Three Thrones, Semiconductors and Beef: What Made Anwar Ibrahim’s Visit to Russia Memorable?

During his visit to Moscow, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim held meetings with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and President Vladimir Putin, spoke with Russian entrepreneurs and members of the Malaysian diaspora, and even managed to give a lecture and receive an honorary doctorate from MGIMO University. But perhaps the most talked-about and memorable part of the visit to Moscow was the humorous moment with the three thrones in the Grand Kremlin Palace, when the Malaysian prime minister quipped that one of them might be meant for the tsar’s second wife. The lighthearted exchange went viral in both Russian and Malaysian media, pointing to the warm and friendly atmosphere as well as personal trust between the two leaders.

The reason why the focus shifted toward the pun lies in the absence of any concrete agreements between the two leaders—at least none that were made public. Press statements following the high-level talks mostly documented the current state of Malaysian–Russian relations and outlined the topics discussed during the negotiations. The main substantive outcome of Anwar Ibrahim’s visit to Russia can be considered to be a confirmation of both parties’ desire to strengthen trade and economic cooperation, which is hindered by a “low base effect.”

Anwar Ibrahim’s visit cannot be described as a breakthrough in terms of final agreements. Rather, it can be characterized as a “test run.” The sides are still sizing each other up, probing the ground for promising areas of cooperation and its scope. However, the number of areas that Malaysia and Russia have substantively discussed through various channels is quite impressive. Apparently, it is only a matter of time and further engagement before quantity transforms into quality.

Before breaking down the results of Anwar Ibrahim’s visit to Russia, it is important to describe the international context, which adds nuance and, in many ways, explains the logic behind the Malaysian prime minister’s visit.

First, this is the second trip to Russia for Anwar since he took office in 2022. The broad geography of his visits strikes the eye—from Vladivostok to, most recently, Moscow and Kazan. His “capital tour” in May 2025 is best understood in connection with his first Russian visit a year ago, when he took part in the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF). Two years later, the Malaysian leadership’s motivation toward Russia has taken on a clearer and more systemic shape—Kuala Lumpur is keen on developing trade and economic ties with Moscow, despite the risks of secondary sanctions and pressure from the West. Participation in two of Russia’s flagship economic forums for two years in a row seems to be the best evidence.

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Second, an obvious catalyst for Anwar Ibrahim’s trip to Russia was the imposition of a 24% tariff on Malaysian goods by the United States—a move that alarmed the country’s elite and business community, which relies heavily on the U.S. market, especially in the export of high-tech products. In 2024, more than half of Malaysian exports to the U.S. were various types of small electronics (microchips), semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and so on. Washington’s plans to introduce special tariffs on all electronic products have predictably raised concerns among Malaysian officials, who are now looking for ways to mitigate the potential fallout—hence the rapid scheduling of Anwar Ibrahim’s visit to Russia. Less than three months passed between Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu handing over an invitation on behalf of Vladimir Putin during a visit to Malaysia in late February and the arrival of the Malaysian prime minister in Russia.

A closer look at the agenda of bilateral negotiations on visas in Moscow and Malaysia’s participation in the international forum in Kazan makes the picture even clearer. Malaysia needs joint investment projects with promising partners. The country is interested in exporting its expertise, services and goods in the fields of innovation, Islamic banking and food security (palm oil), while importing products of national importance (halal-certified agricultural products and LNG). Finally, Kuala Lumpur’s interest in BRICS is no longer an element of diplomatic flirtation; it is becoming an integral part of Malaysia’s foreign policy. All the topics discussed above are an ideological extension of Anwar Ibrahim’s speech at the EEF plenary session in 2024.

Third, the Malaysian prime minister’s visit to Russia and negotiations with Russian officials coincided with the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization’s final ruling that found Russia responsible for the 2014 crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in the Donetsk region. But with so much else dominating the global news, that decision went virtually unnoticed. Malaysia has never publicly blamed Russia for the incident but, on the contrary, criticized the Netherlands and other Western nations for a lack of transparency and perceived political bias in the investigation. The ICAO Council’s ruling and the timing of the visit may be just a coincidence, yet it looks quite symbolic. It is no less curious that amid these accusations, the Malaysian prime minister proposed resuming direct flights between his country and Russia, which was quickly supported by Moscow.

“The game of proposals”

While in Moscow, the Malaysian prime minister held meetings with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and President Vladimir Putin, spoke with Russian entrepreneurs and members of the Malaysian diaspora, and even managed to give a lecture and receive an honorary doctorate from MGIMO University. But perhaps the most talked-about and memorable part of the visit to Moscow was the humorous moment with the three thrones in the Grand Kremlin Palace, when the Malaysian prime minister quipped that one of them might be meant for the tsar’s second wife. The lighthearted exchange went viral in both Russian and Malaysian media, pointing to the warm and friendly atmosphere as well as personal trust between the two leaders.

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The reason why the focus shifted toward the pun lies in the absence of any concrete agreements between the two leaders—at least none that were made public. Press statements following the high-level talks mostly documented the current state of Malaysian–Russian relations and outlined the topics discussed during the negotiations. Official remarks after the meeting resemble a game of diplomatic ping-pong—first one side serves, followed by a quick response, and then the other side serves in its turn. The Moscow “game of proposals” ended in a draw. The Malaysian delegation expressed willingness to increase cocoa and palm oil supplies to Russia, while in return, Russia announced its intention to increase LNG and coal exports. Malaysia signaled its readiness to discuss the possibility of launching direct air links between the two countries, and Russia reaffirmed its interest in implementing joint projects in the gas sector and peaceful nuclear cooperation. Finally, Anwar Ibrahim invited Vladimir Putin to attend the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025, in Malaysia’s capacity as this year’s chair. In turn, the Russian president extended an invitation to the King of Malaysia to visit Russia at his convenience. Although the prospects for both visits are dim, the main thing in this case is to observe the diplomatic ritual and demonstrate good intentions in public.

