... South Caucasus, we can establish similarities between the countries and see how the Blue Ocean strategy approach can develop the “opportunity” part in the region:
SWOT Matrix of the South Caucasus
Strengths
Located between great players - Russia, Turkey, EU and Asia - the South Caucasus can be successfully used as a platform for the production, transfer and transformation of goods;
Favorable climate for the development of renewable energies and products in with a high demand on international ...
... 2021, 13:29. [Viewed 24 February 2021]. Available from:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/serbia-not-happy-with-israels-recognition-of-kosovo-says-it-will-impact-ties/
.
Transparency International. (2016).
Fighting Corruption in the Western Balkans and Turkey: Priorities for Reform
[online]. Berlin: Transparency International. [Viewed 25 February 2021]. Available from:
https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/NISWBT_EN.pdf
.
V-Dem Institute. (2020).
Democracy Report 2020
[online]. Gothenburg: V-Dem ...
... percentage has considerably increased during the last decade, with Kazakhstan being the largest consumer of the area [
viii
]. However, this monopoly is not equally distributed among Central Asian states. Uzbekistan prefers buying weapons from China, while Turkey is the largest arms supplier for Turkmenistan [
ix
].
In case of a conflict, together with the actual military presence on the ground, Russia holds another two trump cards. In peacetime, Central Asian bases are under direct control of the Russian ...
... to design any exit strategy over the five years of its immediate involvement in the Syrian conflict. The degree of Russia’s influence on the Damascus regime is also an open question. Is the dog wagging the tail or is the tail wagging the dog?
Could Turkey be the principal beneficiary? Establishing buffer zones in Idlib and in Syria’s northern provinces is Erdogan’s unquestionable achievement. Yet to what degree is Ankara really in control of the situation in Idlib? This continuously festering ...
... does it have fertile lands like Georgia, Armenia’s another neighbours. The geopolitical situation is dispiriting for Armenia: the country does not even share a common border with Russia, its ally, and is surrounded by an openly hostile alliance of Turkey and Azerbaijan as well as two rather ‘backhanded’ partners, Iran and Georgia. Going back to the “pre-Pashinyan” era would mean Armenia having to get used to the role of a humble petitioner camping on the doorsteps of the faraway Kremlin ...
... decommissioned at the NPPs currently in operation. Extending their service life may provide about 120 GW that otherwise would be shut down by 2030. By early 2020, about 20 GW of new NPP capacities had been built in Finland, France, Japan, South Korea, Slovakia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Otherwise, the projected additional capacities in developed economies is limited.
By 2030, total NPP capacity in the European Union will have dropped by 20 per cent. The biggest drops will be seen in Germany ...
Syria will most likely remain part of US regional policies and subordinate to US dealings with Iran, Turkey and Russia
With the new US administration in the White House, there are rather lofty expectations about a change in the American Middle East policy in general and towards Syria in particular. Some argue that the US Middle East policy will remain ...
... they controlled one of the Assembly’s party factions and could, using the Council’s rotating presidency mechanism, gain this crucially important leadership position. Unwilling to exacerbate the situation, they preferred to give this position to Turkey. So, up until 2014, the balance of Russia’s participation in the Council of Europe, even in its inter-parliamentary dimension, proved to be positive rather than negative.
It was largely positive from the point of view of Russia’s domestic development....
... rights issues against Russia and China—or against North Korea and Iran. This is a light and unburdensome task—in any case, these countries are not and will not be US allies or partners anytime soon. However, what about other potential targets—like Turkey and Saudi Arabia? On the one hand, both Ankara and Riyadh are perceived in Washington as gross violators of basic human rights. On the other hand, Washington badly needs partnerships with both of them. If the Biden administration heads down a slippery ...
... washeld on 11–16 February 2021 at Karachi, Pakistan. The 8
th
exercise will be held in 2023.
As many as 46 countries and 115 observers participated in the Aman-19 naval exercises and around 11 navies, including Russia, China, U.S., U.K., Australia, Turkey, Italy, and Malaysia, participated with their warships. The event was attended by many dignitaries, ambassadors, defense attaches, and senior military/civil officialsfrom the world over.
Vladimir Morozov, Andrew Korybko:
Pakistan’s Role in ...
