... influence Iran, limiting the dangers it poses. The possibilities of Moscow’s influence on Tehran remain limited, though Russia is trying to show GCC countries its ability to influence the implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal. The resumption of the JCPOA as a whole is in the interests of all Gulf countries, including Iran. This is also important for Russia since it considers ensuring security in the Gulf a key regional goal. By expanding the dialogue between Iran and the GCC countries Moscow would ...
... the 2020 elections was especially anticipated in Teheran, which had experienced years of relentless economic pressure by the previous administration in Washington. However, more than a year has passed since Biden arrived into the White House, but the JCPOA still lies on the verge of a complete collapse.
Despite experts remaining consistently optimistic about the ongoing negotiations in Vienna, few—if any—tangible results have been delivered so far. But, while the negotiations have more or less ...
... inevitably involved in it. The more the official nuclear powers brace for more competition with each other, the less they coordinate their efforts in stemming proliferation in the Korean peninsula, and the less they work on the return of the U.S. to the JCPOA. Meanwhile Iran is raising the enrichment of uranium to 60 percent.
Is there a chance that in present circumstances the RevCon can achieve progress? There are certain elements that could help to bring it about. In the core of this lie the responsibilities ...
... other hand, the existing system of nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements is being a target for dismantlement or destruction efforts. The INF Treaty has been destroyed by the U.S. The future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme remains unclear. We see again and again shamelessly open attempts to use the NPT as an instrument to exert political pressure or settle political scores with States.
This year marks the 25th anniversary since the ...
... (SCO). The highlight of the meeting was the decision taken by the Heads of State Council of the SCO on launching the procedure of granting SCO membership to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
US Sanctions Against Iran and the Future of the JCPOA: A View From Tehran and Moscow
Technically, this decision does not turn Tehran into a full-fledged SCO member, launching the accession process only. Granting full membership involves a number of agreements signed, which usually takes about two years....
... difficult to keep it
The prospects for talks on an Iranian nuclear deal are becoming increasingly dim. After Democrat Joe Biden won the presidential election in the United States and was sworn in, Washington started to pursue a return to negotiating the JCPOA. The new administration aims to overcome the legacy of Donald Trump, who unilaterally broke the deal even though it was sealed by
UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015
. In 2018,
Trump renewed the unilateral US sanctions against Iran
, and ...
On September 22, 2021, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) with the Institut Montaigne (France) held a closed workshop “JCPOA and Regional Policies of Iran: Visions from Russia and France”. The goal of the meeting was to find a commonality between the positions of Russia and France on key issues related to Iranian issues
On September 22, 2021, the Russian International ...
... of International Studies, MGIMO University
, MENA Program Manager, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)
Causes for previous failures to build a regional security
Ways to facilitate talks in post-JCPOA era
Changes and role of Russian policy in the Persian Gulf
Biden administration policies and its influence on Saudi-Iranian talks. Impacts of Iran’s presidential elections on regional talks
Working language: English.
June 28, 2021, 15:00 GMT+3
Moscow believes that for JCPOA talks to be successful, Washington and Tehran must synchronise their concessions: the former unfreezes Iranian assets and lifts sanctions, the latter is gradually returning to the terms of the deal. But will the United States and Iran agree to that?...
... than those with the Middle East which will remain on the margins of the US foreign policy, being a concern only through the lens of strategic threats, such as combatting terrorism (anti-ISIS coalition efforts), nuclear non-proliferation (revival of the JCPOA), and interacting with actors involved in those issues.
Third, Biden will face certain domestic opposition to some of the Middle East policy issues, e.g. Iran nuclear deal, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, sanctioned entities and so on.