Israel Will Have to Negotiate with Hamas

The war in the Gaza Strip has already passed the nine-month mark. Since the events of October 7 last year, there has been an unprecedented uptick of violence in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict zone. No solution to the fundamental problems related to the Palestinian–Israeli issue has been found yet, while the risks of escalation in the Middle East amid tensions on the Lebanese–Israeli border have mounted over the past few weeks.

How viable is a settlement of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict based on the “two states for two peoples” formula? How has the role of non-state actors in regional processes changed in recent months? What are the risks of escalation on the Lebanese–Israeli border? These and other questions were addressed by Vladimir Morozov, Vice-Rector of MGIMO University, in an interview for RIAC with its Program Coordinator Ivan Bocharov.

The war in the Gaza Strip has already passed the nine-month mark. Since the events of October 7 last year, there has been an unprecedented uptick of violence in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict zone. No solution to the fundamental problems related to the Palestinian–Israeli issue has been found yet, while the risks of escalation in the Middle East amid tensions on the Lebanese–Israeli border have mounted over the past few weeks.

How viable is a settlement of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict based on the “two states for two peoples” formula? How has the role of non-state actors in regional processes changed in recent months? What are the risks of escalation on the Lebanese–Israeli border? These and other questions were addressed by Vladimir Morozov, Vice-Rector of MGIMO University, in an interview for RIAC with its Program Coordinator Ivan Bocharov.

Vladimir Mikhailovich, not so long ago a delegation from MGIMO University visited Jerusalem and Ramallah, the administrative center of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Could you please tell us about the current situation in Israel and Palestine.

Aleksandr Aksenenok:
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It is difficult to give an unbiased assessment of the situation in Israel and Palestine as a whole. In terms of security, while there are outbreaks of violence in the area of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, this is certainly not the case inside Jerusalem. At the same time, there is a very tense information background in Israel as it conducts two parallel military operations: in the south, in the Gaza Strip, and on the northern border with Lebanon, the scene of a military confrontation with Hezbollah. As for Ramallah, there are no major clashes there. Yet, the Israeli army conducts regular raids in the Palestinian territories after it receives information about the presence of radical elements supporting Hamas in some areas of the West Bank. Israeli security forces enter the territories under the PNA control from time to time, trying to detain someone and storming private homes. But this did not happen during our stay in the West Bank.

And what issues were discussed during the visit?

We had a meeting at the Russian Mission to the PNA with the Mission’s head, Gocha Levanovich Buachidze, who warmly received us. He briefed us on the activities of the Russian Mission in Ramallah and the difficulties they face in the current circumstances. In particular, when the Israeli military conducts its routine raids in the Palestinian territories, and the staff of our diplomatic mission cannot always leave the compound where they work due to security issues. At the same time, we are actively interacting with the Palestinian side and maintaining regular political contacts with the PNA leadership. All analytics prepared after such meetings are sent to Moscow and are taken into consideration when formulating Russia’s foreign policy toward Israel and Palestine.

During the visit we also had interesting meetings at the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem. We discussed the specifics of the Mission’s activities in Israel and the status of land lots that have belonged to the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission since the times of the Russian Empire: the problems related to the status of those parcels of land, the titles to which particular plots were lost, and what land titles Russia managed to reclaim. This is related to many issues handled not only by the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, but also by the Russian Embassy in Israel.

Let’s discuss the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. In your opinion, how viable is a settlement based on the “two states for two peoples” framework? Or perhaps there is some other way out of the current dead-end, some other alternative that would suit both sides?

There is always a way out of any predicament. If we are talking about the viability of the two-state solution, we need to look at the official positions of the countries that endorse this formula. I will remind you that the solution based on the “two states for two peoples” principle was supported by the UN back in 1947, but, as we know, it was never implemented. In the 1990s, the Palestinian and Israeli sides came quite close to resolving the conflict under this formula, when the Oslo I and Oslo II accords were signed. These agreements were not put into practice for objective reasons. Palestine’s borders have not been defined yet, although this is one of the main features of any state.

But there is also another aspect to the problem: Palestine is recognized as an independent state by most countries. If we look at the set of components that characterize a state, it includes international recognition. Palestine is a unique case: its territory is not fully under Palestinian control; it lacks borders and its own currency. Yet it enjoys international recognition. Another wave of recognition of Palestinian statehood, first of all in Europe, followed the latest flare-up in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. And this is one of the factors why Palestine is perceived by most nations as an independent state.

