Whether we like it or not, the history of international politics is practically a continuous chain of violence between states. In reality, this violence does not often pursue the goal of complete destruction or subjugation of opponents. Much more regularly – almost always – the use of force is motivated not by a state’s desire to achieve hegemony, but by its simple desire to survive and create a system of relations where its future would depend not on its own ability to defend itself, but on recognition by others. This becomes particularly relevant when certain states realise that their ability to count on external assistance is becoming increasingly limited.
It seems that with the US becoming less able to effectively control situations far from its borders, its regional partners, even the most privileged ones, will have to find their own, unusual ways to survive in an environment that has historically been hostile to them. The consequences of such activism may vary and are difficult to predict. However, firstly, it seems inevitable and, secondly, it allows us to hope that relatively balanced regional subsystems will replace the distorted picture of international life that took shape in the second half of the 20th century. One of the most important distortions inherent in this picture was the existence of a number of states whose survival depended on the strategic interests of the United States rather than on their ability to establish relations with their neighbours.
The ongoing escalation of violence in inter-state relations in the Middle East underscores how little its main driver, Israel, is able to influence its neighbours. Despite having diplomatic relations with most of them, the Israeli government does not appear capable of solving its pressing problems without resorting to direct violence against other states in the region – whether Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, or Iran. Or by attacking their territory to destroy the infrastructure of its non-state opponents, as happened in early September with Qatar. Israel’s reportedly extensive intelligence infrastructure remains, in reality, nothing more than an instrument of war, rather than diplomacy, as it should be.
Israel is now more isolated than ever, and this is pushing the government of the Jewish state to take desperate measures to achieve relatively broad regional recognition. In such conditions, military action along virtually the entire perimeter of its external environment becomes the only solution for Israel, allowing it to at least theoretically hope for recognition from its neighbours in the future, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.
Whether we like it or not, the history of international politics is practically a continuous chain of violence between states. In reality, this violence does not often pursue the goal of complete destruction or subjugation of opponents. Much more regularly – almost always – the use of force is motivated not by a state’s desire to achieve hegemony, but by its simple desire to survive and create a system of relations where its future would depend not on its own ability to defend itself, but on recognition by others. This becomes particularly relevant when certain states realise that their ability to count on external assistance is becoming increasingly limited.
It seems that with the US becoming less able to effectively control situations far from its borders, its regional partners, even the most privileged ones, will have to find their own, unusual ways to survive in an environment that has historically been hostile to them. The consequences of such activism may vary and are difficult to predict. However, firstly, it seems inevitable and, secondly, it allows us to hope that relatively balanced regional subsystems will replace the distorted picture of international life that took shape in the second half of the 20th century. One of the most important distortions inherent in this picture was the existence of a number of states whose survival depended on the strategic interests of the United States rather than on their ability to establish relations with their neighbours.
The ongoing escalation of violence in inter-state relations in the Middle East underscores how little its main driver, Israel, is able to influence its neighbours. Despite having diplomatic relations with most of them, the Israeli government does not appear capable of solving its pressing problems without resorting to direct violence against other states in the region – whether Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, or Iran. Or by attacking their territory to destroy the infrastructure of its non-state opponents, as happened in early September with Qatar. Israel’s reportedly extensive intelligence infrastructure remains, in reality, nothing more than an instrument of war, rather than diplomacy, as it should be.
These actions may be tactically successful and impress the public. But there is no impression that they significantly affect the willingness of Israel’s neighbours to negotiate with it. At least not yet. In other words, 80 years after the modern balance of power in the region began to take shape, it has still not reached a level that would allow us to speak of the emergence of a separate subsystem of international relations there. It can be assumed that Israel is now more isolated than ever, and this is pushing the government of the Jewish state to take desperate measures to achieve relatively broad regional recognition. In such conditions, military action along virtually the entire perimeter of its external environment becomes the only solution for Israel, allowing it to at least theoretically hope for recognition from its neighbours in the future.
