CSTO Adapting to Modern Conditions

A meeting of the CSTO Collective Security Council was held in Yerevan in mid-October with the heads of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia adopting a Collective Security Strategy for the period until 2025.

The document does not directly cite a single country or organization which the CSTO regards as a potential enemy. However, the current threats and challenges to collective security listed in the strategy make it abundantly clear that new problems directly arising from the geopolitical crisis in Eurasia have been added to the goals of strengthening the organization’s external borders, primarily in Central Asia, as well as fighting terrorism and drug trafficking. Essentially, these are new enemies – IS, which did not previously exist at all, and NATO, which was viewed as a potential partner in the Collective Security Concept drafted by the organization’s member states in 1995.

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For example, the Strategy refers to threats posed by “the unilateral deployment of global missile defence systems by a particular state or group of states without taking into account the legitimate interests of other countries and without the provision of legally binding guarantees by the latter”. This vague and broad wording clearly refers to the U.S. missile defence system installed in Romania in spring 2016 as well as the planned missile defence system – also belonging to the U.S. – in Poland and other similar hypothetical systems close to the territory of Russia.

The document separately refers to “activities that aim to disorganize the government authorities and alter the constitutional system in CSTO member states”. The echoes of Ukraine are quite prominent in the updated strategy with the direct use of such terms as ‘colour revolution’ and ‘hybrid warfare’ along with the authors paying considerable attention to the subject of the internal security of CSTO nations. The parties also took into account the factor of a possible incursion into the territory of CSTO states by armed groups and militants. In the current environment, this directly concerns not only Central Asian nations, but Ukraine’s neighbours, above all Russia and Belarus, which radicals and outright saboteurs driven by dreams of “returning land” or “exporting revolutions” frequently attempt to penetrate.

The parts of the document devoted to minimizing the destructive influence of information and communications technologies as well as tools used to “manipulate public awareness in CSTO member nations” may be viewed as components for maintaining internal political stability. In fact, the Strategy notes the existence of an information war against the organization’s countries.

The subject of Islamic State and international terrorism is a common refrain throughout the entire document. This is manifested not only in general appeals to “find and neutralize” militants, but by focusing on the problem of their recruitment as well. In addition, a fair assessment is given to the “growth in terrorist activity by citizens of CSTO member nations who return to their homelands after undergoing military training within the ranks of international terrorist organizations”.

But why try so hard? Not simply for the sake of peace on earth as it was before. According to the new Strategy, CSTO nations are committed to “forming a new architecture for Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security based on the provision of equal and indivisible security for all nations”. And this is probably the most important thing that allows for qualifying this document as a Strategy specifically designed for a time of crisis.

Thus, unlike a number of Western doctrinal documents of a similar nature, the threats to the CSTO listed in the Strategy are not actually personalized, but are presented based on the principle of the problems they pose. Essentially, the document reflects the main conflict points that have led to the current crisis in the system of international relations. On the one hand, the countries that have taken the path of deliberately exacerbating this crisis may automatically be qualified as a threat to the CSTO and the stability of Eurasia as a whole. On the other hand, though, rival countries that have taken the path of compromise may become partners in forming the actual new architecture for security in Eurasia. Everything else depends on the position taken by each specific country.