... will change, and the positions of Russia-US and China-US relations in US diplomacy may be swapped. After the end of the war in Ukraine, Russia may no longer be the "most direct threat" to the United States with Russia's relations with the West easing. At the same time, China-US relations will become the most direct focus of the United States. This is not to say that Russia-U.S. relations will turn friendly and China-U.S. relations will necessarily deteriorate, but only that Russia-U.S. relations will be relatively less ...
... military phase, but is characterised by many other dimensions of rivalry—from information warfare to direct and comprehensive Western military assistance to Ukraine. The Euro-Atlantic region has not experienced such crises since the end of the Cold War,... ... in NATO. In this sense, it is symbolic that consultations on the Eurasian security issues began precisely between Russia and China—two major powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Thus, the very first steps in creating a new structure ...
... reflect the new vision of China's foreign policy in the new international environment of the 2020s and further elaborate the more general Chinese foreign policy doctrine of "a global community of shared future."
Andrey Kortunov:
Decoding China: GSI and Beijing's International Role
Although the GCI does not directly challenge the Western "rules-based international order" paradigm, it has still faced harsh criticism from the West, similar to the two earlier initiatives. Over the past year, there have been numerous statements arguing that the GCI is fundamentally flawed ...
... would have to accept these rules unconditionally. Of course, the Rest, and Russia in particular, found it difficult to accept such an arrangement. One should also note that over last couple of decades the global balance of powers shifted in favor of non-Western nations, in particular, in favor of China. This critical shift had to be reflected in the international system, but the West, and the United States in particular, turned out to be unprepared for it and unwilling to recognize and to accept the shift.
Zhao Huasheng:
As far as Russia and the ...
... power competition
1989 heralded a unique prospect for an enduring global peace, as harsh ideological divisions and conflicts began to be resolved. Now, three decades on, that peace has been lost. With war in Ukraine and increasing tensions between China, Russia, and the West, great power politics once again dominates the world stage. But could it have been different?
Richard Sakwa shows how the years before the first mass invasion of Ukraine represented a hiatus in conflict rather than a lasting accord – and how, since ...
... Chinese government's effort in "integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China's specific realities and fine traditional culture"?
I find the Chinese experience very interesting, primarily because China does not seek to smash or disprove Western political theories. China does not seek to show that there are bad Western ones and good Chinese ones. China seeks to analyze the intellectual heritage of the West, to adopt what it considers appropriate for itself. And here we are talking not only about Marxism, which, ...
... bipolarity. This is clearly not what most of us hoped for earlier this century, but this trend cannot be ignored and it affects both Moscow and New Delhi.
Year after year, Russia is moving farther east, strengthening and developing its multiple ties with China. Year after year, India is shifting further west, increasing various forms of cooperation with the United States. This is the reality we have to acknowledge before moving any further.
This trend contains considerable risks. If it continues in the medium term, the two friendly nations may eventually ...
... and this will certainly have important repercussions for the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
***
A more accurate definition of China’s positioning in the Russia–Ukraine conflict is
constructive intervention rather than neutrality. Unlike the US and the West, China’s policy is not based on choosing a side, but oriented toward constructive results.
At this stage, China’s understanding of constructiveness can be summarized in the
twelve-point proposition of the Ukraine peace plan it proposed in February ...
... off from its historically close relationship with Moscow. Yet, while India—which has set the goal of becoming the world’s third largest economy by 2040 (it is currently fifth)—is most interested in economic and technological cooperation with the West and is also wary of China, Delhi has been balancing carefully in order to avoid harming its solid relationship with Russia. Much needs to be done by both Delhi and Moscow to bring their “privileged partnership” closer to the scope and intensity of the Russia-China ties,...
Working Paper No. 74 / 2023
Working Paper No. 74 / 2023
The working paper seeks to analyze constitutive voting patterns of Sub-Saharan states of Africa at the UN General Assembly. The methodology proposed in this paper offers an opportunity to explore this issue topic-wise as well as in a broader sense. The paper considers a number of indicators that help assess the involvement of the continent’s different countries in the voting processes, builds on the various types of strategic behavior in the...
