Spokes versus Axes: Modalities of Regional Security in Northeast Asia

In foreign media and academic articles, they increasingly often refer to a “Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang axis” that is emerging in Northeast Asia (NEA). Under these circumstances, Western authors believe, the U.S. and its main Pacific allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea, should close their ranks even more. Such reasoning is constructed for some alternative reality as it suffers from a lack of causality. More so, it is absolutely unclear why the formats of cooperation between “liberal democracies” are so much better than the cooperation of “autocracies.”

A joint statement by the leaders of the United States and the Republic of Korea at the Nuclear Planning Advisory Group meeting spells concerns about the practical interaction between Moscow and Pyongyang, which could contribute to the development of the DPRK’s nuclear missile program. According to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the U.S. does not want “North Korea to receive any military technology from Russia.” Washington clearly intends to speculate on the topic of the alleged MTC between Russia and the DPRK or China and the DPRK. The main goal is to cultivate anti-Russian and anti-Chinese sentiments in the Republic of Korea and Japan.

Meanwhile, Seoul and Tokyo have become the parties most affected as their ties with China are rapidly deteriorating, while joint projects with Russia are frozen for an indefinite period and their dependence on the United States is growing. Whether this policy is really in line with Japanese and South Korean national interests may one day be decided by voters in these nations, despite the actual occupation of part of their territories by the U.S. military.

In foreign media and academic articles, they increasingly often refer to a “Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang axis” that is emerging in Northeast Asia (NEA). Under these circumstances, Western authors believe, the U.S. and its main Pacific allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea, should close their ranks even more. Such reasoning is constructed for some alternative reality as it suffers from a lack of causality. More so, it is absolutely unclear why the formats of cooperation between “liberal democracies” are so much better than the cooperation of “autocracies.”

The TAO of security

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Northeast Asia is an independent region from the socio-economic standpoint rather than from the political perspective. All actors, despite the current difficulties in Japan-China and Russia-Japan relations, stick to the established ties in different areas. Due to the specifics of its political regime and restrictions imposed by the UN Security Council as well by Tokyo and Seoul unilaterally, the DPRK is not heavily involved in economic and social exchanges. Nevertheless, North Korea is clearly an integral part of the region’s internal environment and an important factor in the processes in Northeast Asia.

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is a new IR theory proposed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver from the Copenhagen School. They suggest that a region is a mini-system where the concepts of all theories of international relations operate freely, and most importantly, the security of each actor is closely and mutually dependent on others [1].

Notably, similar arguments have repeatedly been cited by the leaders of Russia and China as a fundamental principle of the foreign policy pursued by the two nations. Thus, President Putin pointed out that “Russia cannot turn a blind eye to the way the U.S. and NATO play fast and loose with the key principles of equal and indivisible security, screwing them to their own benefit.” The given principle implies the right to freely choose the way to ensure one’s own security and to enter into any alliances, as well as the obligation not to bolster own security at the expense of other states.

In February 2023, China published the text of the Global Security Initiative presented by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum for Asia a year earlier. The document builds on the need to adhere to the concept of “common, comprehensive, joint, and sustainable security.” This understanding is quite in the spirit of China’s traditional worldview. In particular, each thing and entity possesses its own unique Dao or Tao, which is the expression of life integrity. In the Neo-Confucian philosophy, the Tao of each person and the entire world are identical, corresponding to the idea of indivisibility.

Orchestra and the audience

Kenneth Waltz, a luminary of the neorealist school, claims that states are always faced with a choice between two main possibilities of gaining power and providing defense. The former is internal balancing by mobilizing their own socio-economic resources and building up military capabilities. The latter is, then, external balancing in the form of alliances and reliance on the resources of allies [2].

As was noted by political scientist Jack Snyder, security alliances allow to unleash more resources—among other things, for economic development, given that defense issues are delegated to a larger and more powerful state. On the other hand, there is always the risk that an ally will refuse or will be unable to fulfill its obligations, or may even draw a friendly nation into an unwanted conflict. [3] In this regard, an unequal alliance based on “joining the winner” (bandwagoning or jumping on the bandwagon with an orchestra during the parade) is most dangerous for a weak state, which actually loses its independence in the sphere of foreign policy and defense. As an alternative behavior, theorists suggest estrangement or even buckpassing (which literally means “a refusal to chip in for drinks at a party”). In this case, the state prefers not to interfere in the affairs of its allies and not to engage in the resolution of contradictions, probably hoping that the problem will melt away, as in the famous parable about Khodzha Nasreddin and his donkey.

The U.S. approach to security in the Pacific after World War II is known as “hub and spokes.” The hub is Washington, whereas its allies are on the “wheel” surface, linked to the “senior ally” through a system of bilateral defense agreements. A NATO-like multilateral format has not yet emerged in East Asia since an undeniable common threat is absent. However, smallish alliances are gradually emerging around the ideas of countering certain threats and challenges.

In the classical traditions of U.S. political thought and practice, alliance partners should have combat-ready armed forces, preferably aligned with those of the U.S. through shared standards, as well as high defense budgets. The practical value is determined by rather cynical considerations – in event of a conflict, the allies should take the brunt of the blow before the main forces come to their rescue, that is if Washington chooses to engage directly, of course. With that in mind, having once “jumped on the bandwagon” not quite of their own free will, Tokyo and Seoul ended up having to secure American interests at their own expense. This is evidenced by their swelling defense budgets and a rather aggressive nature of the current military buildup in these nations.

