... respect to prolong the Treaty, but this is no guarantee in the current situation.
As regards weapons systems threatening strategic stability, what do you think is their hierarchy now? How significant is the effect of anti-missile systems, long-range non-nuclear weapons, anti-satellite weapons?
Regarding anti-missile defence, its effect is certainly greater than it was 10, 20, 30, 40 years ago. The Treaty was concluded in 1972, nearly 50 years ago. It remained in force for 30 years, and anti-missile systems ...
... better. The problem with the New START Treaty is that it limits just Russia and the U.S., though Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine are technically included as they inherited some of the Soviet arsenals. In the past, the Russian government said that other (nuclear weapons states) should participate in these treaties.
The New START Treaty, like its earlier versions, focuses on long-range nuclear arm missiles and bombers. A new type of strategic arms control treaty could limit additional types of weapons,...
The possibility that decisions about the use of nuclear weapons will be influenced by information and communication technologies (ICTs) is the most serious threat that exists today.
Strategic stability is once again becoming a primary concern in international relations. The topic has received a great ...
... This ideology—like any other—is based on an agglomeration of different myths about the past, present, and future of strategic relations between the nuclear powers.
One of them (which may be called “nuclear revanchism”) is that following major nuclear weapons reductions during the last thirty years, their use would no longer be a worldwide catastrophe, so a nuclear war can now be waged and won. Moreover, it is claimed that the limited and selective use of nuclear weapons through integrated ...
... becoming increasingly loud both in Russia and the US, as are statements that the national security of either side will be guaranteed even if the extension of the treaty is renounced.
Without the New START, there will be a broader issue of maintaining the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime. We should not forget about the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty either. The United States, by the way, has not ratified the CTBT, but is now criticising Russia for alleged CTBT violations.
Thus, a chain reaction ...
... a compromise does appear, then the most serious concerns of the Trump administration regarding Iran’s politics should be addressed, otherwise, no deal can be concluded. Clearly, the greatest threat coming from Iran is the prospect of it developing nuclear weapons. When it comes to the nuclear deterrence with regard to Iran, two factors are important for the United States: the possibility of verifying compliance on the part of Iran with its obligations and the term of the JCPOA’s validity. At ...
... the target country with fewer opportunities to use it for achieving diplomatic goals.
Second, the breakdown of the JCPOA undermines non-proliferation efforts. North Korea is a case in point proving that while failing to remove sanctions, possessing nuclear weapons provides some leverage in negotiations. At the same time, giving up nuclear weapons leads to the re-imposition of sanctions under new pretexts.
Third, every new round of sanctions forces target countries to adapt and find new ways to carry ...
Review of the NTI report “Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age”
The subject of the interrelation of threats in the fields of information and communication technologies and nuclear weapons is gradually becoming one of the dominant topics in current international security issues....
... years ago, I attended a small public conference where a representative of the NATO Secretariat was speaking. It was a time of internal turmoil in Pakistan. I asked a question: which country does NATO consider to be a greater threat, Pakistan, which has nuclear weapons, or Iran, which does not. He thought for a while and said: I still think it’s Iran. I asked why. He said because nobody in Pakistan, neither the government, nor the opposition, had claimed that they would destroy another country, while ...
... crumble too, as it is looking dangerously unlikely that the bare minimum of extending the agreement will be achieved. It is time we started preparing ourselves for the possibility of waking up in March 2021 in a world where there are no restrictions on nuclear weapons.
The potential disintegration of New START would not be catastrophic for Russia, all the more so because the country could derive some benefit from the “inter-treaty” period and approach the next, and hopefully inevitable, stage of ...
