President Xi Comes to Town

Chinese President Xi Jinping will come to Moscow on May 9, 2025, to attend the Victory Day parade marking 80 years since the end of World War II in Europe. On top of participating to this highly visible event, he is scheduled to have in-depth consultations with his Russia’s peer Vladimir Putin on a broad range of issues including both various dimensions of bilateral relations and more general recent international developments. One could note that this will be the first trip of Xi to Moscow since March of 2023, when he came to the Russian capital shortly after securing a third term as China’s leader. Half a year ago, President XI attended the 2024 BRICS summit in Russia’s Kazan, but the summit was a multilateral gathering rather than a bilateral summit meeting.

The formal reason for the forthcoming state visit is to pay respect for the Soviet contribution to the defeat of Nazism in the Second World War. The May 9 Victory Day remains a major public holiday in Russia, commemorating the Soviet Union’s wartime efforts while also serving as a display of Russia’s military strength and political unity of the nation. The V-Day has always had a foreign policy dimension as well. Earlier anniversaries were attended by numerous Western leaders but after 2022 it is no longer the case. For the 2025 celebration, Russia has extended invitations to Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Yet, participation of President Xi has a special meaning for the Russian hosts. Vladimir Putin referred to Xi as the “main guest of honor”. In his turn, Xi has already invited Putin to come to Beijing in early September to commemorate 80 years since the end of the second world war for China, which was marked by Japan’s surrender.

President Xi Jinping's official visit to Moscow and his attendance at the Red Square military parade, which in itself is of great political significance in the context of the rapidly changing international situation, symbolizes not only the stability of Sino-Russian relations, but also their development and enhancement. Let us have a look at the likely agenda of the Putin-Xi consultations in May assuming that the two leaders will have enough time to focus on the current state of relations between the two nations in detail and to address not only numerous achievements, but also potential problems and pending challenges.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will come to Moscow on May 9, 2025, to attend the Victory Day parade marking 80 years since the end of World War II in Europe. On top of participating to this highly visible event, he is scheduled to have in-depth consultations with his Russia’s peer Vladimir Putin on a broad range of issues including both various dimensions of bilateral relations and more general recent international developments. One could note that this will be the first trip of Xi to Moscow since March of 2023, when he came to the Russian capital shortly after securing a third term as China’s leader. Half a year ago, President XI attended the 2024 BRICS summit in Russia’s Kazan, but the summit was a multilateral gathering rather than a bilateral summit meeting.

The formal reason for the forthcoming state visit is to pay respect for the Soviet contribution to the defeat of Nazism in the Second World War. The May 9 Victory Day remains a major public holiday in Russia, commemorating the Soviet Union’s wartime efforts while also serving as a display of Russia’s military strength and political unity of the nation. The V-Day has always had a foreign policy dimension as well. Earlier anniversaries were attended by numerous Western leaders but after 2022 it is no longer the case. For the 2025 celebration, Russia has extended invitations to Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Yet, participation of President Xi has a special meaning for the Russian hosts. Vladimir Putin referred to Xi as the “main guest of honor”. In his turn, Xi has already invited Putin to come to Beijing in early September to commemorate 80 years since the end of the second world war for China, which was marked by Japan’s surrender.

President Xi Jinping's official visit to Moscow and his attendance at the Red Square military parade, which in itself is of great political significance in the context of the rapidly changing international situation, symbolizes not only the stability of Sino-Russian relations, but also their development and enhancement. Let us have a look at the likely agenda of the Putin-Xi consultations in May assuming that the two leaders will have enough time to focus on the current state of relations between the two nations in detail and to address not only numerous achievements, but also potential problems and pending challenges.

Bilateral relations

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Pessimistic predictions about Sino-Russian relations are a long-lasting hobby of some Western public opinion, which plays up the existence of contradictions between China and Russia, describes Russia as China's vassal, and tries to drive a wedge between China and Russia to sow discord in Sino-Russian relations. If during the Biden era this was still mainly expressed as an ideology, after the Trump administration, it has been reflected in U.S. policy, with both Secretary of State Rubio and President Trump outspokenly expressing the idea of distancing China and Russia.

Against this backdrop, the so-called Nixon 2.0 concept emerged, which was to revive the Nixon Triangle model but operate in the opposite direction, instead pulling Russia to the side of the United States to jointly target China. In fact, there is no need to take this statement seriously, because any rational mind that understands China-Russia relations knows clearly that under the current conditions, this model no longer works and is impossible to reproduce.

