... with North Korea “on strategic and tactical issues” probably should not imply official support for Pyongyang’s steps in such a sensitive area as inter-Korean relations. As the U.S., South Korea and Japan are forming a triangle directed against North Korea, China and Russia, our adversaries are eagerly waiting for an excuse to blame us for similar aspirations and “supporting” what they see as North’s aggressive actions in preparation for war against the South. Some Russian social scientists speculate ...
... to Pyongyang. China apparently understands that the problem of North Korea's isolation must be solved in one way or another. But for its own reasons, China is not ready to do this directly. At the same time, Russian involvement and partnership with North Korea cannot pose any threat to China’s interests and security - such is the nature of relations between Russia and the PRC.
In the case of Vietnam, the progress of Russian diplomacy is also related to the desire of Asian countries to balance the influence of China and pressure from ...
... superiority of the United States and its allies over any potential rival in the region.
Beijing’s assessment of the significance of the Camp David summit was probably determined not by the U.S. and an emphasis on the awaited collective response to North Korea’s nuclear missile program, but by their
condemnation
of China’s actions in the South China Sea.
According to
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “in the face of unilateral sanctions, hegemony and confrontation, Russia and China should strengthen strategic cooperation.” The involvement of the DPRK, which ...
The growing US-Japanese-South Korean military cooperation inevitably leads to stronger China-Russia-North Korea ties
The Russian-North Korean negotiations this month have provoked a lot of hype, particularly in the West. It is assumed by the West that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's trip might indicate a profound change in Moscow's overall approach ...
... is of strategic value to China. In addition, China does not see the DPRK's nuclear programme as a direct threat to itself. North Korean nuclear weapons are perceived by Beijing primarily as a problem for the United States and its allies. That is why China, on the one hand, suppresses attempts by the North Koreans to gain access to materials and components for the nuclear missile programme, and on the other hand, continues to trade with the DPRK, in spite of the sanctions.
As for Russia, its approach to Korean affairs cannot be separated from its ...
... universities have accessible websites: http://pust.co [3] For more information, have a look at: The Russian Embassy website in the DPRK (http://www.rusembdprk.ru/en/visa-requirements) and the People’s Republic of China Embassy to the DPRK (http://kp.china-embassy.org/chn/zjcx/) [4] CIA - Office of National Estimates (1971). North Korean Policy Toward the Non-Communist World: Objectives, Results, and Prospects. [5] BBC (2020). Kim Yo-jong: Profile of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister. [6] Jenny Jun, Scott LaFoy, Ethan Sohn (2015). North Korea’s Cyber Operations: ...
... strategic asymmetry: while Pakistan trains its weapons on India, India sees China as its main strategic rival, and Pakistan, China’s friend, as an adversary. Maintaining strategic stability between India and Pakistan through arms control on the U.S.... ... issues, the general power imbalance between the two countries, and the asymmetrical strategic position of India and Pakistan.
North Korea, which developed its nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in the 21st century, presented another problem. Its arrival ...
... Chine draw from the Korean War to better handle conflict?
This year marks the 70
th
anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. It was initially a civil war that gradually evolved into an international conflict, during which the Soviet Union and China supported North Korea. Last Friday, China commemorated the 70
th
anniversary of the Chinese People's Volunteers army entering the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. How to evaluate China's decision to ...
... first, this could be conveyed to the Russian side through Track II diplomacy. Depending on the state of U.S.–Russia and U.S.–China relations, time will tell whether this position can be made official, and in what form (in line with the Russia–China roadmap, for example).
If the United States and North Korea resume negotiations, say, after the U.S. presidential elections, then Moscow should be waiting in the wings to clarify the position it has been developing. Russia has the advantage of having good channels of communication with North Korea,...
... a list of exceptions to its sanctions, many of which were in place long before the pandemic. They concern Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela and Russia [
viii
]. A joint US-Swiss relief supply channel for Iran has become operational [
ix
]. We ... ... bear in mind that the help in fighting the epidemic provided by the countries hit by the sanctions, such as Russia, Cuba and China, to the initiators of the sanctions will not make the latter lift the sanctions afterwards.
In other words, COVID-19 does ...