As for the two-state solution, there are many opinions that it is no longer possible as Israel absorbed some West Bank territories through the expansion of Jewish settlements. The Israeli settlement policy is recognized as illegal, including by the U.S. and EU members. The West Bank is split into more than 90 isolated “islands.” Some experts to the question “will or will not the state of Palestine be ever established” ask their own question in return: where and on what territories? Territory is an integral part of a state, and the territorial issue, one of the most important ones in the history of Palestinian statehood, has not been addressed yet.

There are Palestinian borders set out in international agreements, and their delineation is considered to have started in 1967. While there is some clarity in the case of the Gaza Strip — at least it has defined borders and all Israeli settlements were withdrawn from there in 2005 — the opposite is true of the West Bank, given that more and more Israeli citizens are settling there. New Jewish settlements are still being established, and Israel has no plans to pull them out.

The official position of most countries is that it is necessary to move in line with UN Resolution 181 on the creation of two states. This rhetoric continues to prevail. But we see a different situation “on the ground.” Other solutions to the issue are being proposed. For example, not so long ago a narrative emerged in Israel that there is no need to create a Palestinian state because it already exists, and this state is called Jordan. I should remind you that about half of the Jordanian population is ethnic Palestinians. The wife of the King of Jordan, Her Majesty Queen Rania, is also an ethnic Palestinian. This point of view is very convenient for Israel. It is necessary to make a point of noting that this is not the official Israeli standpoint, but the opinion of an Israeli scholar. Nevertheless, there are different approaches to resolving this issue.

Whenever Israel was involved in the past military conflicts, it shunned protracted hostilities. And in that sense, the Gaza operation is unlike previous wars Israel fought. Why is the war we have seen since last October following a different scenario?

A look at the history of Arab–Israeli conflicts since 1948 reveals a clear downward trend in the number of belligerents on the Arab side. First there were seven, then five, then three. The last time Israel was directly at war with an Arab country was in 1973. Then there was, for example, the operation in Lebanon, but it was a different kind of confrontation. So, there is no armed conflict between Israel and Arab countries anymore. But the operation in Gaza is another type of conflict, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. And here we need to look at the history of Israel’s military campaigns in the Gaza Strip. There have already been two intifadas, and now we are witnessing the third spike in the Palestinian–Israeli confrontation. Yet the scale of the confrontation has never been so large. Israel has on many occasions invaded the Gaza Strip and had direct military control over it. But no prior hostilities can match the scale of the ongoing fighting. Terrorists in the Gaza Strip would be eliminated, and their homes destroyed as a punishment. Israel once put an even greater pressure on the Gaza Strip. For example, former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who came from a military background, ordered to have houses in the Gaza Strip knocked down with bulldozers, pounding tracks for military vehicles.

But all of that still cannot match the scale of the ongoing military operation. All because the First Intifada, which lasted from 1987 to 1993, was a “war of stones”: back then, Israeli police officers and the army were mostly pelted with stones. In October 2023, Israeli intelligence, seen as one of the most advanced in the world, overlooked the extensive preparations for the incursion.

What happened on October 7 was a massive blow to Israel. The scale of casualties was unprecedented since the 1970s. Over 1,000 people were killed, some taken hostage. This is a big problem. Under these circumstances, the Israeli leadership and military needed to offer something to the public and promise a tough response. That’s how the massive operation began. Never before has Israel bombed the Gaza Strip and the city itself in this way or cleared out the enclave from its north to Khan Younis in the south. This is the difference from all previous clashes in Gaza.

There is a view that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is deliberately dragging out the fighting out of concern for his political future. To what extent do you think this opinion is valid?

Andrey Kortunov:
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It is quite difficult to prove that the operation is being deliberately protracted. After the October 7 attack, Israel’s leadership set a specific goal — nothing less than destroying Hamas. So far, Israel has failed to do so. Is it because the hostilities are being deliberately dragged out or because the military situation is difficult? It is not quite clear. Now there has been a noticeable shift in the rhetoric in Israel’s information field. An argument is catching on that the goal of the military operation in Gaza is not to destroy Hamas, but to remove it from ruling the enclave. Let me remind you that Hamas has had complete control of life in the Gaza Strip since 2007.