Not to mention that times have changed, the real environment is also quite different during the Nixon era. The reason why the Great Triangle model could be formed was that the Soviet Union was the most serious security challenge to both China and the United States, and the Sino-Soviet relationship had no immediate interest entanglement with China. Therefore, in the context of the Cold War, China and the United States were able to achieve strategic alliance and jointly counter the Soviet Union, the common adversary to both. The current situations are completely different. China is not the common enemy of Russia and the United States. Moreover, China and Russia have significant interests in the fields of security, economy, energy, and in many other spheres. The relationship between China and Russia is much better, closer and more solid than that between Russia and the United States. Of course, this neither means that the cooperation between the two countries is anti-American, nor does it mean that China and Russia cannot develop relations with the United States.

All the above stated notwithstanding, it would be wrong to argue that there are no challenges in Sino-Russian relations today. Take for instance, economic cooperation, which has been the most significant material basis of the relations between the two countries since at least the beginning of the century. Over the years, the bilateral economic cooperation has developed rapidly and has maintained an upward trend. However, trade is influenced by many factors, including international and domestic ones of both countries. It is normal to have ups and downs, fast and slow. The most important thing is that both countries have a long-term demand for economic cooperation and there is significant potential for sustainable development. There is still great room for deepening, and there are also broad areas that have not been fully explored. It is necessary to vigorously develop new major projects, especially in the fields of energy development and the Arctic, transportation, shipbuilding, infrastructure construction, and the development of the Far East and Siberia, and so on.

After very high growth rates in 2022 (29.3%) and in 2023 (26.3%), many analysts in Russia predicted that by 2030 the bilateral trade with China can reach USD 300 billion or even USD 350 billion. The optimistic expectations suggested that before too long Russia will catch up with main China’s trading partners—such as the United States or, at least, as South Korea and Japan. However, in 2024 the bilateral trade demonstrated much less spectacular dynamics (1.8% growth). It is worth noting that Russia’s export to China in 2024 essentially did not change compared to 2023, and all the trade growth was due to a modest increase of Russia’s imports from China (close to 4%). The released data on the first quarter of 2025 reflect a visible decline (6.6%) in the trade turnout. This decline affected almost evenly the Russian export to China (6.7%) and the Russian import from China (6.3%). It remains unclear whether the two sides are in a position to sustain the level of bilateral trade reached in 2024 (USD 244.8 billion). The state of bilateral trade should be one of the talking points for the two leaders’ deliberations.

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After a very steep two-year rise, some sectors of Russia’s consumer market are already saturated with China’s supplies. The most graphic example is the car market, where Russia in 2025 lost its former position as #1 export destination for Chinese automakers being surpassed not only by Mexico, but also by UAE. With no visible strategies of production localization in place, Chinese brands face a growing challenge of post-production maintenance and repair. The rumors that some car-makers from South Korea and Japan might consider returning to Russia in the nearest future are also a factor that cools down demand for China made cars. The same or similar signs of the market saturation can be tracked in other segments of China’s exports to Russia including textiles, furniture, consumer electronics, and so on. To sustain the past growth rates of China’s export to Russia becomes next to impossible.

On the other hand, Russia’s export to China remains heavily dominated by hydrocarbons (mostly crude oil) that, despite all the efforts at diversification, constitute up to three quarters of the overall current export volume. The exact composition of energy deliveries might vary from year to year—for instance, in 2024 there was a general shift away from coal to LNG. However, given the ongoing energy transition in China is hard to believe that its overall import of hydrocarbons will grow exponentially in years to come. Russia also exports to China a lot of metal ores and metals, especially aluminium (about 7% of the overall export volume). All the rest accounts for less than one fifth of the overall Russia’s export. Such a structure makes the monetary value of Russia’s export to China highly dependent on fluctuations of global commodities’ prices. The current decline of this value could partially be caused by the plummeting oil prices that brought the price on Russia’s Urals oil in early April of 2025 to lower than USD 50 a barrel.

Can this pattern of Russia-China economic relations be changed? Three directions of such change, beyond standard diversification, look particularly promising. First, moving from basic trade to deep industrial cooperation based on joint technological and production chains. Second, increasing the share of services (information, financial, educational, medical, services in transportation, tourism, construction, and so on) in bilateral trade. Third, engaging more actively small and medium-size business. This is more a problem for Moscow than for Beijing: in China, small and medium-size business accounts for 60% of the GDP, while in Russia—for no more than 20%.

