... its grip on its “
good friends
”, i.e. the major suppliers such as Equatorial Guinea who was also referred to as China’s “
best friend
” by the Chinese Foreign Minister during his visit in 2007.
Despite its attempt to secure ... ... the region is very limited for several reasons. Firstly, “current U.S. government policy on the procurement of African oil based on the National Energy Policy of 17 May 2001” has become outdated with the recent emergence of new gas producers such as Tanzania and Mozambique. In 2001, Africa was not yet a “pillar of global energy security
[5]
”,...
... of 736 Mtoe (million tons of oil equivalent) by 2035. As even though others will produce a lot of oil and gas, they will not be able to export as much due to domestic needs, etc. As a result, Russia’s net exports will meet 4.2% of world’s energy demand in 2035, which will be sent to Europe (still world’s largest importer of natural gas) and China (world’s largest oil importer).
Oil production will be dominated by USA, Saudi Arabia and Russia, with well over a third of global liquids coming from these three powers. At a rate of 11 Mb/d by 2035 Russia will only trail Saudi Arabia and the US. BP anticipates that ...
... can land adjacent Central Asia support its growing energy demand fully or Russia be prepared to play on its terms. In effect, China is left with investing in second-tier opportunities and the Malacca Dilemma persists with just a balancing effort trying to minimise rise in dependence. Li & Cheng (2006) see that options are limited as energy demand in Asia is growing at an annual rate of over 3% and already more than a half of world’s oil and almost 2/3 of gas pass via the strait, thus it is hard to see how these sums will be circumvented. Still, when Li & Cheng wrote their work, ...
..., USA’s natural conventional gas production will actually fall steadily, which may raise worries if the unconventional gas is actually overvalued. Also, even Russia, traditionally a pipeline supplier will enter the game with about a 1/10th share by 2025.
No section about energy is complete without China, which is why LUKoil highlights that the Asian dragon has the most favourable conditions to establish shale production and it has already begun ...
... against their principles. This is why, distribution of economic capabilities in the near future will be vital as unless asymmetry is lessened, this relationship may not get very far, as asymmetry breeds conflict.
Counter-Agent Dilemma & Subsidized Gas/Oil to China:
The publicised and agreed energy deals with China are currently at the break-even point or just above it, which comparatively puts them on par with expensive Australian projects. If the market conditions do not worsen, these projects will recuperate their costs, but if there is ...
... litigation, energy security, shale revolution and domestic challenges will be discussed. In this post I am joined by the Head of Oil and Gas at the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Tatiana Mitrova. This is the first of two posts from this special ... ... question and answer session is outlined with Dr. Tatiana Mitrova, whereas in the subsequent second post, coming later, we look at China-Russia.
Europe-Russia ‘Special Deal Severed’:
In normal day-to-day life Europe has a stable and diversified ...
... continuous capitalist crisis differs from previous times of turmoil because global finance capitalism has eroded the moral economy ... ... West and instead go East – as soaring trade levels with China already foreshadow.
However, Russia remains a European ... ... and authoritarian consolidation, on the other hand.
Energy Calamity
It is argued by some that the Russo-European ... ... anti-Russian stance. Has this occurred due to European attempts to lower gas import prices, or more serious underlining issues? Europe’s ...
... amounts of energy: to create $1 of GDP China uses 5 times more energy than the US, or 12 more than Japan. Just by 2015 China’s consumption will near EU’s at 490 Mt. ES-2030 shows that by 2030 Russia aims to supply 20-25% of Asia’s oil from the current 6% – with China being the main consumer. Further, by 2020-2022 the figure should be around 14-15%. Gas wise, it is amazing that Russia, the energy superpower, sells no pipeline gas to Asia, and only marginally sells LNG from 2009. By 2020-2022 Russia ambitiously aims to reverse this trend by supplying 16-17% of Asia’s gas – with the figure rising to 19-20% by 2030. In all, this ...
..., its growth has been very rapid. China has single-handedly fuelled more demand for LNG and expanded not only in its domestic, but also in international markets, like Africa (See: NYT). I was personally excited about opportunities between Russia and China, as Energy Minister Alexander Novak, issued a statement that both were working on gas and oil deals prior to Xi's arrival (See: Prime). I even hoped to discuss these issues with Novak personally, at "The Russian Energy Conference", which was run by Vedomosti Business Daily, but unfortunately due to the deal between Rosneft ...
Alongside my typical journalistic duties at ‘Oil & Gas Eurasia Magazine’, I tend to daily scan both Russian and Western media outlets,... ... releases and alike - for major news, interesting articles and possible leads within the energy industry. Today, I want to share with you some of the findings in a liberal leaning... ... aimed predominantly at the home market.
Non-US Shale Progress (Europe and Asia):
China is eager to jump on the Shale Revolution and aims to produce 100 billion cubic...
