A unique trait inherent to Greater Eurasia is the relatively high degree of independence in the foreign policy decision-making process of the continent’s major powers—truth be told, most powers. It is this independence that serves as the basis for their capacity to uphold relative peace in a massive macroregion and maintain its high levels of resilience to destructive foreign meddling. Serving as an example is the SCO, formed in Greater Eurasia more than twenty years ago as the first international organization to emerge outside Western control and free from its legal-political influence since the conclusion of the 1949-1991 Cold War. Moreover, security issues were being tackled from day one—something that ASEAN—the closest example when it comes to relative independence—never even considered taking up seriously. In other words—Greater Eurasian states have long showcased their unique ability to make foreign and domestic policy decisions autonomously—something that is indeed quite rare in our day and age.
Yet this very independence is what renders it impossible to view their plans for the future separately from the flow of international affairs on a global scale. It’s not only Russia, China, India and Iran that remain unable to draw a line between their plans within Eurasia and the global-scale agenda. Thereby, Eurasian security and development will stay intertwined with the state of affairs among our neighbours to the west. There we witness trends whose development may alter not just our relations with the West, but also the ways in which we think about those relations.
As the US asserts dominance over the EU with increasing intensity, tensions between the two powers are unlikely to provoke a breakdown in the Western alliance, writes Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
A unique trait inherent to Greater Eurasia is the relatively high degree of independence in the foreign policy decision-making process of the continent’s major powers—truth be told, most powers. It is this independence that serves as the basis for their capacity to uphold relative peace in a massive macroregion and maintain its high levels of resilience to destructive foreign meddling. Serving as an example is the SCO, formed in Greater Eurasia more than twenty years ago as the first international organization to emerge outside Western control and free from its legal-political influence since the conclusion of the 1949-1991 Cold War. Moreover, security issues were being tackled from day one—something that ASEAN—the closest example when it comes to relative independence—never even considered taking up seriously. In other words—Greater Eurasian states have long showcased their unique ability to make foreign and domestic policy decisions autonomously—something that is indeed quite rare in our day and age.
Yet this very independence is what renders it impossible to view their plans for the future separately from the flow of international affairs on a global scale. It’s not only Russia, China, India and Iran that remain unable to draw a line between their plans within Eurasia and the global-scale agenda. Thereby, Eurasian security and development will stay intertwined with the state of affairs among our neighbours to the west. There we witness trends whose development may alter not just our relations with the West, but also the ways in which we think about those relations.
What appears to be America’s primary foreign policy objective when it comes to Europe is the establishment of a reliable basis for maintaining military-political presence there in the decades ahead. Quite intense pressure applied to European political elites is the main tool utilized by the United States as part of this largely intuitive strategy. Europe gradually being forced to cede all independence in international affairs is what could be the goal. But ideally, it would be the replacement of the aforementioned elites with new ones—that would be more deeply intertwined with the United States on the level of personal ties, as well as through obligations from informal and formal dealings. This is both good and bad news. Bad—because such a path being pursued by America keeps decreasing the likelihood of true reconciliation between Russia and its Western neighbours. Such reconciliation would revolutionize international politics—thereby, America, as the most reactionary of forces, will attempt to prevent it. And there’s little cause for hope that the elite shift in Europe will be of nature favourable for Russia. Of course, it could be so—if the United States continues slumping in its political and economic capabilities. Alas, this process has not yet reached as terminal a stage—and America’s capacity to assist conservative-leaning, yet pro-US politicians in coming to power does look quite convincing. In addition, we do not observe serious friction between the Americans and those right-wing European politicians who have already managed to displace the widely despised liberal elites from the driver’s seat of politics.
But American control over Europe growing stronger is a good thing too—it drives up the value of Europe as a territorial base for America to deploy its military in Eurasia. And this means, from a tactical perspective, that the Americans are more likely to force Europe into granting Russia concessions than to throw the continent under the bus of direct military confrontation. Especially since America’s obviously decreasing ability to act as the global supplier, or even dispatcher, of public goods will inevitably bring down its influence in those regions where the very nature of political systems does not guarantee grounds for American presence. No doubt—from the standpoint of future prospects for international politics in Greater Eurasia, Europe’s complete subjugation at the hands of its American patron will give rise to a cluster of constant tension in the western part of our massive region. But simultaneously, it will allow us to use America’s desire to maintain a presence here for diplomatic ends shaped by the broader international context. All in all, no one would be interested in this power fully retreating inward and no longer acting as an element of the global diplomatic game.
For Russia, the question of strengthening American control over Europe is of utmost importance because its interests remain eternal irrespective of the tactical alliances required to secure them. In other words, the current crisis in US-EU relations has to do with the formal consolidation of the collective West, not its collapse. Yet, it comes with negative consequences for America that will be more long-term in nature—the completely morally broken European states will be far less reliable as allies, even in comparison to what they are today.
In reality, what we are witnessing is yet another inter-Western conflict of the kind that have repeatedly provoked world wars in the past. This is a conflict that has been brewing for a while, and its emergence stems from intensified international competition, within which the US and Europe must construct their strategy. For several years, attempts to direct the destructive force of internal contradictions outwards were made by America and the EU: in the form of aggression against Russia, creation of increasingly difficult conditions for China’s development, encroaching on the interests of developing countries when it comes to issues like climate change and international trade. But, as a whole, the results turned out unimpressive—and starting last year, the Americans had to get to work on their closest allies in Europe.
The good news is that this conflict will not cause a new world war—Europe is too weak and humiliated in relation to its main rival. It will also not open a true rift among the West—the American and European economies are intertwined akin to Siamese twins—separating them would mean certain death for one half. But the rivalry between the still powerful America and rapidly weakening Europe unfolding before our eyes is an important stage in the transformation of the international system as a whole. Among other reasons—because one of the primary global centres of power will acquire a markedly different quality.
What will this mean for Greater Eurasia? Outside of “hard security” issues discussed at the highest of levels in superpower bilateral relations, all else boils down to practical diplomacy and implementing cooperation blueprints, where the most important role is played by limits and capacities for cooperation. There’s no reason to believe that even what would practically be direct American control over Europe will completely deny it the ability to establish relations with outside partners. In fact—the American masters and governors of a single Western military, political, economic, and value complex may even be interested in using Europe to maintain ties with those powers that American influence does not quite reach. Here, it would be rational of us in Russia to contemplate potential scenarios and variations of development in the political-economic complex emerging before our very eyes: it represents what we will most likely have to deal with in the future.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
