The Tripolar World and the Bloc Triangles of East Asia
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Doctor of Philological Sciences, Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor at the Financial University, RIAC Member
Leading Research Fellow at the Korean Studies Center, RAS Institute for Far Eastern Studies, RIAC expert
At the beginning of this decade, the world entered a period of great turmoil. Such transitional moments, inevitable during the collapse of obsolete international systems and the emergence of new ones, happen with increasing frequency (1618-1648, 1792-1815, 1914-1919, 1938-1945, 1988-1992). The current transitional period is characterized by the following processes.
Firstly, developing countries are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the world order in which the U.S. and the “collective West” dictate their will to others. The Western “rules-based order” is perceived as imposed by Washington, and international organizations—which ought to act as arbitrators—are instead seen as passing off Western sanctions and military interventions as the will of the international community. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “The global majority, representing 85 percent of the world’s population, advocates a more equitable distribution of global resources and respect for cultural diversity, as well as consistent democratization of international affairs” (Lavrov, 2023). U.S. President Joe Biden also speaks of a new system: “I think we have an opportunity to do things, if we’re bold enough and have enough confidence in ourselves, to unite the world in ways that it never has been. We were in a post-war period for 50 years where it worked pretty damn well, but that’s sort of run out of steam. … It needs a new—a new world order in a sense, like that was a world order” (Biden, 2023).
At the beginning of this decade, the world entered a period of great turmoil. Such transitional moments, inevitable during the collapse of obsolete international systems and the emergence of new ones, happen with increasing frequency (1618-1648, 1792-1815, 1914-1919, 1938-1945, 1988-1992). The current transitional period is characterized by the following processes.
Firstly, developing countries are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the world order in which the U.S. and the “collective West” dictate their will to others. The Western “rules-based order” is perceived as imposed by Washington, and international organizations—which ought to act as arbitrators—are instead seen as passing off Western sanctions and military interventions as the will of the international community. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “The global majority, representing 85 percent of the world’s population, advocates a more equitable distribution of global resources and respect for cultural diversity, as well as consistent democratization of international affairs” (Lavrov, 2023). U.S. President Joe Biden also speaks of a new system: “I think we have an opportunity to do things, if we’re bold enough and have enough confidence in ourselves, to unite the world in ways that it never has been. We were in a post-war period for 50 years where it worked pretty damn well, but that’s sort of run out of steam. … It needs a new—a new world order in a sense, like that was a world order” (Biden, 2023).
Secondly, ongoing de-globalization, i.e. the appearance of economic divisions based on political ones. The common political, economic, and information space is disintegrating into blocs (different from the Cold-War-era military alliances). The current division is probably deeper than that in the 20th century, when economic interaction between the two main military-political blocs did not stop.
Thirdly, war has returned as an acceptable way to resolve political disputes. An armed conflict as a solution to problems, which was previously employed mainly by some Third World countries, is no longer taboo for the great powers, especially after the events in Yugoslavia in 1999. This increases the likelihood of global war.
The main centers of power today are Russia, the United States, and China, whose relations form the “strategic triangle.” Each pursues its own goals by various means. In East Asia, they are forming the military-political alliances of Washington-Tokyo-Seoul and Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang, which will shape the region’s landscape in the short and medium terms.
This paper utilizes the systemic, historical, and genetic approaches to the study of international relations; scenario forecasting (Akhremenko, 1999); situational analysis (Primakov and Khrustalyov, 2006); and the theory of self-fulfilling prophecies, according to which “public definitions of a situation (prophecies or predictions) become an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments” (Merton, 1948, p. 195).
The tripolar world and its actors’ basic strategies
A tripolar world is quite common in history. For example, the USSR, Germany, and Great Britain became the three centers of power in Europe (for a very short period of 1939-1941): a temporary bloc between the former two strengthened them, but its destruction and the subsequent alliance between the West and the USSR led to the defeat of the Third Reich. The fall of the Eastern Bloc at the end of the Cold War was partly due to the Sino-Soviet split and the resulting tripolarity of the 1970s and 1980s. Feng Shaolei calls “trilateral relationships” a “fairly basic category” in international history. “Behind any bilateral or multilateral relations, there is a shadow of one or several countries as ‘a third party’” (Feng, 2019).
As in a bipolar world, each actor gathers junior allies to form defensive alliances, or softer associations based on “smart power” or value hegemony. Allies often try to secure strategic autonomy in areas important to them, as in the case of the two East Asian triangles.
There are several strategies for “politics-a-trois.”
First. “Weight on the scales”: The third actor is much weaker than the other two, so the world order seems bipolar. However, the two main rivals are unable to win or capitalize on success without the third’s help, so they try to win it over, sometimes in exchange for a degree of strategic autonomy or discretion outside the main confrontation. Often, the third actor builds up its power through skillful maneuvering, after which the model changes.
Second. “Friendship against,” or “balancing.” Two actors join forces against the third, whose increased potential poses a common threat. Such an alliance is often pragmatic and may bring together unnatural partners. For example, the forced cooperation between the Anglo-American bloc and the Soviet Union against the Third Reich in World War II, expressed by Winston Churchill as: “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference of the Devil in the House of Commons” (Nagorski, 2007, pp. 150-151). Such alliances may have an ideological basis, but once the external threat is gone, internal problems return to the fore, and yesterday’s allies become enemies.
Third. The stratagem “sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight,” optionally then finishing off the weakened winner. As Harry Truman put it: “If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances” (McCullough, 1992).
An “ideal” strategy incorporating elements of all the others is extremely rare in pure form. It implies consensus regarding spheres of influence, the rules of the game, and the means of dispute resolution. This was the model adopted after World War II, when all the victorious powers, including China, became permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power. However, as competition intensifies or rules are abused, this model stops working.
Within the strategic triangle, Russia combines elements of each of these strategies, since, given a volatile balance of power, one strategy is easily replaced by another.
The balance of power in the Russia-China-U.S. triangle
Russia-China-U.S. relations are in balance. In the case of Russia and the United States, whose nuclear capabilities significantly exceed China’s, nuclear parity limits the probability of a conflict.
The U.S.-China balance is based on enormous economic interconnectedness and interdependence; reducing dependence on Chinese imports has become an important element of Washington’s preparations for a potential conflict.
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Источник: Russia in Global Affairs
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