Europe and the Middle East Conflict: Balance of Interests and Security

After weeks of intense disagreements over the Gaza situation, which resulted in threats of economic sanctions, the imposition of sanctions on high-ranking Israeli officials, and the suspension of bilateral interests, the Israeli attack on Iran and the Iranian counterattack have reshaped European positions on Israel. Europeans face several challenges as a result of the Middle East conflict's growth, from those that are tactical, defining the parameters of intervention and participation, to the those more strategic, reshaping the region in the event that the conflict continues or intensifies qualitatively with the involvement of other actors. This might involve a threat to European interests, a disruption of energy supply, and an unstable security crisis.

The European stance seems to be split between three objectives: cooperating with the US without sacrificing strategic independence, backing Israel without condoning escalation, and restricting Iran without isolating it. It is challenging to maintain a balance between these objectives. Consequently, it is anticipated that the Israeli-Iranian conflict will impact European-Israeli relations, shift the power dynamics in the strained relationship with Washington, and change the nature of several interactions with Iran.

After weeks of intense disagreements over the Gaza situation, which resulted in threats of economic sanctions, the imposition of sanctions on high-ranking Israeli officials, and the suspension of bilateral interests, the Israeli attack on Iran and the Iranian counterattack have reshaped European positions on Israel. Europeans face several challenges as a result of the Middle East conflict's growth, from those that are tactical, defining the parameters of intervention and participation, to the those more strategic, reshaping the region in the event that the conflict continues or intensifies qualitatively with the involvement of other actors. This might involve a threat to European interests, a disruption of energy supply, and an unstable security crisis.

Israel and Europe: Union or Discord?

Extra-Regional Actors in the Middle East. RIAC Report

When Israel launched its first strike against Iran on June 13, most European responses were de-escalation appeals with implicit support for Israel. In a conversation with the Israeli president, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described the situation as "deeply alarming" and encouraged all sides to refrain from retaliation, de-escalate, and exercise moderation. For the interests of regional and international security, she continued, a diplomatic solution was more crucial than ever.

The EU's strong commitment to regional security, including the security of the state of Israel, was reiterated by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas in an informal video conference statement. She also urged all parties to respect international law, exercise caution, and refrain from any further actions that could have disastrous consequences, such as the possible release of radioactive materials.

European nations were split into two categories at the European level. The first group consists of the majority of European nations; without specifically denouncing Israel or Netanyahu's administration, Denmark, Italy, Finland, Ireland, Croatia, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom have expressed concern about the damage the Israeli attack poses to regional stability. The second group, which included Germany, France, and the Czech Republic made it clear that they supported Israel, citing "Israel's right to defend itself," but refrained from formally approving Israeli military action, particularly in light of growing concerns about escalation and regional conflict. They also charged Iran of pursuing its nuclear program. During a press conference in France, President Emmanuel Macron endorsed Israel's right to self-defense and contacted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu once more. Netanyahu "informed him of the Israeli attack on Iran in a phone call," according to Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany, who also stated that "Israel has the right to defend itself and that Iran must not develop nuclear weapons." The Israeli strikes on Iran were characterized by Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky as "a reasonable reaction from the state of Israel towards a possible threat of a nuclear bomb," adding that the Czech Republic "highly understands military action aimed at preventing the production of a nuclear bomb in the region."

Despite differences of perspective over the initial Israeli strike, Europeans agree on "the need for de-escalation." EU governments that openly backed Israel's right to "self-defense" – even though Israel initiated the escalation – called for defusing the situation. On Sunday, June 22, the French Foreign Ministry issued a statement declaring, "France has taken note with concern of the strikes carried out last night by the United States of America against three sites of Iran's nuclear program," in response to US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. It additionally asked "all parties to exercise restraint in order to avoid any escalation that could lead to a widening of the conflict.” Additionally, the security council of the German government convened. Iran was urged by Chancellor Friedrich Merz to engage in peace talks with the United States and Israel. Asserting that “Iran must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon, as it would be a threat to international security.” Kaja Kallas, the head of European Union foreign policy, repeated this position on the X media platform, calling on all parties to take a step back, get back to the negotiating table, and stop the situation from getting worse. This cautious attitude highlights Europe's efforts to balance its alliance with Israel and continue to play a mediating role in Middle Eastern diplomacy.