Of all the privileged partners of the United States, the State of Israel is considered to be in the closest position to them. It is no coincidence that Washington’s commitment to protecting the interests of its Middle Eastern ally has long been the subject of fierce debate in the United States itself, both academic and purely practical. In this respect, Israel surpasses Europe, partly because protecting its survival does not entail a potential risk for America of being drawn into a conflict that could end in its own destruction or unacceptable losses. Europe cannot boast of such a situation: its likely conflict with Russia, towards which European politicians have traditionally been hostile, poses a direct existential threat to the US.
In fact, this is precisely why serious observers have always answered “no” to the question “Would Americans sacrifice New York to save Paris?”
Even the presence of US troops in Europe or Turkey cannot be seen as a guarantee that Americans will consider the survival of these allies to be their own. The US’s junior partners in the Far East – Japan and South Korea – have found themselves in an equally difficult situation. We know, of course, that it was there, in 1950-1953, that the Americans fought one of the most difficult wars in their relatively easy military history. However, at that time, China did not have the capabilities that would make a conflict involving it as dangerous as a direct confrontation with Russia could be. Now the situation is different. It is not surprising that Tokyo and Seoul are seriously considering acquiring their own nuclear weapons sooner or later.
Against this backdrop, Israel is, of course, in a unique geopolitical position. Its main feature is that none of its neighbours possesses such arsenals of the most lethal weapons in history that they would pose a threat to American territory. Nor will they be able to obtain such possession in any foreseeable future. This has historically allowed the US to view the Middle East as one of the easiest areas for its global presence and intervention in other countries’ affairs. This is especially true since Israel’s neighbours – the Arab states and Iran – have also never seriously demonstrated the ability to unite in a military effort aimed at destroying the Jewish state by any means necessary and without regard for losses.
This has allowed Israel, and the US behind it, to pacify regional powers one by one: to conclude periodic agreements with them or, as in America’s relations with the Gulf monarchies, to take them under its wing. The events following the terrorist attack on Israel in October 2023 further convinced everyone of this peculiarity of the region, namely the impossibility of unity on an anti-Israeli basis. At the same time, according to many qualified observers, this inability of Israel’s neighbours to strike a blow against the Jewish state is due to the fact that many of them perceive the consequences of Israeli attacks on inpidual states or non-state organisations in a very instrumental way. Theoretically, Israel’s attack on Iran in June 2025, which did not lead to tragic consequences for regional stability but somewhat balanced Iran’s self-confidence, could be perceived in the Arab world in a similar way.
In reality, the hypothetical unity of Israel’s neighbours may be more real than it seems. But it manifests itself not in the fact that Israel’s neighbours are ready to resort to armed resistance, risking the wrath of the US, but in the fact that they jointly sabotage any possibility of accepting the Jewish state into the complex system of checks and balances that exists between them. This is particularly evident in Israel’s inability to achieve even simple foreign policy goals without resorting to military force. That is, of course, if we recognise it as a state and not a specific form of armed organisation relying on support from the US.
It seems that over the past decades, the Arab countries and Iran have been able to build a system of relations reminiscent of classic examples of regional balances of power, where the main factor is that no one is willing to take the risk of igniting a general war in order to achieve illusory goals. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime there only added to the region’s internal harmony. For Israel’s neighbours, there is absolutely no need to stand against it in a united front – this would destroy the fragile balance between them. But for the Jewish state itself, this does not bode well – and it seems that it has no choice but to seek recognition by constantly provoking its neighbours.
This provocative behaviour creates a very dramatic backdrop to everything that is happening in the region, but in essence, it changes nothing. Israel resorts to the only means available to states when international law and institutions have completely broken down (regardless of whose fault it is) in order to gain recognition as not just an important but an indispensable part of the regional balance: military pressure on those on whom such recognition depends. European history knows many examples of such behaviour – from Russia in the 16th-18th centuries to Germany in the 19th century – and there is nothing new in Israel’s behaviour.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
