...
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2156686
Kristensen, H.M., Korda, M. & Reynolds, E. (2023). Nuclear notebook: Chinese nuclear weapons.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 79(2), 108-133.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713
Newhouse, J.... ... control. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.
Tuchman, B.W. (1962). The guns of August. New York: Macmillan.
Wilkening, D. (2014). Strategic stability between the United States and Russia. In D. Ochmanek, & M. Sulmeyer (Ed.), Challenges in U.S. National Security ...
... nuclear and non-nuclear planning, exercises, and operations’. However, while key U.S. documents underscore the deterrent role of nuclear weapons, an emerging concept of
conventional-nuclear integration
suggests that nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities may ... ... of recurrent bilateral interactions. Although Russia has rejected the recent U.S. proposal to
resum
e systematic dialogue on strategic stability and arms control, both states should continue to seek other opportunities—whether as a track-1.5 format ...
... controversies have been growing since the late-2000s, the concepts and means of limited nuclear war have come to the forefront of the strategic thinking of the two superpowers. The proponents of limited nuclear warfare assume by default that, under sustained strategic stability, the limited use of nuclear weapons would not necessarily escalate to the exchange of massive strategic nuclear strikes exactly due to the assured prospect of retaliation and general annihilation. Therefore, allegedly a limited use of nuclear weapons can be an effective ...
... overwhelming majority of observers until February 2022. Indeed, it seemed unlikely from the perspective of the past thirty years. And yet, it materialized. Maybe it is time to break down the habitual scheme of things?
Aleksey Arbatov:
The Ukrainian Crisis and Strategic Stability
Regardless of the motives behind this proposal, it requires rational reflection, considering the fundamental importance of the issue. After all, we are talking about nuclear weapons, which are associated not just with a breakdown but with a possible end of everything for everyone. It seems that the preemptive use of nuclear weapons will not solve the issues between Russia and the West. It will significantly aggravate ...
Working Paper No. 68/2022
Working Paper No. 68/2022
The first atomic bomb was designed almost eight decades ago. Since then, the nuclear factor has become one of the game-changers in international relations. The possession of nuclear weapons has become especially important in modern times, as discussions of the fatal destructiveness the use of atomic weapons for all mankind have reintensified. There is increasing speculation on this topic in the international arena. Nevertheless,...
... consequences of using tactical nuclear weapons are completely unpredictable.
Now, it is necessary to revise the principles of nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation. It is necessary to identify the unit of measurement of the effectiveness of deterrence and strategic stability. Quantitative parities are not something to rely on today and beyond.
Nuclear weapons are politicized weapons. They often appear as a symbolic trump card. In all countries there are people involved in planning its combat use. It is very important, while demonstrating the possibility and ability to use nuclear weapons rather ...
... statements of Russia’s leadership imply a broader interpretation of nuclear deterrence and thus affect strategic stability. In particular “aggressive statements” and “illegitimate sanctions” by foreign states were not envisaged as a reason to use nuclear weapons in the Strategic Stability Concept approved by Moscow and Washington in 1990 [Joint statement... 1990]. They are also absent from Russia’s 2018 Military Doctrine and the Fundamentals of Russia’s Nuclear Policy of 2020.
Certainly, the innovations in Russia’s ...
... initiatives” of Bush, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the two governments agreed not to arm vessels on patrol duty with non-strategic nuclear weapons. In the early 2010s, the United States retired its remaining nuclear-capable
Tomahawks
altogether. The feeble ... ... attacked country is set to emerge with prevailing nuclear forces. In this approach, preemptive strikes make no sense and classic strategic stability
v
is easy to maintain. Note that inadequate SNF survivability of one side is as dangerous for other sides ...
... the first nuclear devices were so large and heavy that the idea of them fitting into something like a large-caliber projectile any time soon was totally unthinkable. Besides, only heavy aircraft could at that time offer the capability of delivering nuclear weapons across many thousands of kilometers, which was the ultimate requirement in the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The AGM-28 “Hound Dog” missile mounted on the pylon of a Boeing B-52 “Stratofortress”.
Not ...
On September 5–6, 2020, the International Schiller Institute held an online conference on the topic: “Why a P-5 Summit Is Urgently Needed Now?”.
On September 5–6, 2020, the International Schiller Institute held an online conference on the topic: “Why a P-5 Summit Is Urgently Needed Now?”. The Conference was attended by experts, public figures, and journalists from the U.S., Germany, China, Italy, France, Spain, Canada, Pakistan, and Russia.
Andrey Kortunov, RIAC Director General, made a report...