The military-political crisis in relations between Russia and the Western countries, which is centred on the Ukrainian issue and has put the fate of the entire European security system at stake, has a dual meaning for the states of Greater Eurasia, even those not directly involved in it.
The consequences of its possible settlement, even if temporary, will also have a dual meaning, pending a new round of the struggle to restore the balance of power in Europe. There are three main reasons. First, the strong dependence of all medium and small Eurasian countries on the general world economy and politics, where the rules of the game are still determined by the West.
Second, the inevitable absence in Eurasia itself of a centre of gravity, the presence of which would allow such powers to build their foreign policy in relative safety from a clash of interests at the global level. And finally, the very impact of the crisis in Europe on the international situation and development of states in other parts of Eurasia once again demonstrates their dependence on how relations between the leading powers are developing, far beyond the ability of others to influence these relations.
The military-political crisis in relations between Russia and the Western countries, which is centred on the Ukrainian issue and has put the fate of the entire European security system at stake, has a dual meaning for the states of Greater Eurasia, even those not directly involved in it, Timofei Bordachev writes.
The consequences of its possible settlement, even if temporary, will also have a dual meaning, pending a new round of the struggle to restore the balance of power in Europe. There are three main reasons. First, the strong dependence of all medium and small Eurasian countries on the general world economy and politics, where the rules of the game are still determined by the West.
Second, the inevitable absence in Eurasia itself of a centre of gravity, the presence of which would allow such powers to build their foreign policy in relative safety from a clash of interests at the global level. And finally, the very impact of the crisis in Europe on the international situation and development of states in other parts of Eurasia once again demonstrates their dependence on how relations between the leading powers are developing, far beyond the ability of others to influence these relations.
There is no doubt that by maintaining friendly relations with Russia and, at the same time, trying to support cooperation with its opponents, most of the states of Eurasia have exerted an indirect influence on the stability of Russia’s position in the ongoing conflict. However, to say that their opinion could be taken into account by the main opposing parties would be a rather serious exaggeration. The small and medium-sized countries of Eurasia located to the south and southeast of Russia continue to act as observers of the confrontation, the end of which does not depend on the wishes of even much more powerful potential mediators.
Ultimately, if some peaceful solution to the Ukraine crisis is found, they will have to adapt to it. In this regard, there is a possibility that the medium and small powers of Eurasia are now entering a period of great uncertainty regarding the space in which they must make their sovereign foreign policy decisions. This may prompt a certain emotional element in their behaviour, for which Russia, China and other large Eurasian powers must be prepared.
In other words, the beginning of the diplomatic process around Ukraine and, especially, the comparative stabilisation of relations between Russia and the United States are capable of provoking our neighbours to take actions that will not be entirely expected.
No less problematic for them will be the probable, albeit insignificant, warming of relations between the West and China.
The acute phase of the military-political confrontation between Russia and the West did not come as a surprise to Russia’s neighbours in the former USSR, or, in fact, to anyone else in the world. The former Cold War adversaries had consistently moved toward direct confrontation: the West through its own desire, disregarding the risks of limiting Russian capabilities, and Moscow – through an ever-increasing persistence in ensuring its national interests in the sphere of security and economic development.
The first tactical clash was the peace enforcement operation undertaken by Russia against the regime of Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia in August 2008. From that moment on, it became clear that a much more severe confrontation lay ahead. After the events of 2014 in Ukraine, which put an end to attempts to create a relatively safe state for its neighbours, the inevitable almost direct collision of Russia and the West was already obvious. Such a clash occurred in February 2022, creating a new sense of some certainty among Russia’s neighbours.
This was especially strengthened after Russia withstood the pressure of the first large-scale sanctions of the West, was able to enlist the support of the countries of the World majority and established control over the course of the direct military confrontation with the Kiev regime. Russia’s neighbouring countries quickly and successfully integrated into the new situation: they took the place of necessary intermediaries in trade, attracted the attention of Russian and other foreign investors, mastered the art of manoeuvring and did not even experience particular anxiety about the escalation of the conflict in Eastern Europe. All of them were able to creatively approach the issue of maintaining trade and economic relations with Russia, which at the same time did not create any particular problems in interaction with its opponents.
Also, for Russia’s neighbours in Eurasia, the position “above the fray” turned out to be comfortable, which is not at all usual for them, but provides, as it turned out, a lot of practical and symbolic advantages, including the possibility of appealing to the preservation of constructive relations with Moscow in difficult circumstances in order to be more persuasive when discussing sensitive issues.
The coming to power of the Republican administration of Donald Trump in the United States became a moment of sharply increased uncertainty for Russia’s Eurasian neighbours. It should be noted that this was not only true for them: some concerns about the consequences of the likelihood of restoring Russian-American relations were also expressed by the Chinese expert community. However, in the case of Russia’s neighbours, the uncertainty has become much greater and has already led to some consequences.
First, we can assume that states accustomed to a relatively acceptable existence “above the fray” between Russia and the West could have concerns about Moscow’s departure from its chosen strategy, a “pivot to the East”. Second, reconciliation between Russia and the United States would mean the return of Russia’s neighbours to the peripheral positions they occupied for both great powers before they came together in confrontation in Ukraine. This may, among other things, have quite sensitive economic consequences. Finally, a probable compromise between Russia and the United States on the Ukrainian issue in any case means a victory for Moscow, since it implies the West’s abandonment of the strategy of its “isolation and strategic defeat.”
Such a possibility, regardless of Russia’s true intentions, awakens old fears among Russia’s neighbours that its policy will become somewhat less inclined to compromise. The revival of such fears was facilitated, let’s not hide it, by the more intense activity of the Russian authorities in the issue of regulating migration from the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which unfolded after the tragedy in the Moscow concert hall in March 2024. It coincided, as one can assume, with a more active search by Russia’s neighbours for solutions to socio-economic problems that had accumulated in previous periods, which in the medium term may already present a certain danger to their socio-political stability. Such solutions do not always seem obvious. Of course, the somewhat chaotic negotiation process around Ukraine, which Europe and the Kiev authorities themselves are trying to stop or destabilise, does not contribute to pacification.
It is much more difficult to understand what is happening and imagine what lies ahead in the relations between Moscow and Washington now that two or three years have passed, not to mention among the states friendly to Russia in Eurasia. As a result, Russia, like China, is now interacting in the Eurasian space with states that are looking for ways to adapt to a possible new situation for themselves, whose final features are completely unknown to us. It would be extremely rational for Russia itself to develop a communication strategy in relations with its neighbours now, which would allow them to calm their fears somewhat, but would not mean completely excessive compromises.
At the centre of such a strategy is already the practice of informing the leadership of Russia’s friends and allies in Eurasia about the progress and specifics of the negotiations between Moscow and Washington. These negotiations, like the conflict they are dedicated to settling, have no direct relation to Russia’s neighbours in Eurasia and only indirectly affect their interests in the sphere of security. Therefore, the policy of constantly informing them in the spirit of traditional friendly and allied relations looks all the more justified and even wise.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
