Russia-West: The Radical Scenario and Its Alternatives

Russia and the West are going through another stage of military-political escalation. Its immediate indicator was Ukraine’s use of American and British missile systems to strike Russian territory, the emergence of Moscow’s new nuclear doctrine, the subsequent destruction of Ukraine’s Yuzhmash plant by a medium-range missile, as well as new strikes on Russia. The escalation has not yet led to a sequel to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis amid new conditions. The conflict remains in a mode of “creeping escalation”. However, the deepening of the confrontation in Europe continues, increasing the likelihood of a radical scenario. What is this scenario, are there any alternatives to it, and what path will the situation take?

The basic scenario for the near future is the continuation of “creeping escalation”. We should expect further attacks on Russian territory using Western weapons. However, they will probably be pinpoint attacks, balancing on the edge of the conditions outlined in Russia’s new nuclear doctrine. The Russian army has more leverage in such a scenario. The losses of Ukrainian infrastructure and industrial potential will increase, as will the losses of territory, military equipment, and armed forces personnel. In addition, Russia still has leverage over the West in other parts of the world, including the Middle East. But “creeping escalation” is also acceptable to a certain extent for the West. It allows for Russian potential to be constrained in Ukraine, wearing down Moscow’s resources and testing its weapons and intelligence systems in combat conditions. Ukraine is becoming increasingly dependent on the West, effectively losing its sovereignty. Its ability to conduct military operations is already directly linked to Western support, and post-war reconstruction without it is simply unthinkable.

A radical scenario could be provoked by Ukraine’s attempt to break out of the losing algorithm of “creeping escalation”.

What will happen if Ukraine is nevertheless supplied with a batch of missiles sufficient for massive use against Russian territory and this batch is used beyond the conditions of the Russian nuclear doctrine? Such a strike could be carried out in the expectation that Moscow will not dare to attack targets on the territory of NATO countries, much less use nuclear weapons. However, it would be reckless to hope that the Russian leadership would swallow such an attack, especially if it causes significant damage and casualties.

Indeed, the destruction of targets on the territory of NATO countries is fraught with a direct military clash with the Alliance. However, a nuclear strike on the territory of Ukraine in such conditions is already becoming a much more realistic scenario compared to the recent past. It will most likely not be massive. It is more logical to expect a demonstrative use of one tactical charge far from populated areas. But such a demonstration could be more than convincing.

If the radical scenario does develop, a situation will arise that is possibly more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis. It will be extremely difficult to stop the crisis from escalating in such conditions. The question is whether it develops into a major war between Russia and NATO. The West’s determination to wage war is far from obvious, so an immediate military response is unlikely. However, it will be easier for the West to isolate Russia. A powerful incentive will arise to mobilise new resources in support of Ukraine and accelerate the militarisation of the West itself. Ukraine will return to the global information agenda.

A radical scenario will bring to its limit all those weaknesses in the structure of European and international security that have been accumulating over a long period of time. In this case, the world order really risks collapsing in a classic form for the history of international relations—through an armed confrontation between major powers. The big question is what exactly will arise from the ruins. And at whose expense will the new order be created.

In the “creeping escalation” scenario, Ukraine will also face a growing crisis. Strictly speaking, Kiev is the most vulnerable party in any development of the situation—both radical and basic. Ukraine will inevitably suffer losses even in the event of a peaceful solution. The question is the price for all participants. The price for Ukraine will be the highest.

Russia and the West are going through another stage of military-political escalation. Its immediate indicator was Ukraine’s use of American and British missile systems to strike Russian territory, the emergence of Moscow’s new nuclear doctrine, the subsequent destruction of Ukraine’s Yuzhmash plant by a medium-range missile, as well as new strikes on Russia. The escalation has not yet led to a sequel to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis amid new conditions. The conflict remains in a mode of “creeping escalation”. However, the deepening of the confrontation in Europe continues, increasing the likelihood of a radical scenario. What is this scenario, are there any alternatives to it, and what path will the situation take?

The Stabilizing “Basic Principles”: Moscow Reduces Options for Pre-Nuclear Escalation. Russia’s leading experts on the new Russia’s nuclear doctrine

The events that have taken place can be characterised as a “creeping escalation”. The parties have refrained from abrupt and unpredictable steps. However, they are slowly pushing back the red lines, further expanding the range of weapons used, the areas of hybrid confrontation, and the combat operations zone.

The exchange of missile strikes was preceded by a number of escalatory steps. These include the supply of Western-made long-range missile systems to Ukraine and their subsequent use, drone strikes on Russian territory, and the Ukrainian armed forces invasion of Kursk Region. On the Russian side, there is a continuation of the offensive in Donbass and other regions, new strikes on industrial infrastructure and energy facilities in Ukraine, and increased cooperation with US opponents, primarily North Korea. The use of Western-made missiles to strike Russian territory can hardly be considered a “black swan”. This option has long been discussed, and Kiev actively lobbied for it. On the Russian side, warnings about a possible response were also transparent and clear, including conventional missile and nuclear options. Changing the nuclear doctrine towards expanding the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons has also been discussed for a long time.