The European-Iranian contradiction over Tehran's missile and nuclear programs seems to be more important than the Israeli-European contradiction that has surfaced in recent weeks, a result of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, according to the European positions that have varied under the general heading of denouncing Israel. This is especially true given that the European stance on Iran encompasses more than just the conflict with Israel; it also includes broader alliances connected to the Ukrainian conflict, Iran's policies in Syria and Lebanon, its role in the Red Sea through the Houthi group in Yemen, and Iranian political and logistical support for Russia against Ukraine and the West. As a result, the European alliances that developed following the Israeli strike on Iran seem to be comparable to those that developed on October 7, 2023, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. By establishing a front with a shared enemy, Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was able to partially mend fences with his friends in European nations and prevent European pressure on Israel to halt the assault in Gaza. It is obvious that an Israeli attack on Iran may devalue humanitarian diplomacy and undermine Gaza's ceasefire efforts. According to prevailing political and media discourse, Netanyahu has partially succeeded in reorienting attention from denouncing Israeli actions in Gaza to organizing around the Israeli-Iranian conflict. This helps him achieve his objective of preserving the unity of his government with both foreign and domestic support.

Iran and Europe: Diplomacy or Containment?

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When Iran launched missile and drone attacks in April 2024 in retaliation for Israeli attacks, European nations, mainly the United Kingdom and France, used their Middle East capabilities to provide military and logistical support. The United Kingdom also supplied information and surveillance support, and British Royal Air Force Typhoon fighter jets, based at Royal Air Force Base Akrotiri in Cyprus and Romania, shot down multiple Iranian drones. France cooperated in intercepting Iranian drones and sent naval forces to support Israel, a move that was repeated in October 2024, when Iran retaliated against Israeli attacks.

Today, European countries—despite their political views tacitly supporting Israel—appear less enthused about intervening militarily, even indirectly. On the first day of the escalation, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that his country would defend Israel if attacked by Iran, adding that France had no intention of participating in any offensive operation and calling for a "diplomatic path." However, France, as it had done previously, did not participate in helping Israel repel an Iranian response. British planes are not currently aiding in Israel’s defense from any Iranian counterattacks, according to UK defense officials. This differs from last year, when RAF warplanes were ready to engage Iranian targets.

Several factors seem to be responsible for this shift in behavior. The first is the fear of joining the fight. If the United States, the United Kingdom, and France assist in preventing Iranian missile and drone reprisal for the Israeli attack, Iran has threatened to target its military sites and ships. This risks further growth in the conflict. Iran would probably play all its cards if Europe joined the US and Israel, and the battle would get out of hand with the possibility of an oil crisis or radioactive spillage. Secondly is the tactical posture of the US. At the beginning of the current conflict, US officials emphasized that the US was not involved in the Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear targets. "We are not involved in strikes against Iran and our top priority is protecting American forces in the region," US Secretary of State Marco Rubio asserted in a statement shortly after the strikes started on June 13. "Let me be clear: Iran should not target U.S. interests or personnel." Then US military struck Iran using deceit and decoys, according to US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who stated on Sunday, June 22, that America "does not seek war" despite an unexpected attack on Iranian nuclear targets overnight.

The course of the conflict between Iran and Israel will determine this European abstention from military action, though if events favor Iran, it will undoubtedly change to defensive engagement alongside Tel Aviv. In light of this, Britain has deployed more military equipment, such as fighter jets, to the Middle East to offer emergency assistance across the geographical region. This goes in line with Europe's containment without confrontation approach, which avoids getting involved in the planning of an Israeli assault while delivering a deterrent warning to Iran.

Diplomacy is currently the second avenue for European intervention. While the Iranians do not seem keen to resume negotiations, nearly all European and EU leaders are willing to hold immediate talks with Iran about its nuclear program in an effort to defuse the growing conflict.

More than merely double standards have been shown by the European Union's response to the US strikes on Iran; it has also shown a level of visualization so deep that the European capitals now voluntarily compromise both international law and their own strategic interests. Following similar remarks by the European Commission's president Ursula von der Leyen and High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, the E3's statement, which was signed by French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, perfectly captures this relinquishment.

Although Iran was actually in those very negotiations with the E3's foreign ministers on Friday, the day before the US strike, as it was getting ready to continue negotiations with the US in Oman prior to Israel starting the conflict a week earlier, the E3 – in typical Orwellian style – called on Tehran to "engage in negotiations leading to an agreement that addresses all concerns associated with its nuclear program." In actuality, Israel's choice to undermine U.S.-Iranian diplomatic efforts is proof that, in contrast to what the E3 presently suggests, Iran has taken negotiations seriously enough to make a new agreement a feasible possibility.

