The Geometry of Geopolitics

From the standpoint of global diplomacy, China’s leadership currently finds itself in an exceptionally strong position. This week, Xi Jinping is hosting Donald Trump in Beijing, while several days later he is set to hold talks there with Vladimir Putin. The high-profile visitors will not cross paths in the Chinese capital: a meeting of the new “Big Three” is not yet on the agenda. The consolidation of a new world order remains a distant prospect. Nevertheless, the discussions in Beijing are commanding the attention of the entire world.

While China and Russia enjoy close ties and are making steady progress in their relationship, tensions are rising in U.S.-China relations, logically pointing to the possibility of a major conflict. The United States has declared China as its main rival: Washington has no intention of conceding the top position in the hierarchy of global powers to Beijing.

The U.S. global geopolitical counteroffensive (regime change in Venezuela, an attack on Iran, regaining control of the Panama Canal, claims to Greenland, threats against Cuba) is largely aimed at limiting China’s access to energy resources, disrupting its supply chains, and depriving it of potential geopolitical footholds. The behavior of U.S. allies—notably, Germany, as well as some Persian Gulf states—shows that at the decisive moment, geopolitical considerations prevail over sober geoeconomic calculations. In times of crisis, geopolitics trumps over geoeconomics.

It is important to understand clearly that any hope that Moscow and Beijing can reach an agreement with Washington on strategic issues concerning the future world order—by bargaining for special privileges—is unrealistic. Acting separately toward the United States, let alone competing with one another, would mean acting to their own detriment, both for Russia and for China.

Russia and China are capable of fending off U.S. “attacks” on their own. Even Iran has managed to do so. To build a new world order, however, this is not enough. What is needed here is not a traditional military alliance (although cooperation in the military sphere must be strengthened), but a political, financial, economic, and technological coalition for a new world order. Such a coalition, built around a Russian-Chinese core, would coordinate its actions across a wide range of domains—from geopolitics and geoeconomics to artificial intelligence and space exploration.

Trump’s visit to Beijing is unlikely to go down in history for its outcomes. Trump’s ability to help establish lasting peace in Ukraine is rapidly diminishing. The likely outcome of the November midterm elections in the U.S. raises the prospect of the current U.S. president being politically neutralized and—in any case—the start of a battle for the White House. Under these circumstances, the chances of a strategic agreement with the U.S. must be acknowledged as minimal.  

Putin’s visit, on the other hand, could elevate the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership to the level of a coalition striving to shape the world order. The Washington-Moscow-Beijing “triangle” —conceived by Henry Kissinger to “contain” Moscow, and then (after the end of the Cold War) was viewed by some U.S. strategists as a tool for “containing” Beijing with Moscow’s help—could become a key factor in shaping a new, balanced world order.

From the standpoint of global diplomacy, China’s leadership currently finds itself in an exceptionally strong position. This week, Xi Jinping is hosting Donald Trump in Beijing, while several days later he is set to hold talks there with Vladimir Putin. The high-profile visitors will not cross paths in the Chinese capital: a meeting of the new “Big Three” is not yet on the agenda. The consolidation of a new world order remains a distant prospect. Nevertheless, the discussions in Beijing are commanding the attention of the entire world.

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President Xi will primarily discuss economic and technological issues with Trump, including artificial intelligence. While temporary compromises are possible here, a comprehensive agreement is unlikely. During the recent tariff standoff, China showed the U.S. its “hand” and forced the White House to back down. Restrictions increasingly faced by Chinese companies in the American market are being offset by Beijing through the expansion of ties with a Europe that has become more assertive toward the United States. In the military-strategic sphere, China is building up its military power while refusing to engage in premature negotiations with the U.S.: first, the Chinese need to achieve nuclear and missile parity with America.

With Vladimir Putin, the Chinese leader will, as usual, discuss a broad range of issues—from bilateral economic cooperation to coordination in various regions of the world. In recent years, Xi Jinping has put forward a number of global initiatives that provide a comprehensive picture of China’s current vision of world order. Much in this vision resonates with the approaches of President Putin. The two leaders will also have an opportunity to exchange views, with recent developments still fresh, on how to engage with the United States.

While China and Russia enjoy close ties and are making steady progress in their relationship, tensions are rising in U.S.-China relations, logically pointing to the possibility of a major conflict. The United States has declared China as its main rival: Washington has no intention of conceding the top position in the hierarchy of global powers to Beijing. Washington’s strategy is to use pressure on its allies to roll back Chinese influence in Latin America, Africa, and other regions; to constrain Europe’s ties with China under the banner of “countering Beijing’s great-power ambitions”; and to create an anti-China front in Asia stretching from Japan to the Philippines, and, if possible, extending to India.

