The 2024 expansion is the most important milestone, after which BRICS found itself at a fork in the road. It will either preserve and strengthen the quality of cooperation amid the new composition and turn into a genuine institute of global governance and pe into the formation of a more just world order, or it will become a loose and non-decision-making discussion club, participation in which is prestigious, but does not oblige its members to make any obligations or compromises, which are necessary for genuine multilateralism, Dmitry Suslov writes.
The expansion that took place on January 1, 2024 following the summit in Johannesburg became the most important event in the 15-year history of BRICS, an unquestionable confirmation of its success and the strengthening of its authority and attractiveness in the world, as well as a very significant indicator of a qualitative change in the international environment.
It signified the acceleration of the rate at which multipolarity was taking shape, the reduction of the global influence of the West, and the desire of an increasing number of countries throughout the world to strengthen their sovereignty and to participate more in global governance.
It is no coincidence that the expansion of BRICS occurred at the very moment when, in an attempt to maintain its hegemony, the United States and its allies launched a simultaneous confrontation against Russia, China and Iran and began to vigorously form and expand anti-Russian, anti-Chinese and anti-Iranian blocs, forcing countries to choose if they are with the West or against it. Washington threatened almost everyone with secondary sanctions, thereby violating the sovereign right of states to build relations with each other within the framework of international law. But the effect of this pressure was the opposite. A phenomenon appeared that Russia calls the “World Majority.” This is not synonymous with the Global South. For example, Russia does not belong to the latter and has never belonged to it. The World Majority is comprised of countries that are not against the West, but against the bloc approach, unilateral sanctions, the need to make an “either-or” choice, and for a multipolar world, respect for civilisational persity, and for the right to determine their own development model. It is precisely these countries that have shown a desire to join BRICS, and the association itself, consisting of 10 members, has become the vanguard of the World Majority.
At the same time, doubling the membership is a big challenge for any multilateral entity. Countries with very different national interests and foreign policy orientations have joined BRICS. Now, within BRICS, there are both official opponents of the United States (Russia, Iran) and “major non-NATO allies?” (Egypt, UAE). Often, such large-scale expansions lead to a decrease in the quality of interaction – precisely because of the increasing persity of interests of the member countries. This is especially true for structures in which there is no hegemon that is able to push through a particular decision, as is the case in groups such as NATO or the G7.
BRICS – and this is its most important distinguishing feature – is precisely an association without a hegemon.
In addition, there are many disagreements between the BRICS countries. They concern, firstly, relations with the West: some want to strengthen relations with these countries, counting on their help with economic development and security; others have already gone through this and no longer have such illusions. Secondly, there are disagreements concerning the speed of the formation of a new system of global economic governance. Thus, not everyone supports the rapid creation of a common BRICS currency or even a new settlement mechanism independent of the dollar; not everyone supports rapid de-dollarisation. The reason is the same – different relations with the West. The West, of course, is trying in every possible way to solidify these disagreements. Thirdly, bilateral relations between the BRICS countries are far from always warm and partnership-like. China – India and Iran – Saudi Arabia are the most striking examples.
Thus, the expansion that took place is the most important milestone, after which BRICS found itself at a fork in the road. It will either preserve and strengthen the quality of cooperation amid the new composition and turn into a genuine institute of global governance and pe into the formation of a more just world order, or it will become a loose and non-decision-making discussion club, participation in which is prestigious, but does not oblige its members to make any obligations or compromises, which are necessary for genuine multilateralism. In order to follow the first path, which seems more preferable, based on Russian interests, BRICS should develop in accordance with three priorities:
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First, it is necessary to strengthen the focus on issues of global governance and, above all, the formation of an ecosystem of financial and economic relations independent from the West. It is necessary to strengthen the New Development Bank and accelerate the creation of a settlement mechanism independent of the dollar in trade between the countries of the association, gradually connecting an increasing number of partner countries to it. At the same time, the BRICS countries should not only discuss and support, but also make decisions and ensure their implementation. The emergence of such a mechanism will sharply weaken the effectiveness of the Western sanctions club and will serve as an important contribution to the formation of a more equitable world economic order.
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Second, BRICS should increase internal flexibility in terms of the agenda and cooperation projects, developing multi-speed cooperation on a wide variety of “flexible coalitions”. This, in turn, precludes the transformation of BRICS into a classic international organisation with a permanent secretariat.
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Third, it is advisable to temporarily reduce the pace of expansion, without abandoning it in principle, and focus in the next year or two on strengthening relations with like-minded countries.