Europeans, on the other hand, do not have enough power to carry out their diplomatic strategy in the dispute. First, because Europe's mediation credibility is under doubt, especially after it failed to call out Israel's military action on June 13 and the US action on June 22. Rather, it provided tacit support by reaffirming its "right to self-defense," even while its nuclear file is still being negotiated. As a result, the Iranian side sees Europe as having a weak position. Furthermore, Tehran is fully aware that Europe has little impact on Benjamin Netanyahu's government's policy. Additionally, Tehran's nuclear and missile capabilities, as well as its regional influence continue to be major concerns for Europe. Even though there are still tactical imbalances, this concern brings it in line with US and Israeli strategic goals.

Second, Europe is unable to shape the conflict's outcome because it is currently going through its weakest phase and its geopolitical influence is waning, particularly given the Trump administration's pervasive inner political conflicts within the United States. This was made evident with the Oman Iranian nuclear negotiations in April, from which the Europeans were left out of, despite their active involvement in the Lausanne nuclear deal in 2015, during the Barack Obama administration. As a result, the United States appears to hold most of the leverage, both peaceful and violent, and Europe will only be involved in supporting or deferring to US policies.

Europe at the Crossroads

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Though it has undoubtedly and quickly strengthened the German-French-British tripartite alliance, which has recently started to crystallize on several levels and across multiple issues in counter to US policies, Israel's wide and qualitative opening of the Iranian front has exposed the limits of Europe's influence in the region. The European stance seems to be split between three objectives: cooperating with the US without sacrificing strategic independence, backing Israel without condoning escalation, and restricting Iran without isolating it. It is challenging to maintain a balance between these objectives. Consequently, it is anticipated that the Israeli-Iranian conflict will impact European-Israeli relations, shift the power dynamics in the strained relationship with Washington, and change the nature of several interactions with Iran.

The first is the connection with Israel: Short-term European criticism of Israel over the Gaza situation will be lessened, European attempts to terminate the economic partnership agreement with Tel Aviv will be halted, and Israeli-European relations will be strengthened by the confrontation with Iran. France's decision to delay the UN summit to resurrect the two-state solution—which Washington and Tel Aviv vehemently oppose—is a direct result of this. Nonetheless, European apprehensions over Israeli wrongdoings and a wish to steer clear of a complete partnership with the Netanyahu administration persist. However, in the long term, Israel's attack on Iran might signal a greater decline in European political and popular support, especially in governments like Spain, Belgium, and Ireland, where Europe is still committed to Israel's security but is growing increasingly irritated with its strategic choices and disdain for de-escalation initiatives. This might reduce Europe's ability to mediate the conflict and erode bilateral cooperation.

The second is the connection with Iran: Any remaining European influence over Tehran is probably going to be terminated due to the European position on the Israeli strike on Iran. Europe had been struggling to exert influence over Tehran in recent months, even prior to the attack. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action's framework has essentially run its course, and Iran seems to be siding more with Russia in the Ukraine crisis. Tehran is becoming more conscious that the United States is the party it needs to talk directly with and that Europe is weak. As a result, it seems that Europe's approach to Iran, which has been deteriorating since President Trump cancelled the Lausanne Agreement during his first term, is coming to an end. A more defensive approach that emphasizes containment, sanctions, and crisis management is taking its place, with the EU gaining momentum to reimpose or strengthen sanctions. However, the EU's influence over Iran is significantly reduced in the absence of political or military influence.

The third connection is that of the United States: Given its strategic alignment on Iran and its main objective of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear program, protecting Israel's security, and deterring regional conflict, a war between Israel and Iran offers the United States and Europe a chance to put aside differences. Additionally, there is a chance to improve coordination within NATO, even though the United States seems more accepting of Israel's aggressive posture, while Europe is more circumspect in provoking Iran. Nonetheless, considering Washington's vast and powerful political and military might, a war is probably going to make Europe more reliant on the US, especially in terms of regional policies. European concerns about relying excessively on US leadership in the Middle East are predicted to grow as a result of the crisis. Despite the lack of agreement and ability at the EU level, calls for a more independent EU foreign policy are becoming stronger, especially in France. Europe is more likely to withdraw as a result of the Israeli-Iranian confrontation, which will limit its ability to influence other matters including the conflict in Ukraine, transatlantic relations, and in its relations with Middle Eastern nations.