Many elements of this strategy echo U.S. actions toward Russia. In both cases, Washington emphasizes its continued dominance in global finance. In both cases, it acts through allies, partners, and clients. In the eight months since the Anchorage meeting, Trump has, admittedly, failed to “pressure” Europe into supporting his own proposals for a settlement in Ukraine. Trump, however, is by no means a neutral mediator. In fact, the U.S. continues to support Kyiv, acting both directly (sharing intelligence, etc.) and through Europe, which Washington has tasked with “containing” Russia. U.S. sanctions against Russia have generally intensified. Even technical issues have been blocked: the return of Russian property in the U.S., the restoration of direct air service, etc.

With regard to China, the United States is betting that China—as an economy heavily dependent on exports to the premium markets of North America and Western Europe—will be forced to back down in the face of U.S. pressure so as not to lose access to those markets entirely.

In the past, this U.S. strategy produced results, albeit limited ones. Beijing made certain concessions, since under conditions of globalization its overall position continued to strengthen. For every step back it took, China immediately took two steps forward. Beijing was confident that China’s rise could occur peacefully, that the world order could be reformed as a result of the steady growth in the global weight and influence of non-Western countries—first and foremost, of course, China itself. In recent years, however, the situation has changed. It has become clear that there will be no peaceful transition to a new world order.

The U.S. global geopolitical counteroffensive (regime change in Venezuela, an attack on Iran, regaining control of the Panama Canal, claims to Greenland, threats against Cuba) is largely aimed at limiting China’s access to energy resources, disrupting its supply chains, and depriving it of potential geopolitical footholds. The behavior of U.S. allies—notably, Germany, as well as some Persian Gulf states—shows that at the decisive moment, geopolitical considerations prevail over sober geoeconomic calculations. In times of crisis, geopolitics trumps over geoeconomics.

The Chinese leadership remains a committed advocate of globalization and the peaceful resolution of political disputes. Beijing seeks to position itself as a neutral actor and a potential mediator in the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, in which Washington is directly or indirectly involved. This creates an asymmetrical picture: the United States not only openly identifies China and Russia as geopolitical competitors and military adversaries, but also acts accordingly. At the same time, Beijing and Moscow, while describing their relationship as “more than an alliance,” consistently emphasize that they are precisely not an “alliance.”

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Indeed, if “alliance” is meant to mean something akin to NATO or a modern version of the Warsaw Pact, or what was referred to in the West in the 1950s as the “Sino-Soviet bloc,” then neither Moscow nor Beijing needs such an alliance. That is a foreign policy strategy of the twentieth century. At the same time, it is important, however, to understand clearly that any hope that Moscow and Beijing can reach an agreement with Washington on strategic issues concerning the future world order—by bargaining for special privileges—is unrealistic. Acting separately toward the United States, let alone competing with one another, would mean acting to their own detriment, both for Russia and for China.

Russia and China are capable of fending off U.S. “attacks” on their own. Even Iran has managed to do so. To build a new world order, however, this is not enough. What is needed here is not a traditional military alliance (although cooperation in the military sphere must be strengthened), but a political, financial, economic, and technological coalition for a new world order. Such a coalition, built around a Russian-Chinese core, would coordinate its actions across a wide range of domains—from geopolitics and geoeconomics to artificial intelligence and space exploration. Such a coalition would not be intimidated by sanctions from the U.S. and Europe, the closure of straits (today the Strait of Hormuz, tomorrow the Strait of Malacca), or naval blockades. On the contrary, the resources and capabilities of Russia and China would force the U.S. and its allies to behave far less aggressively and arrogantly and to gradually, albeit reluctantly, get used to a new position in the world—one of equality with other major players. This is precisely the essence of the transition to a new order in international relations.

Trump’s visit to Beijing is unlikely to go down in history for its outcomes. Trump’s ability to help establish lasting peace in Ukraine is rapidly diminishing. The likely outcome of the November midterm elections in the U.S. raises the prospect of the current U.S. president being politically neutralized and—in any case—the start of a battle for the White House. Under these circumstances, the chances of a strategic agreement with the U.S. must be acknowledged as minimal.

Putin’s visit, on the other hand, could elevate the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership to the level of a coalition striving to shape the world order. The Washington-Moscow-Beijing “triangle” —conceived by Henry Kissinger to “contain” Moscow, and then (after the end of the Cold War) was viewed by some U.S. strategists as a tool for “containing” Beijing with Moscow’s help—could become a key factor in shaping a new, balanced world order.