Why will focusing on the issues of global governance allow BRICS to overcome emerging challenges and strengthen unification amid current global conditions (the emergence of the “World Majority” on the one hand, and the bloc confrontation policy of the U.S. and the West, on the other)?
First, despite the increased civilisational and foreign policy persity and even interstate contradictions, all BRICS countries are like-minded on issues of world order and global governance. They all stand for sovereignty, sovereign equality of states, multipolarity, against the hegemony of the US dollar in global finance and the hegemony of the West in global economic governance, for increasing the role of the Global South in regulatory institutions, for the central role of the UN in world affairs and the reform of the Security Council, and so on. The differences between them regarding relations with the West and the speed of formation of a new system of global governance do not cancel out this common denominator. Moreover, the expansion did not change the overall balance within BRICS between countries advocating a faster transition to the new system and countries advocating a slower transition.
Second, the expansion made BRICS even more global. It is no longer a club of several of the largest developing economies. It is the most authoritative and representative association of the World Majority, a defender of the interests of developing countries in global governance.
Third, strengthening the BRICS focus on global governance is also in demand because a vacuum has formed in this area. Western unilateral sanctions, as well as trade and technological restrictions undermine global development. The dollar has become an instrument of dictatorship and blackmail. The G20 is paralysed due to Western attempts to politicise its agenda. It turns out that apart from BRICS, there are currently simply no instruments of global governance that favour developing countries.
Fourth, it is the focus on global issues that allows the BRICS countries to cooperate despite their regional rivalry. Despite often being geopolitical rivals in their regions, the BRICS countries are like-minded with respect to global issues.
Of course, it is important not to try to turn BRICS into an anti-Western alliance. First, this will not work due to the membership of countries in BRICS that value partnership with the West. Second, this will weaken the authority of BRICS in the eyes of the World Majority, whose countries do not want to make a choice and join antagonistic blocs. Third, this will further weaken global governance, while the mission of BRICS is to strengthen it.
Therefore, BRICS needs to form a new system of global governance that is not against the West, but without the West.
The second priority in the development of BRICS to ensure its success after expansion is to strengthen internal flexibility and develop multi-speed cooperation within the framework of “flexible coalitions”. This is what seems to be able to solve the problem when inpidual countries of the association advocate different speeds of cooperation on various issues, including moving towards a new system of trade settlements and currency and financial relations in general, independently of the dollar and Western institutions. The multi-speed model will allow different “advanced” groups to move forward only on those issues in which there is interest, without the obligatory extension of this more advanced cooperation to all BRICS members at once. Of course, other BRICS countries should not be against such a selective cooperation. There can be many such coalitions of interests on a variety of issues with a variety of compositions. Such flexibility rules out the transformation of BRICS into a classic international organisation with a permanent secretariat. These, as a rule, seek to impose uniform rules, standards and deep cooperation on all participants. Moreover, international bureaucracy often tries to start out technical and become more political. It begins to lay claims to leadership, and countries will be forced not to determine the agenda themselves through equal dialogue, but to engage in discussions with the bureaucracy, often fighting it. The above, however, does not negate the expediency of creating a “virtual” BRICS secretariat – a database of all projects and decisions of the association.
Finally, the third priority concerns the balance between openness and efficiency. In order to both increase its attractiveness and influence in the eyes of the World Majority and maintain its viability, BRICS should, without abandoning further expansion, temporarily reduce its pace. The main priority for the short term in this area is the full integration of new members and the creation of a format of “permanent BRICS partners”. This format will allow for the desire of many countries to become closer to BRICS to be taken into account without making BRICS limitless. Unlike the traditional BRICS+, which also needs to be preserved, the “partner countries” can be a permanent group of countries, some of which can eventually become full members. That is, this format can be considered as an “association”. This group can include both countries that have already declared their desire to join BRICS, but have not yet received an invitation, and countries that have not yet declared their desire to join, but can be useful to BRICS in implementing its mission to form more equitable global governance. Partner countries should be involved in many BRICS processes and projects, including at the level of experts, business and civil society, but without decision-making rights.
BRICS should remain the vanguard of the World Majority, and not the majority itself. It should not become an analogue of the UN General Assembly. A certain exclusivity while maintaining openness is necessary. BRICS members should not just be countries that share its basic principles of sovereign equality, a multipolar world order and fairer global governance, but also countries that can make an important contribution to the implementation of this mission – that is, they should be important and influential states, leaders in their respective fields and regions.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
