... February 24
U.S. President Joe Biden has now visited the Middle East, and this week, President of Russia Vladimir Putin also pays a visit to Iran, where he is expected to hold trilateral meetings with President of Iran Ebrahim Raisi and President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Syria's Astana process.
Igor Matveev, Yeghia Tashjian:
Russia and Iran in Syria: A Competitive Partnership?
On February 24, 2022, the Russia–Ukraine military conflict began. Five months into it, the world has undergone ...
... Tehran’s major role in Syria’s post-conflict economic reconstruction as long as Moscow’s strategic interests in maintaining control over the Mediterranean ports of Latakia and Tartus are observed, or Russia may try to coordinate more closely with Turkey in the north and Israel in the south to contain the Iranian expansion.
In the past, Russia’s leading role has been limiting the scope of Iran’s activities in Syria altogether with the “balanced” partnership with Israel and the “
co-opetitative
...
... Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at AUB; Middle East-South Caucasus expert in the European Geopolitical Forum; contributor to various local and regional newspapers, a columnist in the Armenian Weekly, and a presenter of the “Turkey Today” program for Radio Voice of Van
... [Kennedy 1969: 96–97]. The USSR agreed to withdraw the missiles and all nuclear weapons from Cuba, while the U.S. agreed not to attack it (they also privately promised to remove their
Thor
and
Jupiter
intermediate-range missiles from the UK, Italy, and Turkey, which was done shortly).
Today, due to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum (that guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange for the removal of Soviet nuclear weapons from the country), Ukraine does not have either its own or U.S. nuclear ...
... unchanged since the adoption of the UNSC res. 2585 on July 9, 2021. In this context, Russia cannot agree with the comments on “the obvious progress” in cross-line aid deliveries, when the situation has hardly improved.
Kirill Semenov
Finishing the Job: Turkey Preparing For Military Operation in Syria
Russia’s main concerns about CBM and prolongation of UNSC res. 2585
To wrap up all mentioned above, Russia’s main concerns about the CBM and its prolongation revolve around six main arguments.
1. There ...
... resulting scenarios of further expansion. One possible modality would be the RIC (Russia-China-India) serving as a core, with further additions focusing on the largest Eurasian economies such as the G20 countries from Eurasia — Saudi Arabia, Indonesia or Turkey. This route would clearly result in the assembly process being slow and lacking connectivity to other smaller developing economies of the continent.
Another possible format for the Eurasian core could be the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) ...
... Caucasus.
In the context of rebuilding foreign economic relations and creating a new model of the global order, the most important directions are cooperation with world powers – China and India as well as Brazil – and with leading regional players – Turkey, ASEAN countries, the Gulf states, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico and others.
It is in these areas, rather than in traditional Euro-Atlantic arenas, that the main resources of diplomacy, foreign economic ...
... Russia. India, a traditional importer of Soviet and Russian weapons, is now emerging as a major technology partner for Moscow. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are Russia’s principal partners in regulating oil output in the OPEC+ format. Turkey and Iran are major independent players in a key strategic region. The fact that the vast majority of non-Western countries refused to condemn Russia for what it is doing in Ukraine – many of them despite strong US pressure – is most encouraging ...
... constant foreign and domestic political shocks. These include internal political crises of varying intensity and origin in Armenia (since 2018), Kyrgyzstan and Belarus (2020), and Kazakhstan (2022), the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, in which Turkey took an active part, and the border conflict between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in January 2022. The situation around the EAEU member states is also unstable: the Taliban’s coming to power in Afghanistan raises well-justified fears.
However, such ...
... situationally secured commonality of key stakeholders: the United States, the large EU countries (primarily France and Germany), and the countries of Eastern Europe.
The unconditional image victory of the alliance has been the resolution of the dispute between Turkey and Finland and Sweden as a result of intensive open and behind-the-scenes bargaining talks [
1
]. Apart from the signing of the NATO accession protocols in itself as an absolute victory for Helsinki and Stockholm, Ankara remains the main beneficiary ...
