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William Eggerton

Student at the University of Birmingham

Like for many countries in the Western Balkans, the last few years have been a rollercoaster for Montenegro. The year 2020 started in uproar with protests against the new Law on Freedom of Religion, seeing tens of thousands of people march in protest in support of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the largest religious community in the country. This was then followed by even more protests in late December 2020 by those who opposed the new governments amendments to the Law, as well as fresh protests in April against a new Citizenship Law. All of this occurring in the background of the coronavirus pandemic which has left the country in a dire economic situation, with estimates from the OECD (2021) suggesting that country’s GDP has fallen by -12 to -14.9%.

The new government, which has been described as pro-Moscow and pro-Serb was quick to reassure the international community that Montenegro’s future lies in Europe and Montenegro will not deviate from the path to EU accession. Montenegro is already the front runner in the process. Furthermore, the country, together with Albania, is the only country to have consistently aligned themselves with 100% of the EU foreign policies decisions.

However, like other states in the Balkans who are aspiring to join the EU, Montenegro is faced with a similar problem that is beyond its control; EU expansion fatigue. The bloc is still yet to put a date on the opening of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia after Bulgaria’s veto (in the case of North Macedonia) and there are many voices within the bloc, most notably France, who are against further accession. It was France, together with the Netherlands, who first blocked the opening of accession agreements with the two countries in 2019, and it does not seem that this hard stance by President Macron is likely to change in the near future.

If there is one thing that is clear, it is that the transition of power is not going to be instantaneous and the DPS is not going to relinquish power without a fight. The party is deeply rooted within the parliament and the judiciary and getting rid of them is not going to be easy.

Like for many countries in the Western Balkans, the last few years have been a rollercoaster for Montenegro. The year 2020 started in uproar with protests against the new Law on Freedom of Religion, seeing tens of thousands of people march in protest in support of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the largest religious community in the country (Kajosevic, 2020). This was then followed by even more protests in late December 2020 by those who opposed the new governments amendments to the Law, as well as fresh protests in April against a new Citizenship Law with calls that it could “erase the Montenegrin state and national identity” (Kajosevic, 2021A). All of this occurring in the background of the coronavirus pandemic which has left the country in a dire economic situation, with estimates from the OECD (2021) suggesting that country’s GDP has fallen by -12 to -14.9%. The new government, which came to power in 2020 defeating the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) for the first time in 30 years, has much on its plate; and many doubts have arisen concerning the government’s intended path and whether it will be able to release Montenegro from its current state of intrinsic stagnation in areas such as corruption and speed up the process of European integration.

New government, old problems

The ousting of Milo Đukanović and the DPS can be seen as a milestone for Montenegro. Despite his pro-European and pro-Atlantic approach which saw Montenegro become a member of NATO in 2017, his tenure in power has been marked by widespread corruption, state capture of key institutions and a crackdown on press freedom. Montenegro suffers from an undeveloped democratic system which has allowed semi-autocratic leaders to strongly influence political processes and paved the way for widespread patronage networks to emerge. As a result, the judiciary, as noted by the Montenegrin think tank Institut Alternativa, is controlled by the DPS, which has led to questionable results in the area of investigations in cases of high corruption. In many instances, the Agency for Prevention of Corruption did not even pursue an investigation (European Western Balkans, 2021). There have been several affairs which have shone light on the independence of the judiciary; however, the “flats” affair particularly shook the public’s confidence. In 2019, the government revealed that it had been giving loans and flats on very favourable terms to a number of senior judges (Marović, 2021). As a result, 57.3% of Montenegrins believe that the judiciary fails to protect the rights of its own citizens. On paper, Montenegro has done much in order to fulfil the demands required of an EU candidate country in order to combat corruption and strengthen the legal and institutional framework. However, the amendments taken and laws passed are limited in scope, and their implementation has been insufficient. The country still lacks an effective framework for the fight against corruption and the action plan formed to fulfil Chapter 23 of the association negotiations which covers anti-corruption measures is outdated and has only been updated once which was in 2015 (Marović, 2019).

In addition to the boundless corruption scandals, tarnishing the reputation of the small state, the country, according to Reporters Without Borders, has one of the worst press freedom environments in the whole of the Western Balkans with only Bulgaria having a lower score (Reporters Without Borders, 2021)—a figure, which ultimately jeopardises the country’s EU accession process and has caused much concern from Brussels. A case against the newspaper Vjesti is particularly striking as, even though the paper has been under constant attack since 2011 with five vehicles to date having been burnt and various reporters beaten, the police have not managed to resolve any of the issues and not one person has been accused, hinting at the possible support by the judiciary or the DPS (Beiber & Kmezic, 2015). Smear campaigning is also a problem which threatens the health and well-being of reporters belonging to the free press. A recent example was the smear campaign used to attack journalists who were critical of the government in the run up to the 2020 parliamentary elections, calling the journalists “collaborators of the Serbian secret services” as well as providing personal information about them (Reporters Without Borders, 2020).

