... vessels from participating in further repair or maintenance works.
Meanwhile, Germany and the EU have already voiced strong discontent with the U.S. sanctions. Indeed, they benefit from the project. Russia has agreed to preserve a considerable part of its gas transit via Ukraine — this has been one of the key demands to support the project. The European Union has never invited the U.S. to protect them from the NS2, though there was a heated debate inside the EU. Apparently, sanctions emerge as an instrument of towering market competition for the European gas market. Donald Trump has repeatedly ...
... determining the quality of international interaction in the northernmost region of the world. Despite ongoing constructive contacts within the Arctic Council, many of its members and observers maintain sanctions pressure on Russia.
In 2014, the US and the European Union (EU) introduced restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, which are actively associated with a notion of sanctions in the foreign doctrine [
1
].
Ivan Panichkin:
Arctic Oil and Gas Resource Development: Current Situation and Prospects?
However, it should be noted that the prevailing point of view in the Russian legal doctrine is that the notions of sanctions and unilateral restrictive measures should not be confused. The ...
... that the “deal could lead to a restriction of competition.”
Poland has also tried to influence the European Commission (EC). For instance, Warsaw took the issue of expanding the provisions of the Third Energy Package to include maritime parts of gas pipelines running into the European Union. The new rules would mean that Gazprom would only be able to transport up to 50 per cent of the capacity of Nord Stream 2. It is a move designed to create unfavourable conditions for the project’s investors. Only 27.5 billion cubic metres ...
... «North Stream-2» pipeline construction or towards the gradual decline of Russian supplies via Baltic sea ports.
The EU investigation led by the European Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager, was based on the belief that Gazprom broke European Union Competition Law when supplying gas to eight countries of the integration unit - Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Estonia. In addition to overpricing, another alleged offense is tying gas contracts to the oil quotas and the prohibition of Russian ...
... containment. Here the signing of the Turkish Stream project with Ankara is a solution. Russia gains new leverage vis-à-vis the European Union by officially incorporating the Turkish Stream into the picture. In that sense, Russia will be able to use Turkish ... ... catalyst of change for better relations with Russia. From Turkey’s perspective, this project will not transform Turkey into a gas trading hub but it is beneficial for the country in the sense that it will be able to import all its gas needs from Russia ...
In May 2014, in the aftermath of Russia-Ukrainian crisis, the European Commission adopted European Energy Security Strategy, establishing two pillars of European security of supply: prevention and mitigation. The main goal was to prevent gas supply disruptions by implementing “gas stress tests” (modelled by ENTSOG) and to foster solidarity (Regulation 994/2010) between European member states regarding redistribution of storage capacity under Emergency plan. According to CEER,...
... Stream 2. Gazprom’s negotiating position was also favourably affected by the failed military coup in Turkey, which led to a rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara and a renewal of Turkish Stream negotiations. Relations between Turkey and the European Union have cooled noticeably after the attempted military coup, partially because of Recep Ergodan’s
threats
to introduce death penalty, which could complicate their cooperation on the Southern Gas Corridor.
The European Commission insists that Nord Stream 2 cannot exist “in a legal void, or according to Russian law only.”
Gazprom’s rhetoric concerning a move away from Ukrainian transit and toward the Baltic route has become ...
... fears, which have been absorbed within the EU along with the accession of those countries. Nevertheless, the strong economic gas trade model between Russia and core EU member states such as Germany continues to exist and is likely to remain the backbone ... ... EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 64, No. 3, May 2012, 449–469.
Geden, O., Marcelis, C. & Maurer, A. (2006) Perspectives for the European Union’s external energy
policy: discourse, ideas and interests in Germany, the UK, Poland and France (Berlin: ...
Many analysts and politicians consider the current political crisis between Russia and the European Union as part of a long-term negative trend that will lead to a further decrease in cooperation between the two parties.... ... concerning the issue of cooperation between the two German states, the USSR and West Germany managed to establish the base of the gas interdependence model, which was to become a backbone of the contemporary EU energy security. In a time of severe political ...
... Turkmenistan, Iraq and Iran could appear to scale down the dominant position of Russia
[12]
. The logic of diversification is supported by the EU’s aspiration to change the European market rules in terms of distribution and transportation of natural gas. The European Union has already limited the possibilities of Russian exports by adopting the Third Energy Security Package (in particular, “Gazprom” had to give up the “South Stream” pipeline and “Nord Stream” could be used ...