Many hold Benjamin Netanyahu responsible for the events of October 7. The Israeli public has questions. The Gaza Strip is a relatively small territory, enclosed entirely by a concrete fence, with a border that was under round-the-clock surveillance of Israeli troops. Missiles were recurrently fired from there toward Israel, reaching Israeli towns farther and farther away: first in the south, then in the center, and finally in the north. In other words, the range of projectiles launched from the Gaza Strip at Israeli cities was constantly increasing. Why were there not enough troops on the border on October 7 to deal with this threat? That is the question. And Israeli society is deeply worried about what happened.

It is obvious to everyone that it spells the end of Benjamin Netanyahu’s political career. And it is not just about him being 74 years of age. Very serious inquiries are sure to follow the end of the operation. I will remind you that after the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when there was a month of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, the Israeli army did not win. The outcome of the war was the signing of an EU-brokered ceasefire agreement with those whom Israel perceives as terrorists. This was something unprecedented. After all, Israel was fighting not even a country, but a non-state actor, and failed to win. It is still seen as an open wound in Israeli society. Something similar is happening now.

So, there’s a lot of food for thought in terms of the Israeli prime minister’s political career and his possible inclination to drag feet. Some experts share this view. They mean that the authorities tried to open several criminal cases against Benjamin Netanyahu, but he always managed somehow to come off unscathed. Nevertheless, he has certain concerns because the Israeli judicial system is independent. There have been cases in Israel’s history when senior officials, both incumbent and retired, were put behind bars. For example, in 2007, Israeli President Moshe Katsav was suspended and then imprisoned after being found guilty of harassing his female employees. Another example is Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who was jailed after his involvement in corruption schemes came to light, including during his tenure as mayor of Jerusalem.

I think there will be many attempts to prove Benjamin Netanyahu’s involvement in corruption schemes. The domestic political agenda has now grown critical of the prime minister’s moves. It has always been like that: there has not been an Israeli prime minister who has not been the target of criticism. The situation with the hostages, most of whom are likely to be alive, is also tipping the scales against Netanyahu and the Israeli public is demanding that they be brought back home. The blame for the hostage situation is pinned on the Israeli leadership as it, according to the opposition, is not doing enough to release these people from captivity.

Under the current circumstances, what are the chances of the opposition coming to power, in your opinion? And if that might be the case, can we expect the Israeli authorities to adjust their policy toward the Palestinians?

It is difficult to make any accurate predictions. Especially since there is a different opposition in Israel. For example, in the past, the difference in approaches to solving the Palestinian problem between Likud, representing the right-wing camp, and Israeli left-wing labor party HaAvoda was more pronounced. Back then, it was clear that the Oslo Accords were struck by Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, from the left camp. Yitzhak Rabin was shot dead in 1995, and the following year Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of Israel. Immediately after that, Israeli settlements started rising in the West Bank.

Today, however, politics is not so clear-cut because the country is run by a coalition government. Even if a party wins, it has to form a coalition and pursue foreign and domestic policy with an eye to the opinions of those who join the government from other parties, including religious ones. The latter’s attitude to the Palestinian issue is unequivocal: “there should be no Palestine.” If the national leadership does not take into account the opinion of the parties in the coalition government, it will collapse and new elections will be held.

In such a parliamentary democracy much also depends on the personality. There have been examples in Israel’s political history when a certain personality put their own vision into practice despite criticism and opposition. Ariel Sharon was a political leader of this type, for instance. The withdrawal of Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2005 drew a barrage of criticism against him, and the society was effectively polarized. It was a hard decision, yet Sharon made it nonetheless. Another politician, the already mentioned Yitzhak Rabin, took it upon himself to sign agreements with Palestine that brought the two nations closer to mutual recognition. And he paid for it with his life.

There is a perception that Israel “doesn’t talk to terrorists.” But this is not quite so. Israel will have to negotiate with Hamas. The movement knows very well that the longer it holds the hostages, the greater the chance that Israel will not be able to raze Gaza quickly, since both Israeli citizens and foreigners will then suffer. So prolonging hostilities is not always about someone’s seeking to retain a high post and avoid jail. There are also some objective reasons for this.

How has the role of non-state actors in regional processes changed in recent months?

Everything that is happening now is the result of certain processes that have been underway for decades. Russia does not support the attacks that took place. And I personally do not support them. Yet Hamas’s decision to launch this attack may have been seen by this non-state actor as a last-ditch attempt to make its presence known.

