Interview for Hanns Seidel Foundation.
Interview for Hanns Seidel Foundation.
The US-Russia relationship is at a low point, maybe at the lowest level since the Cold War. There is little mutual trust and there are few efforts from both sides to improve the relationship. Against this background, what is your analysis of the Biden-Putin summit and what are the major results? Have your overall expectations been met?
In the US–Russian relations, like in the US-Soviet relations, little happens without summit meetings. That was the case with Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev, with Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, with Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, with Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev. Summit meetings have been powerful catalysts to set into motion the bulky and clumsy gears of state machines on both sides – including multiple layers of bureaucrats, diplomats, military and experts.
However, summits themselves are not enough to change the negative dynamics of the relationship. For instance, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin met in Helsinki in the summer of 2018, but after the meeting, the US-Russian relations did not get any better; on the contrary, they continued to deteriorate. It means that on both sides there should also be a strong commitment and a capacity to start working on specific issues that are dividing the two nations. The decision taken in Geneva to launch a new round of bilateral negotiations on strategic arms control and strategic stability is a positive step, but it by no means guarantees that these negotiations will be successful. In sum, I believe that we have reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the future, with an emphasis on “cautiously”.
When proposing and agreeing to a direct personal meeting, President Biden made it clear that America does not aim at a re-set of the relations but rather at managing a complicated relationship between adversaries and at avoiding further deterioration, including military escalation. President Biden has openly raised the whole range of concerns vis-à-vis Russia, from Ukraine and Belarus to cyberattacks and the Russian way of dealing with the domestic political opposition. What is to be expected in the years to come from the Western-Russian relationship and what is your advice on how to navigate these multi-faceted relations?
Like President Biden, I do not believe in a new re-set of the relations between Moscow and Washington. This is not only about specific points of disagreement like Ukraine, Syria or Venezuela; this is about fundamentally different mindsets and visions of the world that Vladimir Putin and Joseph Biden have. The relations will continue to be adversarial and, in some cases, confrontational for years to come, though some pockets of cooperation will hopefully be preserved—in the Arctic region, on climate change or even in combatting international terrorism.
Still, the name of the game is confrontation management rather than a transition from confrontation to cooperation. Both sides are interested in cutting down the risks and the costs of an uncontrolled confrontation, both want to see more stability and predictability in this relationship. This is why they focused on strategic arms control and strategic stability as their prime goals. Surprisingly enough, they also agreed to start working together on cyber security; if this agreement is not overruled in Washington, it might lead to a positive shift in the overall interaction. As for Ukraine and Belarus, I remain skeptical about any practical opportunity to bridge the gap in perceptions on these matters.
Germany plays a crucial role in how to deal with a Russia that obviously opposes the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Germany balances differing views and interests within the Western alliance and tries to open up channels to Russia whenever possible while adhering to the sanctions regime. How far can Germany go in engaging with Russia politically and economically without irritating its EU and NATO allies?
It would be wrong to label Germany as “Russia’s lobbyist” in the EU or in the West at large. Germany is a disciplined member of NATO; one cannot compare Germany to an unpredictable and dissenting Turkey or even to a Moscow-friendly Italy. The old Neue Ostpolitik is not there any longer. However, many European politicians still look to Berlin for guidance on their approaches to Russia. Germany remains Russia’s largest trading partner in Europe and its key source of investments, technologies and corporate practices. The positive outcome of the Geneva meeting might make it easier for Germany to reach out to Russia—especially on such matters as the EU Green Deal, inter-regional cooperation, 5G, strengthening of the OSCE and other pan-European institutions.
The next elections in Germany are likely to define rules of the game between Berlin and Moscow for another couple of years. With CDU and Armin Laschet in charge, I foresee no dramatic change in the German policy. If we see Annalena Baerbock and her Green party take over, the Kremlin is likely to get some unpleasant surprises – like a change in the German position on North Stream 2, a more persistent pressure on human rights issues and so on.
First published in German in the Hanns Seidel Foundation’s website.
