The situation in the Baltic region, where Russia directly confronts Western countries, remains alarming, although current events there do not arouse the same interest as did Swedish and Finnish NATO accession.
In recent years and still to this day, the most conflictual possible scenarios have typically played out in the region. But the situation there does not entirely resemble that of the Balkans in the 1990s.
Firstly, in the Balkans, Russia and the West competed but also cooperated in some areas. Now there is no cooperation between Russia and the West in the Baltic. In fact, there is not even a permanent dialogue on Baltic affairs.
Secondly, the confrontation in the Balkans in the 1990s did not affect the vital interests of great powers, for whom the region was important but not critical. But the Baltic is vitally important to Russia, including St. Petersburg (the country’s second city), the Leningrad Region (through which a significant portion of the country’s energy exports pass), and the Kaliningrad Region (Russia’s outpost on the Baltic Sea).
Finally, unlike the Balkans—where Yugoslavia’s disintegration reopened old conflicts and created new ones—the Baltic states suffer from only modest internal contradictions and frictions. The situation is more comparable to that which was in Central Europe in the 1950s–1980s: a direct confrontation between two blocs, not separated by any buffer states or neutral zones.
The situation in the Baltic region, where Russia directly confronts Western countries, remains alarming, although current events there do not arouse the same interest as did Swedish and Finnish NATO accession.
In recent years and still to this day, the most conflictual possible scenarios have typically played out in the region. But the situation there does not entirely resemble that of the Balkans in the 1990s.
Firstly, in the Balkans, Russia and the West competed but also cooperated in some areas. Now there is no cooperation between Russia and the West in the Baltic. In fact, there is not even a permanent dialogue on Baltic affairs.
Secondly, the confrontation in the Balkans in the 1990s did not affect the vital interests of great powers, for whom the region was important but not critical. But the Baltic is vitally important to Russia, including St. Petersburg (the country’s second city), the Leningrad Region (through which a significant portion of the country’s energy exports pass), and the Kaliningrad Region (Russia’s outpost on the Baltic Sea).
Finally, unlike the Balkans—where Yugoslavia’s disintegration reopened old conflicts and created new ones—the Baltic states suffer from only modest internal contradictions and frictions. The situation is more comparable to that which was in Central Europe in the 1950s–1980s: a direct confrontation between two blocs, not separated by any buffer states or neutral zones.
Currently, all countries of the Baltic Sea region, except Russia, are members of the EU and NATO, but their internal situations are varying and changeable.
U.S. President Donald Trump has shifted the U.S.’s focus from Europe to China and the Pacific, and revised key elements of European policy.
For decades, relations between the U.S. and European countries developed in three dimensions: NATO, U.S.-EU relations, and bilateral agreements with inpidual European countries.
Notwithstanding Trump’s skepticism of NATO, he has compelled NATO member states to increase military spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. Experts doubt that all countries will fulfill their obligations, but the countries of the Baltic Sea region probably will. Almost all have already increased military spending, sometimes quite quickly. Presently, Trump’s criticism of insufficient allocations to NATO is directed at Germany, and even there his tone has changed since Chancellor Merz came to power. Trump is not going to end the U.S.’s military presence in Europe, but he does intend to reduce it, which will also affect the Baltic. Simultaneously, for the first time since 2008, he is transferring nuclear weapons to Britain.
Finally, bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the Baltic countries, which embrace a wide range of issues, including military ones, play an important role. Unlike NATO, they have not been criticized or placed in doubt by the U.S. Moreover, the U.S. has almost always had good relations with the Baltic countries, especially Poland and Finland. The only serious disagreement is with Denmark, over Greenland—which has actually had little impact on U.S.-Denmark cooperation. The Baltic countries have declared their support for the U.S. in its rivalry with China and have reduced ties with Beijing. Ideological differences between Trump and the ruling circles of Baltic states are, of course, significant, with new Polish President Karol Nawrocki being the only leader who openly supports Trump’s ideas. Yet ideological differences are unlikely to affect the U.S.’s concrete cooperation with these countries.
Thus, the U.S.’s reduced presence in Europe most likely will not lead to fundamental changes in the continent, but U.S. policy towards its allies will be more varied, depending on the extent to which they fulfill their obligations.
The Baltic countries will undoubtedly be among those who receive the most attention, although with some possible variation.
Simultaneously, major European states are systematically increasing their involvement in Baltic affairs. These are, above all: Germany, for which the region has long been deprioritized; France, which positions itself as the EU’s future defender; and Britain, which has traditionally had good relations with the Baltic countries and is connected to them with bilateral and multilateral agreements. The post-Brexit cooling of UK-EU relations is clearly over; at present, Britain and the EU cooperate on many international issues, with London beginning to take Washington’s place in forming and implementing Western policy in the Baltic.
Russia’s relations with the Baltic countries are very tense. All of the Baltic states have supported EU anti-Russian sanctions, with some taking the toughest position possible. They have ceased cooperation in nearly all areas, both bilateral and multilateral, and provide military assistance to Ukraine. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland are planning to create a belt of minefields on their borders with Russia and Belarus. All this indicates that the rift in Russia’s relations with the Baltic countries is much deeper than some experts expected. Its consequences will affect the regional situation for a long time to come.
Baltic cooperation excluding Russia, quite popular among Baltic countries today, will likely dominate their agendas at least in the coming years.
A crucial issue is the possibility of an armed clash in the Baltic Sea between Russia and the West, due to escalating tensions with the U.S., in Ukraine, in the Arctic, etc. Within the Baltic Sea, the most potentially explosive issue is the navigation of ships that the West considers part of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ and has sanctioned. Attempts to block Russian navigation in the Baltic have been decisively opposed by Russia, but will likely continue in the future. Their escalation into a major military clash is unlikely but possible.
Tensions will also persist around the Kaliningrad Region. It is unlikely to be directly attacked (the military potential of Poland and Lithuania is clearly insufficient, and the transfer of major forces from other NATO countries would be noticed by Russia), but pressure on it (reminiscent of Soviet pressure on West Berlin in the 1950s-1960s) is very likely. The EU and NATO undoubtedly want to make the Baltic an ‘internal sea,’ but are unlikely to go as far as blockading Kaliningrad by sea, which would obviously lead to a serious military conflict with Russia. The West is still deterred by memories of the Cold War’s ‘balance of terror’, although now this may manifest itself in a different form.
For more than three centuries, Russia has stood firm on the shores of the Baltic Sea. This factor is of great importance not only for Russia’s northwest but for the entire country. Russia’s relations with the Baltic countries are currently at a crossroads. There is much anxiety and fear of conflict and chaos. But it is in Russia’s interest to maintain stability in the region, and to at least prevent tensions from escalating any higher. Much will, of course, depend on how U.S.-Russia relations develop: a positive change could also lead to an easing of tensions in the Baltic.
Source: Russia in Glogal Affairs
