Given that over the past decade China's technology sector has evolved practically regulation-free, it is now clear that the same development dynamics will no longer be
After a decade of explosive growth, China’s tech sector lost hundreds of billions of dollars in less than two and ...
On July 12, 2022, the Aspen Institute Italia and the international Center for European Reform held an online expert workshop on the U.S. and European Union relations with Russia and China in the new geopolitical and geo-strategic environment.
On July 12, 2022, the Aspen Institute Italia and the international Center for European Reform held an online expert workshop on the U.S. and European Union relations with Russia and China ...
... could be pursued simultaneously.
In the scenario involving the formation of the Eurasian core for the Global South, the main question is its composition and the resulting scenarios of further expansion. One possible modality would be the RIC (Russia-China-India) serving as a core, with further additions focusing on the largest Eurasian economies such as the G20 countries from Eurasia — Saudi Arabia, Indonesia or Turkey. This route would clearly result in the assembly process being slow and lacking ...
... politics as an independent factor, and to completely destroy the Russian economy.
The success of this strategy would allow the US-led West to finally resolve the
«Russia question»
and create favorable prospects for victory in the confrontation with China.
Such an attitude on the part of the adversary does not imply room for any serious dialogue, since there is practically no prospect of a compromise, primarily between the United States and Russia, based on a balance of interests. The new dynamic ...
The Russia-Ukraine conflict is the most radical international political change to date, and the most difficult political choice China has yet faced
When talking about external challenges for China–Russia relations, we should first clarify what they mean given the current political situation. These challenges can be considered from different perspectives.
At the ...
... Western peers who stay firm in their intention to ignore him in Bali. Still, Russia will hardly be fully isolated at the FMM: Lavrov can count on a chain of bilateral consultations with his counterparts from several non-Western G20 countries including China, Mexico, South Africa and Brazil, as well as with the invited leaders of some international organizations.
However, the FMM intrigue is not limited to Russia's place within G20. The West comes to Bali more united than it has ever been since the ...
On July 4–10, 2022, the University of Torino Business School and the Torino World Affairs Institute held another annual international Summer School on foreign policy and internal development of modern China (TOChina-2022)
On July 4–10, 2022, the University of Torino Business School and the Torino World Affairs Institute held another annual international Summer School on foreign policy and internal development of modern China (TOChina-2022).
Over ...
... the Cold War, the leading countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have risen spectacularly in all respects, from economically and politically to technologically and militarily.
Even before the outbreak of the
“hybrid war,”
China had overtaken Germany not only as Russia’s principal trading partner, but also as the leading exporter of machinery and equipment to Russia. India, a traditional importer of Soviet and Russian weapons, is now emerging as a major technology partner ...
... the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the state of the prisoner-of-war exchange process, the possibility of resuming the export of Ukrainian grain, and the prospects for the parties to return to diplomatic dialogue. Leading international researchers from China, the USA, Great Britain, Ukraine, and Russia took part in the event. Russian side was represented at the event by Andrey Kortunov, RIAC Director General.
... composition.” Other researchers also note internal structural vulnerabilities of the EAEU member states (in particular, weakness of institutions) (Sushentsov and Silaev, 2022, p. 21).
Another side of this asymmetry is Russia’s own concerns about China’s growing influence in Eurasia and even the “danger of [its] dominance” (Vorobyov, 2017; Klepach, 2020, pp. 39-40), which allows experts to say that “Russia is experiencing an ambivalence in its attitudes towards China in Eurasian integration” ...