Hamas tried to draw attention to the Palestinian problem in a radical way, through hostage-taking, shelling and shootings. Did it have an effect? It did. It was a kind of a hard message: “heed our plight.” Another quasi-state actor, Hezbollah, has opened a simmering front in northern Israel. Now the Israeli media landscape is all about whether a war with Hezbollah will break out soon. In the past, nobody but Middle East experts heard about the Houthis. This non-state actor controls substantial territories in Yemen, and now it is shelling ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. These people may not have changed the course of the world history, but at least they have changed the course of world trade. Routes through the Red Sea have grown unpopular. And this too has become an important message by non-state actors.

The recognition of Palestinian statehood by several countries, primarily from Europe, was the result of the events of October 7, which was an attempt by Hamas to bring the Palestinian problem to the attention of the world community. In this sense, the reaction of the Arab states is quite noteworthy. We used to always put the Palestinian–Israeli conflict at the center of the Arab–Israeli confrontation. But this is no longer the case. Egypt made peace with Israel in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994. In 2020, the Abraham Accords were signed and official relations were established with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco. There was no hard and consolidated Arab reaction to the events that followed the Hamas attack on Israel. In fact, we can say that the “Arab front” fell apart.

Sooner or later, Israel’s operation in the Gaza Strip will end and some solution will be found. The media landscape in Israel suggests there are some attempts at dialogue with Hamas to rescue the hostages. At the same time, Israel is reluctant to declare a lasting truce, as it fears that Hamas might gain strength. Therefore, military pressure continues to be exerted.

So, we can say that non-state actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis have managed to catch everyone’s eyes and assert themselves as independent players capable of influencing regional processes.

What are your reflections on the risks of further escalation on the Lebanese–Israeli border? How likely is it that the IDF will carry out an operation against Hezbollah?

Igor Subbotin:
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Israel is in a double whammy of having two different fronts open. It is hard enough for it to conduct military operations on two fronts. Although there is no official war, we know the IDF and Hezbollah do trade fire. It should also be kept in mind that Hezbollah has a lot more weapons and manpower, and under these circumstances Israel is not interested in starting hostilities by moving its army into Lebanon.

The simmering front on the Lebanese–Israeli border has remained so for a long time because Israel is now focused on the Gaza Strip, and it would be hard to have the military operation there alongside a war in Lebanon. I should remind you that southern Israel is not so densely populated. The situation is different in the north, and the damage to local infrastructure can be much more serious.

Another important aspect is the position of the United States, which quite recently held consultations with the leadership of Israel and Lebanon on preventing a further escalation of the conflict. Washington understands that a potential Israeli military operation in Lebanon would be associated with the U.S., and it would be compelled to ensure a certain military presence in the region and supply Israel with ammunition. But the U.S. is no longer able to provide for all conflicts in the world where its allies are involved.

U.S. President Joseph Biden officially declares support for Israel. And there was a statement that in the event of war between Israel and Hezbollah, the United States will support its ally. At the same time, the U.S. is making efforts to preclude this war.

Is Hezbollah interested in intensifying hostilities? Opinions differ on this point. Hezbollah is one of Israel’s main adversaries, all the more so because Iran is backing it. That being said, Hezbollah is deeply integrated into Lebanon’s political landscape. It is not a full-fledged non-state actor as the movement is represented in both the Lebanese government and parliament. Furthermore, Hezbollah has a paramilitary wing that is not part of the Lebanese army and has controlled the whole of southern Lebanon for many years. In 2006, it was Hezbollah, not Lebanon, that fought Israel from Lebanon’s south. Is Hezbollah capable of inflicting significant damage on Israel? Yes, it is. Is it prepared to do so? Many experts concur that it is not. Because in response to Hezbollah’s attacks, the Israeli army will bomb Lebanese territory, and it is this political movement that will be responsible for whatever may happen: for the damage that might be done to Lebanon, for the destruction of infrastructure and the decline in people’s living standards. And Lebanon, which is already in chronic crisis, will suffer greatly.

Iran is not interested in escalating the situation on the Lebanese–Israeli border either. It certainly has a powerful army and a large territory; if hostilities break out and the U.S. intervenes, Iran will last the longest. But I think Iran has no interest in an open confrontation either now or in the future. It is ready to stoke tensions, but it is not ready to engage in large-scale fighting.

Israel, however, is not ruling out the possibility of Iran’s direct involvement in the conflict. Yet no one is interested in a full-blown war.

Can the U.S. military build-up in the region be seen as a demonstration of its readiness to use force to protect Israel from possible threats?