Kazan: at the heart of the Islamic world

After a two-day stay in Moscow, the Malaysian prime minister traveled to Kazan, where he took part in the 16th International Economic Forum “Russia–Islamic World: KazanForum.” His speech in Kazan stood in stark contrast to the remarks he made during the EEF plenary session in 2024. The main difference is the balance between business issues and political agenda, which was centered around calls for unity within the Islamic world in the face of global challenges.

In his speech at the Kazan forum, Anwar Ibrahim described Tatarstan and Russia as “leading the voice of for the Muslim world,” and addressed the head (rais) of the Republic of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhanov, as “my dear brother.” Moreover, during his impassioned address, he recited a line in Tatar from the poem “Tormysh” (“Life”) by the Tatar poet Gabdulla Tuqay, which drew applause and delighted the local audience. Anwar Ibrahim’s keynote speech also featured routine accusations against Israel, which he condemned for hypocrisy, moral bankruptcy and killing thousands of civilians in Gaza. Among all countries outside the Arab world, Malaysia has traditionally been one of the main proponents of a hardline policy toward the Jewish state, going as far as calling for sanctions, expulsion from the UN and even military intervention. These appeals help Anwar Ibrahim score political points, solidifying his image as a champion of the Islamic world.

Having won over the audience, Anwar went on to promote the business agenda, highlighting economic topics that are important to Malaysia and promising for bilateral ties with Russia. In particular, he emphasized the great potential for developing cooperation in Islamic banking, halal trade, digital transformation and the energy transition. The Malaysian leader shared similar ideas during a meeting of the Russia–Islamic World Strategic Vision Group.

What comes next?

Regardless of the level of negotiations, venues and events, the main substantive outcome of Anwar Ibrahim’s visit to Russia can be considered to be a confirmation of both parties’ desire to strengthen trade and economic cooperation, which is hindered by a “low base effect.” In 2024, bilateral trade amounted to only $2.5 billion, down 24% year-on-year. However, Malaysian exports to Russia have increased each year since the start of the special military operation and nearly recovered to 2021 pre-crisis levels. The main driver of growth continues to be machinery and mechanical appliances, particularly data-processing machines. In 2024, Russia became the key export destination for these products (over 22% of Malaysia’s total overseas shipments in this category), even though the country had barely imported these goods before 2023. Although the export value is not impressive ($250 million in 2024), there are two things to consider.

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First, Malaysia exported more data-processing machines to Russia last year than in all previous years of Russian–Malaysian relations combined. In this light, the hackneyed phrase “the potential has not been fully unlocked” seems particularly apt.

Second, this supply channel is increasingly important for Russia’s efforts toward phasing out imports of critical equipment and ensuring technological resilience. This is especially significant given the country’s limited production capacity, acute shortage of microelectronics professionals and the high cost of manufacturing components and assemblies in Russia. The high-tech sector, including quantum technologies, has the potential to become a flagship area in Russian–Malaysian trade relations. This was echoed in remarks by Malaysian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Russia Cheong Loon Lai, ahead of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s visit. In fact, real partnership in this field is only beginning to take shape, and the combination of sanctions against Russia and U.S. tariff wars creates strong momentum for the development of bilateral dialogue.

In addition, as often happens, high-profile events like official negotiations between national leaders or international forums overshadow lower-level engagements in terms of media coverage. Yet it is usually these less-publicized events that produce the most tangible results. This was exactly the case during the visit of Anwar Ibrahim. For example, during talks between representatives of Russia’s agricultural watchdog, Rosselkhoznadzor, and Director General of the Department of Veterinary Services at Malaysia’s Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Akma binti Ngah Hamid, they agreed to accelerate the approval process for the documents required to begin supplying Russian beef to Malaysia according to halal standards. It was also noted that Kuala Lumpur has agreed in principle to recognize halal certificates issued by Russian authorities. This means that the ball is now in Russia’s court, and the main bureaucratic obstacles to the entry of domestic exporters of livestock products into the Malaysian market have been cleared. Although it is impossible in the foreseeable future to achieve export volumes comparable to India, which accounts for over 80% of Malaysia’s beef imports, Russia is capable of carving out a certain niche in the Malaysian market and competing with countries such as Australia, Brazil, Argentina or New Zealand.

At the same time, Malaysia’s agro-industrial sector is heavily dependent on fertilizer imports, which creates room for Russia’s stronger long-term influence. In fact, Russia has already managed to overtake China, for the first time becoming Malaysia’s top fertilizer supplier in 2024 with a market share of over 26%.

Finally, another area where Russia can potentially strengthen its presence is coal supplies. Malaysia, like many developing Asian countries, seeks to reduce its dependence on “dirty” energy sources. Nevertheless, in reality the country faces a number of problems with the green transition, and coal will continue to play a significant role in the country’s energy mix. In 2023, the share of coal in Malaysia’s electricity generation exceeded 43%. Russia has consistently been among the top three exporters of black coal and coal briquettes to Malaysia, making up 7.5% of the country’s total imports in this category. Knocking Australia and Indonesia off the top spots seems unlikely. However, with an agreement at the highest political level and preferential treatment for Russia, Moscow could increase its share in the Malaysian market.

Anwar Ibrahim’s visit cannot be described as a breakthrough in terms of final agreements. Rather, it can be characterized as a “test run.” The sides are still sizing each other up, probing the ground for promising areas of cooperation and its scope. However, the number of areas that Malaysia and Russia have substantively discussed through various channels is quite impressive. Apparently, it is only a matter of time and further engagement before quantity transforms into quality.