out under strongly hostile anti-Russian slogans.

Joint nuclear planning with non-nuclear States, along with the growing integration of U.S. nuclear forces and the conventional capabilities of its allies under the banner of so-called “integrated operations”, is steadily expanding across the Asia-Pacific region. This trajectory is accompanied by increasingly open political discourse among U.S. regional allies regarding the need for an enhanced link to the U.S. nuclear weapons (for instance, in the form of their potential reintroduction on their territory) and even by floating the idea of potentially moving towards acquiring such weapons themselves. Particularly notable is the case of Japan, which, having embarked on a path of accelerated remilitarization, has initiated the process toward revising its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”, long portrayed as a foundational pillar of Tokyo’s pacifist policy, which is now widely seen as dying out.

The latter development is a matter of a serious concern, particularly as a growing number of the U.S. non-nuclear-weapon allies in Europe allow themselves to entertain the idea of acquiring their own nuclear capabilities. It is highly provocative and destructive for the NPT regime, especially as it is unfolding with no visible objection on the part of Washington and the capitals of the European nuclear-weapon States. It is noteworthy, since for years we have heard assurances that “nuclear sharing” and “nuclear extended deterrence” arrangements allegedly serve as effective tools for addressing non-proliferation goals within the so-called “collective West”. Mildly speaking, this claim is a priori highly questionable in my view, and fails to find understanding among the overwhelming majority of the NPT States Parties. Indeed, today it is becoming increasingly evident that the more actively these arrangements are pursued by Western nuclear powers, the more they incentivize their non-nuclear-weapon allies to become even more aspiring and ambitious as to getting more access to nuclear weapons.

Overall, the international arena – and multilateral fora in particular – are in great deficit as to acknowledging the objective link between state of play at the disarmament track and the prevailing security environment. There is also lack of genuine political will to work collectively toward addressing the root causes of crises and fundamental inter-state contradictions on the basis of mutual respect and due consideration of principled concerns of all parties. Instead, individual states and their associations persist in aggressively promoting their priorities without regard for the positions of others. As a result, such initiatives fail to gain consensus support.

The problem is that such proposals often fail to be convincing for countries in providing credible answer to the central question: how will they strengthen their security in today’s turbulent environment? Moreover, these proposals frequently overlook the objective differences in states’ strategic position, as well as their economic, political, military, and demographic capacities. This, in turn, prevents from laying a solid foundation for updating the system of regional security and global stability, and creating favorable prerequisites conducive to progress in disarmament.

Despite the rather bleak and alarming picture outlined above, Russia is not abandoning arms control and continues to view it as a useful tool that, under certain conditions, can help maintain at least a minimally sufficient level of international stability and serve our country’s national security interests. Not everything has been dismantled: a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements still remain in force and continue to be relevant. At the same time, the situation at such fora is often rather discouraging. Many of them remain vulnerable to the risks mentioned earlier, particularly those arising from attempts to politicize these formats and to use them as means for settling scores with “disliked” states.

Nevertheless, we are keeping up our efforts to rectify the complex situation surrounding existing international legal instruments in arms control. We continue to promote our own initiatives in this area, in what we believe is long overdue and capable of contributing to the maintenance of peace and security.

In particular, the Russian Federation has been consistently calling for keeping outer space as the heritage of all humankind and its uses exclusively for peaceful purposes. As the author of a number of fundamental initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), Russia invariably contributes to keeping outer space free from weapons of any kind and preventing it from becoming yet another area of armed confrontation.

Our principled position has remained unchanged over decades: the only viable path toward achieving the goal of PAROS is through the development of generally recognized legally binding norms of international law that would be comprehensive in nature and aimed at PAROS, as envisaged by the decisions of the First Special Session of the UNGA on Disarmament in 1978.

With regret and concern we have to state that these values are not shared by all UN Member States. We witness the growing risks of turning outer space into a springboard for aggression and war. A number of Western countries openly pursue the course towards placing weapons in outer space and using it for combat operations to guarantee their dominance and superiority, as it is exactly the case with the destabilizing U.S.’ “Golden Dome” project mentioned by me earlier.

We are convinced that national and international obligations should be undertaken not to place weapons of any kind in outer space (including in the low-Earth orbit) and the threat or use of force against and by means of outer space objects should be prohibited as well. It is important to establish a comprehensive ban on space strike weapons designed to destroy outer space objects.

We have not yet passed “the point of no return” in keeping outer space peaceful and free of weapons and conflicts. However, many things now depend on urgent and coordinated actions of the international community. Today the initiatives on PAROS, primarily on elaborating a relevant international legally-binding instrument, are more in demand than ever. The Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects can serve as its basis. An important intermediate step towards the legally-binding instrument on PAROS is the international initiative or political commitment of “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”, which already comprises 37 states.

Russia will proceed with constructive efforts to enhance space security in the interests of all.

Looking ahead, we also remain open to politico-diplomatic solutions aimed at stabilizing the strategic environment through the dialogue between or among nuclear powers. At the same time, it is clear to us that constructive and productive engagement on this track, including on arms control issues, will require creating necessary conditions. Such engagement cannot be separated from the overall state of relations between the parties or from the broader security environment. It is necessary to lay a suitable political and military-political groundwork, which presupposes refraining from encroachment on each other’s core interests, as well as a clear willingness to engage in joint and comprehensive efforts to reduce the overall conflict potential on the basis of equality and mutual consideration of concerns, as well as with an emphasis on addressing fundamental contradictions that could otherwise lead to armed confrontation. Clearly, progress in this direction cannot be achieved without strong political will, which is currently lacking amid the ongoing struggle over the future model of the world order and international relations. This reflects the particular nature of the present historical period, which must be overcome through collective efforts that, as we hope, will once again be possible in the future.

I thank you for your attention.