Of course, that is precisely the purpose for this military build-up. When Israel launched an operation in the Gaza Strip in response to the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, regional forces, including the Houthis and Iran, stepped up their activities. The first thing the United States did was sending an aircraft carrier group to the eastern Mediterranean. They did not mean to use it but demonstrated that if anyone dared to intervene in the conflict, the U.S. would be there to support Israel. Meanwhile, the United States also supplies Israel with ammunition and weapons.

In case of any emergencies, the U.S. quite often sends additional forces to Israel’s shores, or to the Persian Gulf. If military tensions rise dramatically, the U.S. will anyway hesitate whether to use military force or not. After all, it would require authorization from Congress. The U.S. will not be able to launch a military operation for no good reason. Respective decisions have to be made first, which will take some time. So, I think that a larger military presence is essentially a show of force. And they will always be able to promptly ramp up their military footprint and send more aircraft carriers to the Middle East. They have military bases all over the world, so such moves will not take much time.

Do you think the polarization of American society and growing support for the Palestinians may influence the U.S. policy toward Israel?

Societies in different countries have different views on the Palestinian–Israeli confrontation. But here you have to look first of all at the elites and what decisions they make. Pro-Palestinian demonstrations on the street is one thing, and the authorities’ stance is quite another.

Right now, the situation in Palestinian–Israeli relations is extremely ominous. Fighting is underway; tens of thousands of people are being killed. These are very serious casualties. Not to mention the delayed effect of infrastructure damage and how many years it will take for post-conflict reconstruction to be completed. It is terrible to imagine. But under these circumstances, the reaction of the Arab public seems more restrained than one might expect. That said, there have been many protests in Paris, London, New York, in Canadian and Australian cities. Demonstrations in support of Palestine have been held in many Western countries that officially support Israel. And not only refugees or ethnic Palestinians take part in these rallies. Nevertheless, the official authorities of those countries generally remain pro-Israeli.

The U.S. has always supported Israel. And every American president has seen it one of his main goals to engage in the Middle East settlement. Just think of numerous program announcements, negotiations, peace summits, including those that succeeded! The Camp David Accords and the Egypt–Israel peace treaty were signed in the 1970s with U.S. assistance. The same is true of the Israel–Jordan peace treaty signed in 1994. The Oslo Accords were mediated by Norway but were signed on the White House lawn. The Abraham Accords were also promoted by the U.S. leadership. In the meantime, the U.S. continued to provide strategic support for Israel and maintained allied relations with it. Washington does harp on about the need to solve the Palestinian problem in keeping with the “two states for two peoples” formula. But what kind of a two-state solution can be implemented if then-U.S. President Donald Trump, for example, built his policy exclusively in favor of Israel?

Let me digress a bit from our topic. Now everyone is busily discussing what is happening in relations between Israel and Palestine and the prospects for a peaceful settlement, while accusing and stigmatizing everyone. But for some reason everyone has forgotten about Donald Trump’s role in settling the Palestinian issue, which in my view was completely negative. For some reason, no one recalls it. Nobody remembers, for example, the “Deal of the Century” unveiled by him, although it was nothing less than an attempt at solving the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. The plan was big and extensive: it implied both some economic measures and land swaps. Donald Trump and his aides drew up the “Deal of the Century” and discussed it with the Israeli leadership but did not coordinate this plan with the Palestinians. This caused much resentment on the part of the Palestinians who refused to negotiate on this topic in principle.

After that, the U.S. pushed some Arab countries toward establishing relations with Israel within the framework of the Abraham Accords. This lifted another Arab blockade: diplomatic relations were established and direct flights were launched. Through this political maneuvering during Donald Trump’s presidency, Israel got some positive breakthroughs in the normalization of its relations with Arab nations. And everyone has forgotten about the Palestinians. We should also not overlook the relocation of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In fact, this means recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Before that, the U.S. kept delaying this decision, and its embassy was for many years located in Tel Aviv, the internationally recognized Israeli capital. Moreover, the Golan Heights, occupied following the war with Syria and not recognized by the UN as Israeli territory, were recognized by the United States as part of Israel. Can this be called a balanced position?

I do not think that the next U.S. administration will have a more weighted position on the Palestinian–Israeli issue. Today we see how the Democratic Party implements its policy. Let’s assume that Donald Trump will be the next U.S. president. In that case, he will proceed with the pro-Israeli course that he pursued four years ago. For now, I do not see any prospects for a fundamental U-turn in the approaches of the U.S. elites to the Palestinian–Israeli issue.