Triangular affairs

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The G20 Summit was held in New Delhi in September 2023 without the leaders of Russia and China. In the opinion of Indian scholars, this was a symbol of the deepening rift between the East and the West, most notably in Northeast Asia.

Recently, the Western media have been referring more and more to a “Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang axis,” with a sheer negative connotation and an obvious allusion to the existing Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. At the same time, the most important factor that contributed to the “unification” of Russia, the DPRK and China was the obvious ideological and practical rapprochement between Seoul, Tokyo and Washington in the field of security and defense.

One of the first alarm bells was the U.S. strategy for building a “free and open Indo-Pacific” in 2019, which was criticized by Russian and Chinese officials and experts due to its apparent coalition nature. The DPRK generally shares these concerns in a bellicose manner, typical of the national style of diplomacy. Interestingly, Chinese academic circles initially tried to see something good in the U.S. plans or to perceive them solely as a temporary phenomenon inherent in the anti-China policy of the Trump administration, but soon realized that it would last for a long time.

The second signal is the sudden normalization of South Korea-Japan ties, despite the unresolved nature of some mutual problems. Although Tokyo and Seoul have proclaimed countering the North Korean threat as the main motive for their rapprochement, the joint efforts may well take on an anti-China character. These concerns are only heightened in light of the trilateral military exercises and increased engagement with NATO. Tokyo’s release of the National Security Strategy and the White Paper on Defense has become a symbol of the militarization of international relations in Northeast Asia and the increasing role of military force in shaping the geopolitical image of the region. President Yun Sogyeol’s ambitions to acquire his own nuclear weapons can also reflect the spirit of the new era. After two visits to South Korea by U.S. nuclear submarines this year, these words are no longer perceived as mere rhetoric.

The final trigger was, of course, the trilateral summit at Camp David in August 2023, which, among other things, completely dispelled all illusions about Seoul’s possible independent and autonomous role in the political process in Northeast Asia. The leaders of the three nations decided to institutionalize their partnership on a wide range of regional security issues and joint work in the economic, intelligence and cyberspace spheres. Yet, it is possible to talk about a strategic triangle formed with the explicit goals of ensuring the military superiority of the United States and its allies over any potential rival in the region.

Beijing’s assessment of the significance of the Camp David summit was probably determined not by the U.S. and an emphasis on the awaited collective response to North Korea’s nuclear missile program, but by their condemnation of China’s actions in the South China Sea. According to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “in the face of unilateral sanctions, hegemony and confrontation, Russia and China should strengthen strategic cooperation.” The involvement of the DPRK, which has also found itself “in the crosshairs” of the U.S. and its allies, was a logical development.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia in September 2023 and Foreign Minister Lavrov’s October trip to Pyongyang have already been covered in the Western, Japanese and South Korean media with most unthinkable details. To be sure, Moscow and Beijing proceed from pragmatic considerations when developing contacts with North Korea. The most important thing is to ensure stability of the existing regime through diplomatic support and trade-economic cooperation within the limits established by the UN Security Council resolutions. The question of Russia’s and China’s creative approach to interpreting sanctions remains open, given the increasing offensiveness of Washington and its allies.

Seoul is extremely zealous in building trilateral cooperation between China, the DPRK and Russia. Nevertheless, it was Yun Sogyol’s administration that initiated the actual destruction of inter-Korean dialogue, choosing the path of military confrontation. In his speech at the UN General Assembly, the incumbent ROK leader expressed his displeasure with Russia’s behavior, trying to accuse Moscow of violating the international sanctions regime. Yun said that if the DPRK gets hold of information and technology to improve its capabilities in weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, Seoul will not “stay on the sidelines.” Earlier, Russian Ambassador to the ROK Andrey Kulik was summoned to the country’s Foreign Ministry for a talk on the inadmissibility of military-technical cooperation between Russia and the DPRK.

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ROK Foreign Minister Park Jin, during his negotiations with Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, urged the PRC to strictly enforce the UN Security Council sanctions regime against Pyongyang. However, the Yun Sogyeol administration likely has no intention of maintaining ties with Beijing on security issues in the Korean Peninsula, as they do not see China as a stakeholder. A trilateral meeting between the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea is to be held before the end of 2023, but in light of the Camp David trilateral pact, the prospects for the event are extremely dim.

A joint statement by the leaders of the United States and the Republic of Korea at the Nuclear Planning Advisory Group meeting spells concerns about the practical interaction between Moscow and Pyongyang, which could contribute to the development of the DPRK’s nuclear missile program. According to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the U.S. does not want “North Korea to receive any military technology from Russia.” Washington clearly intends to speculate on the topic of the alleged MTC between Russia and the DPRK or China and the DPRK. The main goal is to cultivate anti-Russian and anti-Chinese sentiments in the Republic of Korea and Japan.

Meanwhile, Seoul and Tokyo have become the parties most affected as their ties with China are rapidly deteriorating, while joint projects with Russia are frozen for an indefinite period and their dependence on the United States is growing. Whether this policy is really in line with Japanese and South Korean national interests may one day be decided by voters in these nations, despite the actual occupation of part of their territories by the U.S. military.

1. Buzan B., Waever O. Regions and Powers: the structure of International Security. Cambridge University Press. 2003. 564 p.

2. Waltz K. Theory of International Politics (1979). Waveland Press reissued. 2010. 251 p.

3. Snyder J. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca, New-York: Cornell University, 1991.