... nuclear weapons. However, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review released after his election declined to commit to such a stance, arguing that it would expose the United States to an unacceptable level of risk. It did, however,
designate
both Russia and China as nuclear adversaries for the first time. The US plans to
invest
634 billion US dollars in modernizing its nuclear weapons from 2021 to 2030, an increase of 28% compared to the previous budget. Russia, in November 2024, introduced an
executive order
, Approving the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. This updated ...
... initially
located
in northeast China, later they were observed in southern regions as well. Although some US sources have
suggested
that the DF-17 could potentially carry a nuclear warhead, there is no reliable evidence to confirm this.
In addition, China is also notably expanding its arsenal of land-based nuclear weapons. In 2021, a group of US analysts led by M. Korda, studying commercial satellite images, discovered two positional areas of silo-based ballistic missiles in Gansu Province and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. A third positional silo ...
... situation, as it can only partially offset NATO’s weight. At the same time, Moscow does not perceive its relations with Beijing as a firm military alliance (and it is hard to imagine that it will in the future), meaning that the authorities cannot rely on China’s strategic nuclear forces to strengthen Russia’s own deterrence.
Because Russia kept its nuclear weapons complex going through the 1990s and then developed it further, the country is surely
capable
of expanding its strategic nuclear forces at a pace comparable to that of the U.S. (where the industry collapsed, delaying the resumption of ...
... obligations, the country made notable strides in developing advanced missile systems. Yet, the regime governing missile and nuclear weapons continued to deteriorate. In 2019, the Trump administration initiated the withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range ... ... (including the ABM Treaty), suspicions of new system developments, and the presence of such systems in third countries, notably China. During Trump’s first term, the extension of New START was nearly derailed, only to be salvaged under the Biden administration....
... relations with Moscow are unfriendly or, at best, uncertain. It is no coincidence that serious
discussions
have recently
unfolded
in Germany, Japan and South Korea, as well as in Taiwan and Ukraine, about the costs and benefits of acquiring their own nuclear weapons.
Regardless of the progress of the peace process in the Ukrainian conflict, resuming the U.S.–Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue will be a daunting challenge. In any case, the U.S. will likely make China’s involvement in arms limitation efforts a mandatory condition. Furthermore, one cannot rule out the possibility of Washington leaving the New START before its extended expiration date in February 2026 under the pretext of alleged Russian “violation” ...
... linked to the great powers, are painful and destructive, but implicitly motivated by the need to resolve the contradictions impeding the new world order’s formation.
In the fall of 2024, such an understanding is in need of correction.
First,
regarding nuclear weapons. It is not that they have ceased to function as a deterrent. Their possession by Russia, China—and to some extent Israel—does deter those states’ adversaries from actions that they would likely otherwise take to achieve success. But the Ukraine conflict has forced the world to reconsider the limits of nuclear deterrence, i.e., to define ...
... conflict between Russia and the West. France was reduced to the position of America’s junior partner, although it itself has some nuclear weapons. Similarly, Japan and South Korea find themselves with foreign policy largely determined by Washington, often ... ... radical movements in Syria receive support from abroad, which has little effect on Russia’s relations with their sponsors. China at one time actively used radical Marxist movements in the countries of Southeast Asia and provided them with various assistance....
... relations with China are based, among other things, on conventional arms control in border areas (Shanghai and Moscow agreements), and the relevant control body recently met again in Astana. The Russian-Chinese mutual commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other also plays a significant role.
Zhao Huasheng, Andrey Kortunov:
Prepare for the Worst and Strive for the Best. Russia’s and China’s Perceptions of Developments in International Security
There is also a Russian-Chinese agreement on notifications of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. It is possible to use such mechanisms in the future to reduce regional ...
... continuation of this practice. China, for its part, intends to build up its nuclear arsenal rather than reduce it, probably with a view to achieving parity with the US and Russia in the long term. The Americans, who have officially identified Russia and China as the main threats to their security, are considering how to balance the combined nuclear potential of Moscow and Beijing. So there is no hope here.
The main problem, however, is not the quantity of nuclear weapons or even their presence per se, but the quality of relations between states. The world order is experiencing an acute systemic crisis. In the past, such crises inevitably led to wars. Now nuclear deterrence is working, albeit with some ...
... 24 hours, and 121 carriers or 1,139 charges within 30 days. Of particular significance are the U.S. plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons, including medium-range missiles, which further increases their strike potential. In this context, the development ... ... defense system in the Asia Pacific calls global strategic stability into question, because it could be used against Russia and China. In 2018, the head of Russian diplomacy insistently
urged
Japan to enter into a dialogue about the U.S. plans to create ...