Thinking of longer-term prospects for Russia-China economic cooperation, one should consider the growing impact of the fourth industrial revolution on the global economy and trade. In years to come advanced robotics and AI are likely to reduce reliance on low-cost labor, encouraging developed nations to reshore manufacturing, localized production (3D printing) could decrease demand for certain imported goods, IoT will transform logistics providing for real-time tracking that will optimize supply chains enabling just-in-time manufacturing. Russia and China will face multiple challenges in data localization, digital taxation, intellectual property; harmonizing regulations on digital trade and addressing cyber security risks will be critical for advancing bilateral economic cooperation.

Regional matters

It would be only natural for the Russian and Chinese leaders to discuss the evolving geopolitical and security situation in East Asia, which was significantly affected by the ongoing Russia’s conflict with the West and be mounting tensions between China and the United States. Historically, Moscow tried to play the role of a geopolitical balancing power in East Asia. In the North East Asia region that approach implied that along with heavily investing into Russia-China relations, the Kremlin also tried to explore economic and even political opportunities with Seoul and with Tokyo. In addressing the North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, Russia relied on multilateral frameworks including UN Security Council solidary voting on economic sanctions against Pyongyang and the six party negotiating mechanism. In the South East Asia region Moscow preferred not to take sides in local territorial disputes and to enhance bilateral relations with ASEAN nations, especially with Vietnam.

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Since the beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine this approach to the region has changed in a significant way. There are no longer prospects for improving Russia-Japan or Russia-ROK badly crippled relations anytime soon, neither there are opportunities for restoring a multilateral consensus on North Korea. Instead of trying to serve as a balancing actor in the North East Asia, Moscow is explicitly tilting toward Beijing and Pyongyang. The prime challenge for the Russian foreign policy is not about how to forge an inclusive great power multilateral understanding on North Korea, but rather how to make sure that the ongoing Russia-DPRK rapprochement is not looked at with suspicions or discontent from Beijing. In the South East Asia this shift has been so far less articulated, but Moscow’s attempts to reach out to ASEAN have had only limited success (for instance, the Russia-ASEAN trade turnout over last couple of years amounted to only USD 20–25 billion). At the same time, Russia has become more supportive of China on the issue of Taiwan.

An important task for the two leaders meeting in Moscow would be to harmonize their respective approaches to North Korea in order not to allow Pyongyang exploiting likely differences in these approaches and to use its main international partners against one another. At the same time, in view of the resent steps of Washington, Seoul and Tokyo in the direction of bringing the US-Japan-ROK strategic partnership to a new level, Russia and China are forced to consider more multilateral cooperation within the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang strategic triangle without necessarily encouraging DPRK nuclear and ballistic ambitions.

There are a number of other important security matters in Asia that Presidents Putin and Xi might consider approaching at their Moscow meetings. For instance, Russia is fully committed to a any plausible detente in China-India relations and though Russia’s impact on this relations should not be overestimated, it can still make a modest contribution into this process by offering the two sides engaging in trilateral projects (e.g. in Russia’s Arctic regions). Moscow and Beijing share interests in maintaining peace and stability in the war-torn Afghanistan as well as in the neighboring countries of Central Asia. Both Russia and China are concerned about the continuous Israeli military activities in Gaza and in the West Bank, about the situation in the Red Sea as well as about a possible military actions of the United States against Iran. A consorted Russian-Chinese position on any of these or any other burning Middle East security matters would be a contribution to regional peace and stability that Middle East needs so desperately.

The US factor

It is well known that US President Donald Trump views the Russia-China partnership as “unnatural” and challenging for American strategic interests. He stated more than once his intention to “un-unite” the two nations by driving the wedge between Moscow and Beijing similar to the Nixon-era strategy that exploited the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War. The ongoing US attempts to start a dialogue with the Kremlin are based on the assumption that better US-Russian relations could contribute to separating Moscow from Beijing by weakening its current dependence on China, hoping that Russia might moderate its ties with Beijing if given the right incentives. This strategy is sometimes referred to as a “reverse Nixon” policy, where instead of aligning with China to counter the Soviet Union, the U.S. would engage Russia to counterbalance China.

It is also true that the Trump administration is ready to change its strategy of “dual containment” of China and Russia and seek instead to unite Russia and suppress China, as the Trump administration has made clear. But the chances of success of this strategy are slim, because there is no good reason for Russia to accept this proposal, but there are a lot of not to accept it. Any rational mind would recognize this. This does not mean that Russia will not cooperate with the United States. On the contrary, developing relations with the United States cannot but be hoped for by Russia, especially in the current situation where the Russia-Ukraine conflict is deadlocked. It can greatly change Russia's situation at one stroke. China is also glad to see the normalization of Russia-US relations, which is conducive to international stability.

