Iran's New Identity: Patriotism vs. Islamism

For the first time in three weeks, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has made a public appearance, attending a significant Shiite Muslim religious ceremony. Reformists and others from Iran's political spectrum have praised Khamenei's come back, which comes amid increased fears of an Israeli assassination attempt. This highlights the transformation in identity politics in the wake of the recent war with Israel, as the political elite intensifies the merging of nationalist themes with Islamist doctrine.

The Islamic Republic appears to be deliberately seeking to strengthen Iranian-Islamic identity by combining Islamic revolutionary values with elements of nationalism. The challenge is clearly to unite a disparate population in the face of impending chaos and internal political and economic problems.

The key question remains whether this transition is a temporary phenomenon or whether it signals a long-term change that will eventually shape a new conventional wisdom. In this context, the future of the conflict with Israel could have a significant impact. Given Khamenei's religiously motivated aversion to nuclear weapons, a change in leadership coupled with an intensification of nationalist rhetoric could significantly affect the nuclear weapons debate, especially if national interests begin to be perceived as more important than religious ones. Following the recent US and Israeli raids on Iran, during which Washington claims to have destroyed Iranian nuclear facilities, considerable mistrust remains. While acknowledging serious damage, Tehran has nevertheless vowed to continue its nuclear program.

For the first time in three weeks, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has made a public appearance, attending a significant Shiite Muslim religious ceremony. Reformists and others from Iran's political spectrum have praised Khamenei's come back, which comes amid increased fears of an Israeli assassination attempt. This highlights the transformation in identity politics in the wake of the recent war with Israel, as the political elite intensifies the merging of nationalist themes with Islamist doctrine.

On the eve of Ashura, which is celebrated on July 5 this year and commemorates the 680 CE killing of Prophet Muhammad's grandson Hussein ibn Ali, Khamenei returned to public view after a 22-day absence following Iran's June 13–24 confrontation with Israel. Although Khamenei did not speak, the ceremony's leading eulogist, the renowned Mahmoud Karimi, informed mourners that the supreme leader had asked him to recite the patriotic anthem “Ey Iran” (O Iran).

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Since the war with Israel ended after a US-mediated ceasefire, this hymn, along with other patriotic music, has been played at Ashura-related mourning services. The most well-known version of “Ey Iran” is the one performed by Mohammad Nouri. Karimi's rendition of the hymn added a couple of changes, incorporating religious elements and referring to Iran as “the nation of Ashura” and “the land of Karbala,” where Hussein ibn Ali and his comrades were slaughtered.

The next day, Karimi expressed that the supreme leader had commended his performance of the song's lyrics and asked for another patriotic song in the future. In Iran, it is not common practice to recite patriotic anthems during religious events, which makes Khamenei's request all the more unexpected—but consistent with the present trend. The rising use of the Iranian flag at religious mourning rites in recent days is another indication of growing national fervor, which has been emphasized by a number of state-affiliated media sites, including Mehr News Agency and Shahraranews.

Former government leaders and Reformist officials have also praised Khamenei's comeback to the public eye. President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Iran “is always eternal and enduring” while posting a photo of Khamenei at the July 5 ceremony. He likened Iran to a Hussainiyah, a place where Shiite Muslims congregate for religious gatherings. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, while attending a BRICS conference in Brazil, wrote on X that the picture of Khamenei at the event “was the most beautiful image” he had seen when he first arrived in Rio de Janeiro.

Reformist former president Mohammad Khatami's aide, Mohammad Ali Abtahi (1997–2005), wrote on X that Khamenei's public appearance was “the most calming thing” that could have occurred “amid the enemy's mind games.” Abtahi was most likely alluding to international media allegations that Khamenei was hiding due the assassination threats. On July 6, Hassan Rahimpour Azghadi, a hardline figure, wrote on X that trying to murder Khamenei would be “the biggest mistake of the century” and would lead to “a wave of retaliatory attacks across five continents, including within the US.”

Patriotism Instead of Islamism

With nationalism centered inside a Shiite Islamic framework, the Islamic Republic's public message increasingly indicates that it is shifting from a “Islamic-Iranian” to “Iranian-Islamic” identity. In the past, eulogies during Ashura ceremonies have included current political topics, such as nuclear talks with Western powers. It is rare, nevertheless, that there is currently such a strong push to emphasize Iranian national identity. The Iranian government appears to be trying to unite a divided country and strengthen cohesion in the wake of the armed war with Israel by incorporating patriotic elements into religious ceremonies.

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On June 26, Khamenei gave his first address following the ceasefire with Israel, and observers noticed a strong patriotic tone in his words. The head of the government's public relations office, Ali Ahmadnia, observed that Khamenei used the word Iran 23 times, and the words “nation and people” 18 times, which is unusual given his typical emphasis on the “Islamic nation.”

Commentator Mehdi Arab-Sadeq noted that the change in discourse could signify “the beginning of neo-nationalism,” emphasizing that Iran's “victory” over Zrael depends on maintaining national unity. The installation of billboards, banners and monuments glorifying Iran's pre-Islamic heritage in major cities coincides with a shift in the rhetoric of the political establishment.

These events come on the eve of the anticipated resumption of nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran. The Iran-US dialog has so far been mediated by the Sultanate of Oman, with five rounds of talks held in Muscat or at the Omani Embassy in Rome. However, it is still unclear whether the Omani side will lead the talks this time, or whether the Norwegians may also take part in the dialog. Furthermore, as before, the talks are characterized as “indirect”, meaning that there is no explicit direct interaction between the parties.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic appears to be deliberately seeking to strengthen Iranian-Islamic identity by combining Islamic revolutionary values with elements of nationalism. The challenge is clearly to unite a disparate population in the face of impending chaos and internal political and economic problems.

The key question remains whether this transition is a temporary phenomenon or whether it signals a long-term change that will eventually shape a new conventional wisdom. In this context, the future of the conflict with Israel could have a significant impact. Given Khamenei's religiously motivated aversion to nuclear weapons, a change in leadership coupled with an intensification of nationalist rhetoric could significantly affect the nuclear weapons debate, especially if national interests begin to be perceived as more important than religious ones. Following the recent US and Israeli raids on Iran, during which Washington claims to have destroyed Iranian nuclear facilities, considerable mistrust remains. While acknowledging serious damage, Tehran has nevertheless vowed to continue its nuclear program.