... isn’t over ideologies like the Old Cold War was but concerns the rivalry between polar opposite viewpoints of the international order: the U.S.-led and largely unipolar Western-centric system vs. a more equitable and just multipolar one led by non-Western countries like China and Russia.
Yaroslav Lissovolik:
The Dilemmas of the Global South
India is in the unique geostrategic position of having stakes in both blocs, which explains why it closely cooperates with them in order to advance its goal of becoming a third pole ...
... competition between the two models of social organisation will continue, but, I hope, in a less brutal mode. A less-than-perfect compromise between the West and Russia might be followed by a more important, and more fundamental, compromise between the West and China. If a deal with Mr Putin is possible, a deal with Xi Jinping would be a logical continuation. A rapprochement between China and the West would require more time, energy and political flexibility from the West, however. That would lead to a reformation ...
... to the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic and similar entities within the former Soviet Union will be extremely limited as well, which will predetermine these territories’ gradual drift away from Russia. The leading non-Western states (China, India, Iran) will cautiously continue to seek for ways of expanding their interactions with Russia but they will not be challenging U.S. leadership in the open. Russia’s full-fledged re-integration into the international political and economic ...
... viciousness because of subconscious racism.
Though, in one respect it makes sense for China to buy time by tightrope-walking and juggling at the same time over Ukraine, the time that will be bought may work to China’s disadvantage if Russia, which guards China’s western flank as China guards Russia’s eastern flank, is weakened as a state. At the end of the period of time bought, China will be weaker to the extent that Russia may be weaker while the West may be stronger.
Ivan Timofeev:
Ukrainian Crisis. Who ...
... together matter more than the West.
Dayan Jayatilleka:
Putin’s Ukraine Pushback: Existential War & The Moment of Rupture
China, of course. Russia already talks a lot with China. But Russia has still been so focused on getting things “right” with the West, that Russia has not optimally used the opportunities which China has to offer. Not only politically, but also commercially. Look at Russia’s exports to China and deduct revenues from oil and gas. The it becomes evident, how much room for improvement Russia has. Not U.S., not the EU are the World’s biggest ...
... social and political destabilization.
Clearly, the West hopes for a replay of the 1990s and a regime change in Russia, which would lead to a regime of capitulation and appeasement installed in Moscow. If this goal were to be even halfway successful, China would be isolated and the West would return to a situation of world-historical supremacy or predominance in the very least—something it enjoyed in the 1990s.
If the West succeeds, this will mean the subordination of Russia, its subalternity, on the world stage and in the shaping ...
... investments, and
secured
a few small-scale projects in ports and energy. A more controversial aspect of its economic ties with China is the highly sensitive defense industry, which has triggered significant resistance within the country and from its Western partners. The Ukrainian provenance of China’s first aircraft carrier is a well-known example, while a more recent one can be found in the attempted acquisition of aircraft engine manufacturer MotorSich by China’s Skyrizon. This deal was put on hold due to U.S. lobbying and eventually ...
... like a whale and an elephant, to put them into one basket of "global autocracies" is a very questionable and misleading generalization, to say the least.
Second, there is nothing in the joint statement that would give reasons to believe that China and Russia are eager to launch an ideological war against liberal Western democracies or to question the right of the West to stick to political systems that have evolved in Western countries over the last two or three centuries. The statement underscores only the obvious: No country, and no political party or movement ...
... positioning on a long-term perspective must be based on humility beyond national borders. This assumption in international politics is equivalent to a wait-and-see attitude and pragmatic observation on development issues.
Nowadays, Chinese model vs. Western one
China invests massively in long-term projects, using debt as a leverage for long-term accountability and project-monitoring. Additionally, the
Chinese development assistance doctrine
insists on a
few principles
, including the unconditionality of its ...
... of the Western normative model. No other community has yet been able to successfully exploit the values of freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and other principles of the Enlightenment, while maintaining democracy as the main political value. The West will remain a significant value guide. China, Russia and any other power may well offer intelligible projects for their internal audiences based on patriotism and their own culture. But they will be forced to wage a constant defensive war. On the field of values, they lack the means for a ...