How do you see the current state of Russian–Israeli relations?

Regional Trends in the Middle East: Political and Economic Dynamics. RIAC Report

Russian–Israeli relations have a solid and positive footing. From my perspective, it was so, perhaps, also due to personal ties and contacts between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who have been in contact for many years and, it seems to me, have always sympathized with each other. Israel has always been a constructive partner for us.

With that said, Israel has always criticized Russia for its ties with Hamas and Hezbollah. Continued contacts with Hamas are automatically perceived in Israel as supporting terrorist activity. We have repeatedly stated that we cannot support either terrorist or military activity. Russia maintains political contacts, including with Hamas and Hezbollah. But for Israeli society, this has always been and will always be an aggravating factor in Russian–Israeli relations. Israel’s arch enemies are Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, while we have constructive relations with them. Let me remind you that Hamas and Hezbollah are designated as terrorist organizations in Israel, while in Russia they are not. This is also brought up against us. But we have our point as well. Each country has its own list of terrorist organizations, determined by the extent to which an organization poses a direct threat to national security. For us, the activities of Hamas and Hezbollah do not pose a direct threat. Meanwhile, we do not condone their military activity against Israel.

Few people know that the Taliban movement was not on the list of terrorist organizations in the United States. In Russia it is, but now it is most likely to be delisted. In other words, each country decides for itself which organization poses a threat to it. Moreover, not all Western countries recognize Hamas as a terrorist group. In some of them only its military wing is designated as a terrorist organization. But for some reason we do not hear any criticism of those countries from Israel.

Bilateral relations between Russia and Israel have taken a hit since the start of the special military operation and the introduction of sanctions against Russia. Israel, which did not impose sanctions on Russia either after 2014 or 2022, is having a rather hard time under pressure from the U.S., its main ally and security guarantor.

For all that, Israel has taken, in my view, a constructive stance on sanctions-related issues. Israeli authorities have long stated that their country will not be used to bypass sanctions. However, they themselves have not aligned with these sanctions, and I believe it to be a very positive thing. In addition, there are direct flights between our countries. But under Western pressure Israeli society has taken an anti-Russian stance. In the current political environment, the Israeli establishment cannot but mirror the public mood.

Meanwhile, Russia and Israel still keep in touch with each other, though I would like the level of working contacts to be a little higher.

Has the potential of international mediators such as extra-regional actors and the UN to resolve the Palestinian–Israeli conflict been exhausted?

I think that the potential has not been exhausted. For decades after the start of the violent phase of the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Palestinian–Israeli confrontation, individual states and groups of states have been making efforts to normalize relations between the warring parties. These issues have been addressed, among other things, in the UN General Assembly and Security Council. There are other examples of successful mediation efforts. For example, during the Second Lebanon War, then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy brokered on behalf of the EU. So, the assistance of an extra-regional actor was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire agreement and resolving the crisis between Israel and Hezbollah.

Another case study is the work of the Middle East Quartet, which included the U.S., Russia, the UN and the EU. There are different opinions about its effectiveness, but it functioned nonetheless. Members of the Middle East Quartet were in contact with both the Israelis and the Palestinians. The question was not so much about a comprehensive settlement of the conflict as it was about maintaining positive dynamics. It was a very representative international mechanism with two co-sponsors, Russia and the United States, as well as two international organizations: a regional one, the EU, and a universal one, the UN. And while no one expected any breakthrough solution from this joint effort, it nevertheless worked fine. However, after 2014, that mechanism was wound down, not on our initiative. The U.S. took the lead, trying to solve the Palestinian–Israeli conflict in the spirit of supporting one side.

Meanwhile, the two-state solution remains on the agenda. The United States does not say that it favors a one-state solution, in which the Palestinian territories will be part of Israel. And the name of this state will be Israel, not some confederation, whether Palestinian or Middle Eastern.

And even the U.S. is still committed to the idea of two states, although in reality it supports only one side. Some experts attribute this to the role of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. political establishment, which is rather active under any administration.

But even with such a pessimistic picture that has taken shape now, there is hope that the international community will be more actively engaged in solving the Palestinian problem. And we see that some nations are beginning to recognize the state of Palestine in the teeth of Israel. Armenia was the latest to do so, and prior to that Norway, Ireland and Spain recognized Palestinian statehood. So, they are also making attempts to break the impasse in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.