... the matter was the reason why Article 49(c).7. of the Treaty, which proclaims the principle of the collective defence of the European Union, includes the provision that, “This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy ... ... States.”
. In this case, we are talking about strategic weapons only. France’s nuclear arsenal also included tactical nuclear weapons, namely, the
short-range road-mobile missile systems, from 1974 to 1997.
. The United Kingdom ...
The best possible next step for European countries would be to try to reach out, formally or informally, to Russia to clarify the technical parameters of the proposed moratorium
The Russian moratorium proposal
February 2019, when the United States announced that it intended to withdraw from the INF Treaty on 2
August, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a
with ministers Shoigu and Lavrov to discuss the possible weapons that might be developed in response, and
framed a ‘formula’...
... This ideology—like any other—is based on an agglomeration of different myths about the past, present, and future of strategic relations between the nuclear powers.
One of them (which may be called “nuclear revanchism”) is that following major nuclear weapons reductions during the last thirty years, their use would no longer be a worldwide catastrophe, so a nuclear war can now be waged and won. Moreover, it is claimed that the limited and selective use of nuclear weapons through integrated ...
... Washington cancelled the exemptions altogether, thus even more strengthening the blockade of Iranian oil exports.
4. Even though the European Union criticized the US for withdrawing from the JCPOA and revived the 1996 Blocking Statute, major companies are expected ... ... undermines non-proliferation efforts. North Korea is a case in point proving that while failing to remove sanctions, possessing nuclear weapons provides some leverage in negotiations. At the same time, giving up nuclear weapons leads to the re-imposition ...
... years ago, I attended a small public conference where a representative of the NATO Secretariat was speaking. It was a time of internal turmoil in Pakistan. I asked a question: which country does NATO consider to be a greater threat, Pakistan, which has nuclear weapons, or Iran, which does not. He thought for a while and said: I still think it’s Iran. I asked why. He said because nobody in Pakistan, neither the government, nor the opposition, had claimed that they would destroy another country, while ...
... most interested in maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation system (even though, to some extent, the existing regime is essential for all countries). We may assume that this task is a priority for nuclear states seeking to preserve their monopoly on nuclear weapons, thereby minimizing the risk of their use for military purposes. This calls for the process to be led by recognized nuclear powers, namely Russia, the United States, China, France and the United Kingdom (and also by the European Union as an influential political association). If these countries accept the conditions for limiting Iranian uranium enrichment, this could help achieve several goals at once. First, such major and reputable countries could help to establish ...
... peacekeeping operations through Combined Task Forces, for example, among other options, in the Baltic region?
What would happen if the European Union developed more autonomous defense structures and peacekeeping forces? Could a more integrated EU system of defense ... ... to include other states, such as the European states and China?
Washington is also in the process of modernizing its tactical nuclear weapons systems, such as the B-61-12, in part by extending its range. For its part, Moscow has threatened to deploy its ...