After the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, new and extremely broad opportunities for multilateral diplomacy opened up. It could be understood as the joint actions of leading powers, regional centres of power and small countries in the field of resolving security issues and responding to common challenges. UN, as the only universal international organisation, was the key institutional structure for multilateral diplomacy. The end of the bloc confrontation between the USSR and the USA gave hope that multilateral diplomacy would not be hampered by the contradictions of the leading centres of power. Thirty years later, multilateral diplomacy is in crisis, and has yielded to “classical” balance of power diplomacy.
The ambitions of the United States have become one of the factors in the crisis of multilateral diplomacy, at least in security matters. Two indicators can be considered failures with respect to Iran and North Korea. Instead of becoming a leader of multilateral diplomacy in these areas, Washington eventually turned into their spoiler.
Despite the crisis of multilateral diplomacy, preserving its supporting structures seems necessary. The UN Security Council was bound by bloc confrontation during the Cold War, but played a vital role in communication between the great powers. It retains this role today. The next round of great power rivalry will increase pressure on the UN system, undermining its capabilities, but at the same time will inspire parallel formats of interaction between like-minded countries. It is possible that such formats will make a basis for new blocs and alliances, bringing the new edition of the Cold War to its logical conclusion.
After the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, new and extremely broad opportunities for multilateral diplomacy opened up. It could be understood as the joint actions of leading powers, regional centres of power and small countries in the field of resolving security issues and responding to common challenges. UN, as the only universal international organisation, was the key institutional structure for multilateral diplomacy. The end of the bloc confrontation between the USSR and the USA gave hope that multilateral diplomacy would not be hampered by the contradictions of the leading centres of power. Thirty years later, multilateral diplomacy is in crisis, and has yielded to “classical” balance of power diplomacy.
Multilateral diplomacy received a powerful impetus for its development in the 20th century. Its institutional design at the outset included numerous international intergovernmental organisations focused on individual functional issues. The formation and subsequent development of the UN made it possible to create an institutional framework for solving many common problems—from health care and food security to communications and nuclear energy. This framework became one of the factors, which ensured the UN’s longevity and relevance as a universal international organisation. However, security issues remained the most difficult area for multilateral diplomacy.
During the Cold War, the bloc confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union could be considered the main obstacle. Key issues of regional and international security inevitably bore the imprint of the rivalry between these two powers. In addition, other centres of power, despite having their own voice, still could not act as alternative and independent centres of power equal to the superpowers. To a certain extent, China could afford such a role. However, it was also focused on the tasks of modernisation, concentrating its foreign policy on its own key regional problems.
After the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, a window of opportunity opened for multilateral diplomacy. On the one hand, the bloc confrontation with its policy of mutual balancing of two centres of power where the rest were lined up around this confrontation became a thing of the past. On the other hand, other players emerged and began to feel increasingly confident. United Europe, despite lacking independent and consolidated military potential, achieved a more noticeable role in international relations, focusing on soft power, humanitarian and economic instruments. China gained significant weight and was actively involved in solving international problems both through the UN Security Council and in other formats (including the Group 5+1 on the Iranian nuclear problem and the “six” on the North Korean nuclear problem). India, Brazil and South Africa, despite not being permanent members of the UN Security Council, intensified their efforts through BRICS, the G20 and other formats. Large US allies, primarily Germany and Japan, also began to play a more noticeable role. They became some of the key donors to the UN, were active participants in the G7, and then in the G20.
Despite the losses after the collapse of the USSR, Russia still skilfully maneuverer in the new conditions. It retained its place in the UN Security Council, and simultaneously played a leading role in new associations—BRICS, SCO, and the G20. At the same time, Moscow acted as a key element in the development of the OSCE, joined the G7, created institutions for interaction with the EU and NATO, and actively promoted international cooperation in the Arctic.
Washington, for its part, retained all the key structures of Euro-Atlantic security, strengthening its leadership there. Bilateral US alliances in Asia continued to function. American diplomacy made use of the UN. The US positions in such institutions as the IMF, not to mention the G7, remained decisive and strengthened.
Outside the institutional circuit, the US managed to become the centre of the global financial system, as well as technological and industrial chains. The US compensated for its absence in new associations of the world majority, such as BRICS, by maintaining bilateral relations with the participating countries. Washington supported multilateral diplomacy, but tried to play a special role, reserving for itself the freedom to pursue its own policies in defiance of multilateral formats.
The ambitions of the United States have become one of the factors in the crisis of multilateral diplomacy, at least in security matters. Two indicators can be considered failures with respect to Iran and North Korea. In the first case, the result of multilateral diplomacy was the solution of the “Iranian nuclear problem”, enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution No. 2231 of 2015. The United States was an active participant in the negotiations, and the Obama administration was among the architects of the “nuclear deal”. However, after Donald Trump took office in 2016, the United States distanced itself from the “deal”, and in 2018 unilaterally withdrew from it, renewing its sanctions regime against Iran. Given the weight of the United States in the global economy and finance, their unilateral withdrawal effectively put an end to the “deal”.
In the second case, opportunities were missed in the 1990s and early 2000s, when the United States maintained a regime of total sanctions against the DPRK and introduced new restrictions unrelated to the nuclear programme. The George W. Bush administration was tougher on the DPRK, which largely hampered the efforts of the “six”, strengthening Pyongyang’s conviction that only nuclear weapons can serve as a reliable guarantee of security and sovereignty.
It would be wrong to link both failures only with US policy. Iran and North Korea pursued their own interests, at certain stages dragging out negotiations, achieving tactical advantages for themselves and buying time to achieve their goals. North Korea succeeded in this to the fullest extent. However, the responsibility of the United States is proportionate to its place and role in world politics at that time. Instead of becoming a leader of multilateral diplomacy in these areas, Washington eventually turned into their spoiler.
Unlike the bipolar confrontation of the 20th century, the new one is more complex. At the forefront there is the confrontation between Russia and the collective West. But in the background there is the gradually increasing rivalry between China and the United States. In the new edition of the Cold War, there’s no clash of military alliances yet. However, the rivalry of the great powers slows down cooperation or makes it impossible even in limited, but at the same time inclusive formats that were observed in the 1990s and 2000s.
Russia is trying to consolidate the global majority and build relations with the opponents of the United States. China creates its own platform for international relations in the economic and financial spheres, although it has so far avoided rigid military alliances. Diplomacy is again built around individual centers of power, moving away from multilateralism to the tasks of the balance of power.
Despite the crisis of multilateral diplomacy, preserving its supporting structures seems necessary. The UN Security Council was bound by bloc confrontation during the Cold War, but played a vital role in communication between the great powers. It retains this role today. The next round of great power rivalry will increase pressure on the UN system, undermining its capabilities, but at the same time will inspire parallel formats of interaction between like-minded countries. It is possible that such formats will make a basis for new blocs and alliances, bringing the new edition of the Cold War to its logical conclusion.
First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.