Afghanistan and Regional Security: Scenarios for the Future

For several decades, Afghanistan has been a source of threats and risks, including those of a terrorist and extremist nature, for the broader Central Eurasian region. That said, since the Taliban swept to power in August 2021, security in Afghanistan has significantly improved, a fact that is now almost universally recognized. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to acknowledge that the lingering uncertainty about future developments (including the presence of international terrorist groups on Afghan soil) remains a driver of these threats and risks. Furthermore, the current geopolitical turbulence, coupled with Afghanistan’s strategic geographic location, offers a high potential for the country to be used as a stage for a global conflict between Russia and the U.S. with its allies, between the U.S. and China, or between Iran and the collective West.

In the present circumstances, the situation can unfold in several different ways, and each scenario can reshape the existing terrorist threats and risks for the SCO and CIS region in some manner.

The moderately optimistic scenario can materialize if no external actors try to contribute to destabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, including through proxies such as international terrorist groups or those identifying as anti-Taliban.

There is also a pessimistic scenario, where external actors with vested interests might exploit the lingering uncertainty in Afghanistan and finance “anti-Taliban” or terrorist groups.

At this point, taking all internal and external factors into account, it is not possible to confidently predict how likely it is that all processes will turn toward a fully optimistic scenario. However, there is no strong reason to expect a purely negative scenario either. This long-standing uncertainty is likely to persist much longer, which will require the SCO and CIS member states to make regular situation-specific recalibrations of their actions concerning Afghanistan, including in counterterrorism efforts. In any case, cooperation with the de facto government in Kabul in this area has been tried and tested, and it would be prudent to expand this cooperation moving forward.

For several decades, Afghanistan has been a source of threats and risks, including those of a terrorist and extremist nature, for the broader Central Eurasian region. That said, since the Taliban [1] swept to power in August 2021, security in Afghanistan has significantly improved, a fact that is now almost universally recognized. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to acknowledge that the lingering uncertainty about future developments (including the presence of international terrorist groups on Afghan soil) remains a driver of these threats and risks. Furthermore, the current geopolitical turbulence, coupled with Afghanistan’s strategic geographic location, offers a high potential for the country to be used as a stage for a global conflict between Russia and the U.S. with its allies, between the U.S. and China, or between Iran and the collective West.

Russian-Chinese Strategic Cooperation to Ensure Security in Afghanistan Following U.S. Withdrawal. RIAC Report

In the present circumstances, the situation can unfold in several different ways, and each scenario can reshape the existing terrorist threats and risks for the SCO and CIS region in some manner.

The first scenario can be described as moderately optimistic. Many countries, particularly and primarily most SCO members, have already de facto accepted the need for constructive engagement with the Taliban government as a key policy in relation to Afghanistan. In the SCO and CIS region (with rare exceptions), there is an understanding that the Taliban movement is a long-term reality and a shared recognition of the need to prevent Afghanistan and its current government from facing international isolation.

The issue of recognizing the Afghan government is gradually fading from the Afghanistan-related agenda. The problem of human rights in Afghanistan—strongly emphasized by Western nations, especially regarding women’s rights and education—should be recognized as an internal matter, belonging to Afghan society and its government. Afghanistan was one of the first Muslim states to sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but this only formally obliges the country’s leadership to adhere to its principles. In addition, the crisis of the UN has caused many similar, and more significant, documents to be ignored all over the world, so the Afghan government is not an exception.

The so-called government inclusivity is beginning to appear as an artificially constructed cliché, which Western and some other countries are trying to use to put pressure on the Afghan government. Whenever Russia, Iran or China discuss inclusivity, they recommend rather than demand it. The composition of the government is also a domestic matter for each country, and the three years of Taliban rule show that the movement has confirmed its internal legitimacy. Recommendations for inclusivity from Russia, Iran or other Central Asian states imply that a government representing a broader political spectrum would better serve the interests of the country and society, and therefore be more stable. Representation of different political forces, including ethno-political ones, in the government acts as a stabilizing factor. However, the truth is that there is no one with whom to form an inclusive government right now; the Taliban are the only political entity to be reckoned with both internally and externally. Politicians outside the Taliban movement, who could be part of such Afghan government and have no foreign affiliations, are practically nonexistent.

The U.S. and its allies are manipulating the issue of “recognition/non-recognition” out of self-interest. At the same time, Chinese President Xi Jinping received the credentials of the Taliban-appointed Afghan ambassador. During a visit to Kabul by Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, a decision was made to upgrade diplomatic relations, which also implies the appointment of an ambassador by the Afghan government. In Russia and several other countries, Afghan diplomatic missions are headed by envoys appointed by Kabul in the rank of chargé d'affaires ad interim, but this is likely to change soon. Moscow, specifically, should go through the process of overturning the now outdated decision to list the Taliban as a banned organization. In any case, when it comes to developing foreign economic ties, the main obstacle is not so much the Taliban’s status anymore, but rather certain security issues and an unclear investment climate. This is why economic cooperation has so far been limited mostly to trade, while investments and infrastructure development are what is really needed.

Security is the only issue that cannot be seen as Afghanistan’s internal matter and should be regarded as a broad transnational problem. The success of the current Afghan government in tackling corruption (including border corruption), drug production and international terrorist groups still present in Afghanistan is quite remarkable. On a regional scale, this fact is fostering a new atmosphere of cross-border connectivity. Several countries in the SCO and CIS region—Iran, Uzbekistan, China, Russia, Turkmenistan and others—are successfully engaging with Afghanistan economically, while also contributing to the stabilization of the socioeconomic situation and positive changes in security. At the same time, the Taliban government is also establishing a more effective control over the country’s territory. The current security situation is already conducive to launching several cross-border transport and energy projects, which, once implemented, should become drivers of Afghanistan’s development (e.g., the Trans-Afghan Railway project, TAPI and others). Under the U.S. and NATO occupation, and with the presence of collaborationist governments fostering armed conflict across the country, these projects had no prospects.