The new stage has not changed the situation on the battlefield, but has opened the way for a transition to new stages of escalation with a minimum of incentives to reduce it.

The basic scenario for the near future is the continuation of “creeping escalation”. We should expect further attacks on Russian territory using Western weapons. However, they will probably be pinpoint attacks, balancing on the edge of the conditions outlined in Russia’s new nuclear doctrine. The Russian army has more leverage in such a scenario.

First, test strikes involving the new medium-range missiles may continue. There are unlikely to be many of them, but the psychological effect and the use of the new system in combat conditions are important.

Second, Russia will continue its usual attacks with missiles and drones, as it has been doing for a long time in a way that Kiev can’t match. Ukraine’s material losses from such strikes are tangible.

Third, the Russian army is slowly advancing, wearing down the enemy. In the “creeping escalation” scenario, Russia has an advantage and the ability to inflict much greater damage on Ukraine than Kiev and the West inflict on Russia. The losses of Ukrainian infrastructure and industrial potential will increase, as will the losses of territory, military equipment, and armed forces personnel. In addition, Russia still has leverage over the West in other parts of the world, including the Middle East.

Ivan Timofeev:
Why Involvement of NATO Forces in Ukraine Should Be Taken Seriously

A radical scenario could be provoked by Ukraine’s attempt to break out of the losing algorithm of “creeping escalation”. The build-up of missile strikes in combination with the use of drones is an attempt to counterbalance Russian actions, demonstrate the growth of the ability to cause damage, and at the same time to involve Western partners more deeply in the conflict. Kiev’s Western allies do not yet have a consolidated desire to get involved in such initiatives. For example, Germany is avoiding deliveries of its cruise missiles for attacks on Russian territory. But “creeping escalation” is also acceptable to a certain extent for the West. It allows for Russian potential to be constrained in Ukraine, wearing down Moscow’s resources and testing its weapons and intelligence systems in combat conditions. Ukraine is becoming increasingly dependent on the West, effectively losing its sovereignty. Its ability to conduct military operations is already directly linked to Western support, and post-war reconstruction without it is simply unthinkable.

What will happen if Ukraine is nevertheless supplied with a batch of missiles sufficient for massive use against Russian territory and this batch is used beyond the conditions of the Russian nuclear doctrine? Such a strike could be carried out in the expectation that Moscow will not dare to attack targets on the territory of NATO countries, much less use nuclear weapons. However, it would be reckless to hope that the Russian leadership would swallow such an attack, especially if it causes significant damage and casualties.

Indeed, the destruction of targets on the territory of NATO countries is fraught with a direct military clash with the Alliance. However, a nuclear strike on the territory of Ukraine in such conditions is already becoming a much more realistic scenario compared to the recent past. It will most likely not be massive. It is more logical to expect a demonstrative use of one tactical charge far from populated areas. But such a demonstration could be more than convincing.

In itself, it will create a situation that doesn’t resemble the Cuban Missile Crisis as much as it does the American strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

At the time, the US went for the destruction of two large cities; in a matter of days it put an end to the war with Japan. Moscow may have similar calculations, although the destruction of cities is obviously not part of its plans.

In 1945, the US was the only nuclear power and had huge potential in the field of conventional weapons; its territory was invulnerable, while Japan was left without viable allies and was on the verge of collapse. Ukraine is also exhausted by the war, but its allies have colossal power and, if they gather the political will, are capable of more aggressive actions. In addition, other centres of power, such as China and India, are not interested in nuclear escalation. Moscow can hardly rely upon their support in such a scenario.

Ivan Timofeev:
Hybrid War and Hybrid Peace

If the radical scenario does develop, a situation will arise that is possibly more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1962, the USSR and the US were balancing on the brink of a nuclear war in peacetime. Today this is playing out amid a major conflict in Europe. It will be extremely difficult to stop the crisis from escalating in such conditions. The question is whether it develops into a major war between Russia and NATO. The West’s determination to wage war is far from obvious, so an immediate military response is unlikely. However, it will be easier for the West to isolate Russia. A powerful incentive will arise to mobilise new resources in support of Ukraine and accelerate the militarisation of the West itself. Ukraine will return to the global information agenda. The way will open to new stages of escalation. For example, Kiev could use a dirty atomic bomb against Russia, which could be met by a retaliatory strike from Moscow. A radical scenario will bring to its limit all those weaknesses in the structure of European and international security that have been accumulating over a long period of time. In this case, the world order really risks collapsing in a classic form for the history of international relations—through an armed confrontation between major powers. The big question is what exactly will arise from the ruins. And at whose expense will the new order be created.

The alternative is to avoid a situation where Moscow decides to try to put a fat end to the conflict by using nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

Cruise and ballistic missile strikes on Russian territory will not break the will of the Russian leadership. Quite the opposite. They will increase the motivation to end it with much more decisive and rapid steps. In the “creeping escalation” scenario, Ukraine will also face a growing crisis. Strictly speaking, Kiev is the most vulnerable party in any development of the situation—both radical and basic. Ukraine will inevitably suffer losses even in the event of a peaceful solution. The question is the price for all participants. The price for Ukraine will be the highest.

First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.