... Iran, is far from perfect. It does not set any restrictions on Tehran’s military activities in the Middle East, it is a fixed-time deal, and it cannot prohibit Iran from extending financial and military aid to its regional allies. Nevertheless, the JCPOA did guarantee the main thing – that Tehran could not obtain nuclear weapons, the prospect of which far outweighs all other threats emanating from the country. Thus far, there is no alternative to this agreement, and no replacement appears to be in the offing. Despite the harsh economic sanctions and the real threat ...
... the next administration would not revert to the policy of sanctions. The US retains a powerful tool for inflicting economic damage on the target country with fewer opportunities to use it for achieving diplomatic goals.
Second, the breakdown of the JCPOA undermines non-proliferation efforts. North Korea is a case in point proving that while failing to remove sanctions, possessing nuclear weapons provides some leverage in negotiations. At the same time, giving up nuclear weapons leads to the re-imposition of sanctions under new pretexts.
Third, every new round of sanctions forces target countries to adapt and find new ways to carry ...
... years of negotiations between the international community and Iran over the latter’s nuclear program. The plan provides for a broad range of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activity, its primary purpose being to prevent the country from obtaining nuclear weapons. The JCPOA was never meant to be the final solution to the problem of Iranian nuclear weapons; instead, it is a temporary solution limited to a period of 15 years. This circumstance caused a wave of criticism on the part of the international community.
The ...
... of Turkey’s relations with the U.S. and individual EU member states. The country’s NATO membership and the maintenance of nuclear weapons on its soil were once again called into question. Reports began to circulate about plans to transfer the warheads ... ... important nuclear issue in the Middle East was Iran’s nuclear program. The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 on 14 July 2015 was a major breakthrough. The agreement reflects Russia’s position as a participant ...
... START and its extension until 2026. Now is clearly not the best time to discuss these matters, but the lack of dialogue on them is producing an even greater uncertainty.
The expert community in the Euro-Atlantic region has
stressed
that undermining the JCPOA has exacerbated the nuclear threat in the region and weakened the ability to counter the threat of using nuclear weapons globally. The implications of the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran deal are hard to predict fully so far. Russian diplomats have pointed out that the withdrawal is sending the wrong signal to North Korea. A reasonable question ...
... reduction, and start a dialogue on conventional weapons (tanks, warships, military aviation). The number of states possessing nuclear weapons should not expand. However, maintaining the status quo in this area between nuclear powers is permissible, because ... ... fundamental changes in the balance of power.
Further, the experts discussed the possibility of rescuing the Iranian nuclear deal (JCPOA). The position of Trump administration boils down to the fact that the 2015 deal has its shortcomings, which should be adjusted....
..., Moscow has stated that it will respond by asymmetrical means to U.S. Missile Defense deployments and radar systems in Poland and Romania, as well as in Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East.
How might the 2013 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear accord with Iran impact U.S. Missile Defense deployments in Europe — particularly given the fact that Iran’s presumed nuclear weapons program and its missile program primarily justified those deployments.
Can the U.S., Russia, China and Japan find ways to at least freeze North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities through diplomacy rather than through U.S. military ...