Ivan Bocharov:
The Middle East: Impact of Afghanistan and Ukraine Crises on Key Regional Trends

The improvement in Afghanistan’s security is not only a consequence of the Taliban ceasing the hostilities that had continued until August 2021. The movement has also made great strides in fighting everyday crime as well. With no armed opposition in the country, this has had a positive effect on the overall atmosphere in society. Terrorist attacks against the Taliban—publicized by various kinds of “anti-Taliban” groups that are mainly directed from the U.S., Europe and Turkey—are most often virtual in nature. No institutional opposition to the Taliban has emerged in the country since August 15, 2021, and only virtual platforms are filled with bids to fill this “vacancy.” Meanwhile, the Taliban government is showing a certain evolution in its policies, which will continue if the peaceful scenario unfolds. Thus, the system of governance, including the counterterrorism component, should become more effective.

Intelligence services of Iran, Russia and Uzbekistan, as well as agencies of the CIS and CSTO, are now cooperating with the Afghan General Directorate of Intelligence on counterterrorism, and this interaction is yielding some positive results. In February 2024, head of Uzbekistan’s State Security Service Abdusalom Azizov visited Kabul—a sign of high-level cooperation. The information provided by Afghanistan’s intelligence directorate has helped prevent at least 15 terrorist attacks in Iran. The Taliban view ISIS [2] not only as ideological adversaries but also as a foreign and alien movement and political phenomenon that could plunge Afghan society into another catastrophe. This has paved the way for cooperation in counterterrorism efforts.

In August 2021, the Taliban’s rise to power caused quite a stir in radical circles around the world, where it was billed as a success story for the entire Muslim Ummah. However, this excitement has largely died down. For example, the well-known extremist party Hizb ut-Tahrir [3] criticizes the Taliban for “refusing to go beyond Afghan borders, curtailing jihad and withdrawing support from the oppressed in Western China, Central Asia and Palestine.” The group argues that radicals from the region had expected the Taliban to help “ erase colonial borders and restore Islamic rule, but instead, their actions play into the hands of the enemies, leading Afghan Muslims astray as they can no longer distinguish between good and evil.” It is fair to assume that further constructive cooperation between the countries of the region and the Kabul government will gradually dispel the “success story” for radicals beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

This moderately optimistic scenario can materialize if no external actors try to contribute to destabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, including through proxies such as international terrorist groups or those identifying as anti-Taliban. None of these groups currently pose any threat to stability in Afghanistan or have any significant support in the country. At most, they can carry out sporadic terrorist attacks (mostly targeting patrols or posts of government security forces). It makes no difference whether we describe these actions as “terrorist” or use the more palatable term “sabotage,” since the methods of anti-Taliban groups and ISIS are virtually identical.

The second scenario is undoubtedly pessimistic. External actors with vested interests might exploit the lingering uncertainty in Afghanistan and finance “anti-Taliban” or terrorist groups. Heightened activity by these groups would cause instability across the country to rise, resulting in a decline in Afghanistan’s economic cooperation with regional partners. The country could then face some degree of isolation from external actors, which could entail both internal fragmentation of the Taliban (with some members joining terrorist groups) and radicalization of the movement as a whole. In this case, the Taliban could realign with the global terrorist network, as they did in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This scenario would essentially mirror the events of that period, undoing all current trends toward a gradual and sustainable settlement. Afghanistan’s territory would once again become a base for international terrorist groups, where threats much greater than those seen today would be brewing for the SCO member states and other regional stakeholders.

Alexandra Perminova:
The Role of the SCO in Ensuring Water and Energy Security in Central Asia: Opportunities for Russia – China Cooperation

There are symptoms or signs pointing to the possibility of this scenario. In July 2024, Republicans introduced a bill in the U.S. Congress titled “Preventing the Recognition of Terrorist States Act of 2024,” which labels the Taliban movement as a “state sponsor of terrorism” and a “terrorist organization.” During the same month, former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton called for military and economic aid to “resistance groups inside Afghanistan.” The U.S. could start financing the opposition, which would trigger an escalation of conflict in Afghanistan. This would bring the region a host of threats and risks, creating a kind of déjà vu of the 1990s. The U.S. and its allies have enough resources for this endeavor: a proxy war in Afghanistan is not as technologically and financially demanding as, for example, the conflict in Ukraine. If Donald Trump wins the presidential election, this approach might become a reality in U.S. and European policy toward Afghanistan.

At this point, taking all internal and external factors into account, it is not possible to confidently predict how likely it is that all processes will turn toward a fully optimistic scenario. However, there is no strong reason to expect a purely negative scenario either. This long-standing uncertainty is likely to persist much longer, which will require the SCO and CIS member states to make regular situation-specific recalibrations of their actions concerning Afghanistan, including in counterterrorism efforts. In any case, cooperation with the de facto government in Kabul in this area has been tried and tested, and it would be prudent to expand this cooperation moving forward.

The article is based on the author’s speech at the 10th RATS SCO International Conference on Jointly Countering International Terrorism and Extremism and the 2nd CIS Conference on Combating Terrorism and Extremism that were held in Tashkent on September 5, 2024.

1. The organization is designated terrorist and banned in Russia.

2. The organization is designated terrorist and banned in Russia.

3. The organization is designated terrorist and banned in Russia.