On June 26, 2025, the press center of the Russia Today International Media Agency hosted a RIAC roundtable, “Outcomes of the NATO Summit: Rising Tensions in the Baltic Sea Region?”
Experts discussed the results of the NATO Summit in the Hague, its implications for strengthening the Alliance’s military capabilities, emerging divisions within NATO, and possible responses by Russia to the increasingly assertive policies of the collective West. The conversation also addressed the risks of further escalation in the Baltic Sea region.
On June 26, 2025, the press center of the Russia Today International Media Agency hosted a RIAC roundtable, “Outcomes of the NATO Summit: Rising Tensions in the Baltic Sea Region?”
Experts discussed the results of the NATO Summit in the Hague, its implications for strengthening the Alliance’s military capabilities, emerging divisions within NATO, and possible responses by Russia to the increasingly assertive policies of the collective West. The conversation also addressed the risks of further escalation in the Baltic Sea region.
Participants included:
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Andrey Kortunov, Expert, Valdai Discussion Club; RIAC Member
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Dmitry Danilov, Head of the Department of European Security, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences; Vice President, Association for European Studies
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Vladimir Olenchenko, Senior Research Fellow, Center for European Studies, IMEMO RAS
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Tigran Meloyan, Analyst, Center for Mediterranean Studies, HSE University
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Igor Zhukovsky, Senior Research Fellow, Baltic Region Comprehensive Studies Group, IMEMO RAS
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Yury Zverev, Director, Center for Foreign Regional Studies and Country Studies, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
Discussion Highlights
Andrey Kortunov
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A clear discrepancy can be observed between NATO’s rhetoric and the actual provisions of its documents regarding Ukraine’s potential integration into the Alliance.
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At the Hague Summit, NATO representatives on the one hand signaled interest in Ukraine’s integration, while on the other hand sought to avoid provoking a political clash with Donald Trump.
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The NATO Summit at the Hague was notably brief, lasting less than three hours.
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It was also the first summit since the start of the Special Military Operation that was not attended by NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners—Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
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The entire process of increasing defense spending is stretched over time, and long-term planning helps avoid immediate responsibility.
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The decision to raise military spending to 3.5 percent is driven primarily by political considerations. In practice, some NATO members—such as Spain—have not met even the 2 percent benchmark they previously committed to.
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Budgetary challenges within NATO will remain acute. Progress toward the 3.5 percent target will be slower than Mark Rutte would prefer.
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The Baltic region is unique in terms of its dense network of interactions. Today, the Baltics resemble the Balkans 20–30 years ago in the sense that any spark could ignite a larger conflict.
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Most respondents in the Baltic states support limited cooperation with Russia. It is important to take this into account and continue engagement efforts.
Dmitry Danilov
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The outcomes of the NATO Summit are minimal, despite being presented as historic. Many questions remain regarding defense spending commitments.
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Three main issues were discussed at the Hague Summit: Ukraine, the increase in defense expenditures, and strengthening capabilities to ensure readiness for potential aggression.
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The North Atlantic Alliance still lacks a coherent strategic vision.
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From Mark Rutte’s perspective, Russia represents a security threat to NATO member states, while China is viewed as a challenge. The “Russian threat” will increasingly be assessed in the context of Russia–China cooperation.
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NATO remains an indispensable instrument for the United States. Washington has no intention of giving up the Alliance as a tool for exerting pressure on European partners.
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Looser criteria for calculating defense spending means that each NATO member state will frame the increase in military expenditures through the lens of its own national interests. This dynamic is one of the factors contributing to emerging divisions within the Alliance.
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The absence of Asian leaders from the NATO Summit indicates that they are not prepared to integrate into the Alliance’s activities. At the same time, the United States intends to rely on more flexible mechanisms in its engagement with Asia-Pacific states—such as AUKUS, the Quad, and the U.S.–South Korea–Japan trilateral partnership.
Tigran Meloyan
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The Hague Summit was less about demonstrating unity and more about attempting to restore Euro-Atlantic cohesion.
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The United States is pushing Europe toward a path of militarization. At the same time, it is important for Donald Trump that European states channel a significant share of their increased defense spending into the American military-industrial complex.
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On defense expenditures, the United States and European countries succeeded in reaching an agreement. Europe accepted the formula of allocating 3.5 percent for defense spending and 1.5 percent for infrastructure. However, Spain, Slovenia, Belgium, and Luxembourg have not yet reached even the 2 percent benchmark. There is no certainty they will achieve it by the end of 2025, despite the target originally being set for 2024.
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The U.S. position under Trump is that if European states invest sufficiently in defense, Washington will reaffirm its commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. If they do not, the United States may resort to pressure, including potential threats to reduce its troop presence in Europe or impose trade tariffs.
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Experts view the Baltic region as the second potential flashpoint after the Black Sea region.
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NATO may continue efforts to block Russian vessels in certain straits, which would significantly disrupt logistics chains and force Russia to allocate additional military resources to escort commercial ships.
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Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland have announced their withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention and plan to mine their borders with Russia. This indicates the long-term nature of their confrontation with Russia. Such measures jeopardize the future of cross-border cooperation projects that have historically delivered economic benefits to all parties involved.
Vladimir Olenchenko
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Political figures in the Baltic states, as well as external experts, argue that the situation in the Baltic Sea region is being overly dramatized.
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Attempts to turn the Baltic territories into a platform for an attack on Russia have been underway for more than 20 years.
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The Baltics constitute a “trap”: the territory of the Baltic states can be targeted either from the sea or from the Kaliningrad region.
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The Baltic states have traditionally aligned themselves with the Democratic wing of U.S. politics. For example, Lithuanians generally believe that only the U.S. Democratic Party represents their interests in relations with Washington.
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There is a region between Lithuania and Poland known as “Suwalki”, sometimes referred to as a “bear corner” due to its marshy terrain and the absence of major transportation routes. Local residents in Suwalki tend to feel closer to Belarus than to Poland or Lithuania. In the United States, it is commonly believed that if the Russian Federation were to advance through Suwalki, it would disrupt supply lines to the Baltic states.
Igor Zhukovsky
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The Baltic region has shifted from being an area of Russia–NATO and Russia–EU cooperation to a region of cooperation without Russia.
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The Russian Federation has a clear understanding of how to deliver a firm response in the event of scenarios involving a blockade of the Kaliningrad region.
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In recent years, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have significantly expanded their presence in the Baltic states.
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At the Hague Summit, key issues for the President of Poland included the combat readiness of the Polish armed forces and Warsaw’s political consolidation of the Baltic region in line with Poland’s interests. One significant outcome of the summit for Poland was the return of Norwegian F-35 aircraft, which will now patrol Polish territory.
Yury Zverev
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The Baltic region is often described as one of the more prosperous and stable parts of Europe; however, due to its proximity to the borders of the Russian Federation, it could quickly become a zone of confrontation between Russia and NATO in the event of an escalation.
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Statements suggesting that the Baltic Sea will become “NATO’s internal sea” are exaggerated. In the event of a conflict, Russia would retain the ability to control a significant portion of the Baltic Sea through its coastal missile systems and naval assets.
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The most likely scenario for relations between Russia and the Baltic states is a state of “no war, no peace.” Other scenarios, however, can also be envisioned, such as a “drift into chaos” or a “Baltic conflict.”
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The prospects for cooperation between Russia and the Baltic states cannot be viewed positively. A return to substantive formats of engagement is unlikely in the foreseeable future.