In order to bring Russia down on its side against China, Trump's likely maneuver is still his usual two killer apps, one of which is extreme pressure and the other is the lure of benefits, or the carrot and stick big size. But Russia will not be willing to act as a tool for the United States to contain China, and at the expense of its own vital interests. In international politics, Russia will insist on being an independent pole and will not be a “pawn” of other countries. On strategic issues towards China, Russia and the United States may have some points of convergence mainly on the issue of nuclear arms control. The United States advocates involving China in the Russia-US nuclear disarmament negotiations. Russia respects China's position but does not oppose the United States' ideas either. The United States also recognizes that the 2.0 model of the Great Triangle is hard to replicate. Therefore, its current goal is to keep China and Russia as far apart as possible, with the focus on hindering cooperation between the two countries in the military and energy fields. The most important thing is to prevent an alliance between Russia and China, and at the same time narrow the distance between Russia and the United States.

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The apparent changes in US positions towards Russia will definitely constitute an important item in the Putin-Xi dialogue in Moscow. The whole idea of a sinister Moscow-Beijing axis looming over the West is, of course, absurd. The cooperation between two large neighboring countries has its own foundations and drivers; it would have continued even if the United States had not existed at all. By the way, the current US trade with China (USD 688 billion in 2024) is almost three times bigger that the Russia’s trade with the Middle Kingdom, but nobody in the Kremlin is lamenting about the US-China partnership. Furthermore, neither Moscow, nor Beijing is pursuing the idea of a legally binding military-political alliance with each other, similar to the multilateral North Atlantic Alliance or to the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960. Many in Russia and in China alike would argue that such rigid security arrangements in the XXI century appear to be inefficient and antiquated and that the existing more flexible format of interaction between Moscow and Beijing has proved to be more practical and more productive.

However, the likely US-China trade war is not something that will have no impact on the Russian-China relations. In the immediate future Moscow can even benefit from a steep decline of the bilateral US-China trade since Beijing may be forced to redirect some of the trade flows from the United States to neighboring Eurasian countries, Russia including. In some cases, the Russian side might be in a position to negotiate better deals with its counterparts from China. And yet, there are enough reasons for decision-makers in Moscow to be concerned about more remote implications of the recent U.S. tariff moves regarding China. The precise impact of these moves on the global economy is still hard to predict; but in the worst-case scenario, we could record a rise of global inflation, a significant slowdown in economic growth worldwide and even a new global recession followed by higher unemployment and a decline in real incomes across the world. Responding to demonstrative U.S. unilateralism, China and other major economic actors might be forced to shift their attention to expanding their domestic rather than foreign markets. Triumphal protectionism would limit the appetite and capabilities of major actors to work together in addressing common risks and challenges from climate change to artificial intelligence governance.

If such a scenario becomes reality, it will affect everybody, including Russia. For example, China’s demand for Russia's commodities will decline, its energy and raw materials exports will start shrinking, and domestic economic growth will eventually go down due to growing trade deficits, depreciation of national currency, and higher inflation. On top of that, one should not forget that U.S. President Donald Trump continuously threatens to impose further restrictive economic measures, such as new tariffs on Russian oil consumers, on Moscow if Russia does not properly engage in U.S.-mediated Ukraine ceasefire negotiations. Though Russia is not in a position to affect the US-China economic relations in any significant way, Presidents Putin and Xi should keep these relations on their radar screen while discussing future cooperation between the two major Eurasian powers.

The international situation, which is characterized by rapid changes, risks and uncertainty, cannot be a subject of concern for the leaders of Beijing and Moscow. Assessing the situation, looking ahead, exchanging views and proposing ways of promoting international peace and maintaining stability should be among the topics. On the occasion of the commemoration of the victory in the Second World War, both countries will once again emphasize the need to safeguard the victorious results of the Second World War, to preserve the international order， which here refers to the international order centered on the United Nations, the international rules based on the Charter of the United Nations, the rejection of hegemony and unilateralism, the advancement of multi-polarity world.

With the international order following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the so-called Yalta model has emerged in the academic circle, which could be called Yalta 2.0, has emerged in the academic world, with the politics of the great at its core. Obviously, this is a different era, and one or two big powers cannot organize the fate of the world, nor can they divide the interests that do not belong to them. Moreover, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is very likely to have neither a completely victorious country nor a completely defeated one.

The BRICS Group and the SCO are the two main multilateral institutions for international and regional cooperation between Russia and China, and they are the most important platforms through which the two countries can promote their common international and regional agendas, including in the areas of the politics, economy, finance, world order building, and so on. It is a common interest of the two countries to see how these two mechanisms can be utilized more effectively.

First published in the Guancha.