... is narrowing. Kiev pins its hopes on NATO offering it more weapons, while the Alliance members are set to increase their defence spending and invest in arms manufacturing and infrastructure in the foreseeable future.
Any attempt to assess the role of nuclear weapons in a present-day armed conflict stumbles upon the fact that the experience in using them in combat is virtually non-existent. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings in 1945 took place in a different political and technological paradigm ...
The issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as delivery systems, has long since moved into the practical plane
Thus, the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as delivery systems, has long since moved into the practical plane. The only thing that can ...
... have acted purely out of “responsibility” and “sincere commitment to nuclear disarmament” (at least, it would be a positive message to non-nuclear states at the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).
New START does not necessarily have to end next February: although the treaty does not provide for more than one extension of up to five years, neither does it mention any “suspension.” This is a bilateral accord between sovereign ...
... redoubled its efforts to maintain a balance of power in the missile and nuclear sphere. While adhering to existing international obligations, the country made notable strides in developing advanced missile systems. Yet, the regime governing missile and nuclear weapons continued to deteriorate. In 2019, the Trump administration initiated the withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The INF crisis was preceded by years of mutual accusations, fuelled by new technological realities,...
... outlines how Russia’s nuclear posture has already forced a shift in US strategy—pushing Washington to quietly retreat from its earlier hardline stance on Ukraine.
Below, Karaganov explains why he believes Russia must reject denuclearization, how nuclear weapons remain the ultimate equalizer, and why Western European leaders, in his view, need a reality check.
MK:
If nuclear weapons are to be reduced, perhaps all members of the “nuclear club” should do so, not just Russia and China, which ...
... asymmetrically, a strategy that has often proven successful in the past
Over the past few years, public attention in Russia and abroad has focused on an unprecedented debate within Russian expert and political circles regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine. In 2024, this debate centered on amendments to Russia’s official Military Doctrine on nuclear deterrence, which were promulgated in November of that year. The issue gained even greater ...
55 years ago, the Soviet Union ratified the NPT
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), ratified by our country on November 24, 1969, is often referred to as the cornerstone or the foundation of the modern system of international relations. In many respects, this description holds true. A vivid illustration of this ...
... Kiev actively lobbied for it. On the Russian side, warnings about a possible response were also transparent and clear, including conventional missile and nuclear options. Changing the nuclear doctrine towards expanding the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons has also been discussed for a long time.
The new stage has not changed the situation on the battlefield, but has opened the way for a transition to new stages of escalation with a minimum of incentives to reduce it.
The basic scenario ...
... potential adversaries unaware of actual red lines, thus preventing them from making reckless moves that could lead to a nuclear war. This approach is fully shared, for example, by the United States, which does not specify the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, reserving the right to decide what constitutes the exceptional circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons based on a broader situation.
Russia does not reject ambiguity in nuclear deterrence either. For example, the doctrine ...
... be fully extended to deter non-nuclear threats to Belarus from, for instance, NATO members. This “umbrella” has been reinforced by the stationing of Russian nuclear arms in Belarus and joint exercises to practice the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons. These changes are clearly warranted, given the situation on the ground (and in the air). At the same time, cooperation within the Union State in non-strategic nuclear weapons is closely linked to the escalation of military confrontation ...
