... relations with Moscow, which, in turn, influence the strategic structure and balance of power, and this will certainly have important repercussions for the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
***
A more accurate definition of China’s positioning in the Russia–Ukraine conflict is
constructive intervention rather than neutrality. Unlike the US and the West, China’s policy is not based on choosing a side, but oriented toward constructive results.
At this stage, China’s understanding of constructiveness can be summarized in the
twelve-point proposition of the Ukraine peace plan it proposed in February ...
... re-emergence of the unipolar moment—the remaining opposition to this arrangement by Beijing notwithstanding. Although Ukraine might be unfinished business for Mr Putin, Russia’s status is itself unfinished business for many in the West. Triumph for Ukraine might lead to a tamed and domesticated Russia. A quiet Russia would allow the West to cope more easily with China, which would be the only major obstacle to liberal hegemony and the long-awaited “end of history”.
If the conflict results with an imperfect but mutually acceptable settlement, the final outcome of the collision between the Russian and the Ukrainian ...
Working Paper #66, 2022
Working Paper #66, 2022
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict will lead to long-term global socio-economic and political consequences in the foreseeable future. Russian and foreign experts are currently exploring a wide range of scenarios for such transformation—from relatively positive to extremely negative. The author formulated three potentially possible options for the current world order transformation, assessing the probability and consequences of the practical implementation...
... West’s contemporary China policy is a flexible pivot and a grand strategic offensive. It pivoted to Asia, bult up the Indo-Pacific strategy; it is now pivoting to the West, aimed at Russia, and it will, whether or not it prevails, pivot back to contain China.
If the West does not prevail in Ukraine, it will pivot back to containment of China; but if it does prevail in its aims towards Russia, when it pivots back to China, it will be from a position of strength, and adopting a policy beyond containment—it will be one of confrontation.
...
... The West has no other option. Meanwhile, Russia should use the pause in talks with the West to make up for a possible, I will not say neglect, but at least lack of focus, on talking with all the parts of the World that together matter more than the West.
Dayan Jayatilleka:
Putin’s Ukraine Pushback: Existential War & The Moment of Rupture
China, of course. Russia already talks a lot with China. But Russia has still been so focused on getting things “right” with the West, that Russia has not optimally used the opportunities which China has to offer. Not only politically, but also commercially....
... intervention in Ukraine.
That would be a specious argumentation. The sanctions signal the adoption of a strategy of economic eviction as well as a dramatic abandonment of the West’s old strategy of a truly globalized capitalist economy, in which Russia and China are stakeholders. It also signals the abandonment of any vestige of the Kissingerian notion of Russia being a partner in co-managing the world order.
The West has adopted an offensive strategy—while Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, though tactically offensive, remains strategically defensive. This time, the aim of the West is to win; to prevail; to supposedly ‘destroy’ the Russian economy and its scientific-technical base as well as its military, all of which means ...
... about future Sino-Russian cooperation has
run rampant
. Much of this has to do with the current crisis over Ukraine, with commentaries warning that Chinese backing could embolden Russia into military action by shielding it from the consequences of Western sanctions, thus
removing
a powerful deterrent. Others have warned against a further spillover, arguing that a U.S.-Russian confrontation over Ukraine might even
encourage
China to pursue military reunification with Taiwan. Such extreme scenarios are unlikely to materialize, but the fact that they are being raised at all makes it necessary to analyze the interests, shared visions, but also limitations behind the emerging ...