It is in the background of this democratic decay in which the new government finds itself, with most of the power, even though not formally, belonging to the DPS. Đukanović has already stated that he will not sign proposed changes to the law governing prosecution appointments. A change that, although has been criticised by the Venice Commission, is necessary in order rid the prosecution office of corruption and loyalists of the DPS. However, the agenda of the new government itself is largely unknown, and whether it will survive the full four years is an even bigger mystery as the current government only holds a very slim majority of one Member of Parliament. At the current moment, the three parties are united in their fight against the DPS and the rule of Đukanović; however, the strings may soon become loose and divisions may start to appear within the coalition. At face value, the new government has much technical experience, however for some including the prime minister himself, politics is something completely new and navigating through the complex waves of Balkan politics is something that not everyone is gifted with. Despite their brief time in power, the government has had to deal with many problems, most notably the pushback from the Law on Religion and the proposed government debates on the Law of Citizenship (Dragojlovic, 2021), less to mention the rifts which are already beginning to show, damaging the alliance with the largest party, The Democratic Front, recently boycotting parliamentary procedures and accusing the prime minister of working with the DPS (Kajosevic, 2021B).

A European future?

The new government, which has been described as pro-Moscow and pro-Serb was quick to reassure the international community that Montenegro’s future lies in Europe and Montenegro will not deviate from the path to EU accession. Montenegro is already the front runner in the process and, according to the results of a public opinion poll conducted in November and December 2020 on behalf of the Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, 77.6% of Montenegrin citizens have a positive attitude towards the EU and the country has opened all chapters with three provisionally closed (European Union External Action Service, 2021). Furthermore, the country, together with Albania, is the only country to have consistently aligned themselves with 100% of the EU foreign policies decisions.

However, like other states in the Balkans who are aspiring to join the EU, Montenegro is faced with a similar problem that is beyond its control; EU expansion fatigue. The bloc is still yet to put a date on the opening of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia after Bulgaria’s veto (in the case of North Macedonia) and there are many voices within the bloc, most notably France, who are against further accession. It was France, together with the Netherlands, who first blocked the opening of accession agreements with the two countries in 2019, and it does not seem that this hard stance by President Macron is likely to change in the near future as he is looking to appease the right-wing voters of the country who are mostly against further immigration in the run-up to the Presidential elections in 2022 (Crowcroft, 2021). The effects of the coronavirus pandemic and Brexit have also shifted attention away from the region, with expansion no longer being a priority for the EU.

If there is one thing that is clear, it is that the transition of power is not going to be instantaneous and the DPS is not going to relinquish power without a fight. The party is deeply rooted within the parliament and the judiciary and getting rid of them is not going to be easy. A task made all the more challenging with the recent protests and the effects of the pandemic. As the recent religious protests have shown, Montenegro is still a deeply divided nation with a lot of the politics fuelled by ethno-nationalism and made worse by politicians who play the ethnic card in order to achieve short term gains. In such environments, it does not take much for the spark to be ignited leading to violence based on ethnic grounds. With this in mind and taking into account the coalition’s unstable footing, Đukanović will do much in order to entice the smaller parties in the coalition to leave, triggering new elections where he would still have a good chance of being re-elected. Although there is hope that the ruling coalition will be able to muster up more support and achieve its aims, at the moment it is looking unlikely that it will survive.

Bibliography

Bieber, F and Kmezic, M. (2015) Media Freedom in the Western Balkans, Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, Available at: http://biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BIEPAG-Media-Freedom-in-the-Western-Balkans.pdf

Crowcroft, O. (2021) ‘Albania is no closer to joining the EU. Its leaders might prefer it that way’, Euronews, 23 April, Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2021/04/23/albania-is-no-closer-to-joining-the-eu-its-leaders-might-prefer-it-that-way

Cuckić, N. (2021) ‘Fight against corruption will not be an easy task for the new Montenegrin government’, European Western Balkans, 29 January, Available at: https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2021/01/29/fight-against-corruption-will-not-be-an-easy-task-for-the-new-montenegrin-government/

Dragojlovic, M. (2021) ‘Montenegro: Crowds take to the streets amid debate on amendments to Law on Citizenship’, Independent Balkan News Agency, 8 April, Available at: https://balkaneu.com/montenegro-crowds-take-to-the-streets-amid-debate-on-amendments-to-law-on-citizenship/

European Union External Action Service. (2021) ‘Support to Montenegro's EU membership greatly increased’, European Union External Action Service, 15 January, Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/91477/support-montenegros-eu-membership-greatly-increased_en

Kajosievic, S. (2020) ‘Tensions Rise in Montenegro After Protesters Clash with Police’, Balkan Insight, 28 January, Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2020/01/28/tensions-rise-in-montenegro-after-protesters-clash-with-police/

Kajosievic, S. (2021A) ‘Montenegro Delays Law Easing Citizenship Amid Opposition Protests’, Balkan Insight, 8 April, Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2021/04/08/montenegro-delays-law-easing-citizenship-amid-opposition-protests/

Kajosievic, S. (2021B) ‘Montenegro Govt in Crisis as Coalition Partner Announces Boycott’, Balkan Insight, 18 June, Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2021/06/18/montenegro-govt-in-crisis-as-coalition-partner-announces-boycott/

Marović, J. (2021) Nations in Transit 2021 Montenegro Executive Summary. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/montenegro/nations-transit/2021

Marović, J. (2019) ‘Politicised institutions are key obstacle to fighting corruption in Montenegro’, The Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, 1 November, Available at: https://biepag.eu/politicised-institutions-are-key-obstacle-to-fighting-corruption-in-montenegro/

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, (2021) THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN MONTENEGRO, 31 January, Available at: https://www.oecd.org/south-east-europe/COVID-19-Crisis-in-Montenegro.pdf

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Reprters Without Borders, (2020) ‘Montenegro: Witchhunt against investigative reporters on eve of parliamentary elections’, Reporters Without Borders, 27 August, Available at: https://rsf.org/en/news/montenegro-witchhunt-against-investigative-reporters-eve-parliamentary-elections


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