..., while the U.S. sanctions do not prohibit foreign vessels from participating in further repair or maintenance works.
Meanwhile, Germany and the EU have already voiced strong discontent with the U.S. sanctions. Indeed, they benefit from the project. Russia has agreed to preserve a considerable part of its gas transit via Ukraine — this has been one of the key demands to support the project. The European Union has never invited the U.S. to protect them from the NS2, though there was a heated debate inside the EU. Apparently, sanctions emerge as an instrument of towering market competition for the European gas market. Donald Trump has repeatedly ...
... determining the quality of international interaction in the northernmost region of the world. Despite ongoing constructive contacts within the Arctic Council, many of its members and observers maintain sanctions pressure on Russia.
In 2014, the US and the European Union (EU) introduced restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, which are actively associated with a notion of sanctions in the foreign doctrine [
1
].
Ivan Panichkin:
Arctic Oil and Gas Resource Development: Current Situation and Prospects?
However, it should be noted that the prevailing point of view in the Russian legal doctrine is that the notions of sanctions and unilateral restrictive measures should not be confused. The ...
... opponents were expecting European companies to abandon the project in light of these circumstances. However, the Council of the European Union Legal Service
pointed out
that expanding the provisions of the Third Energy Package to include Nord Stream 2 was ... ... the country often cite two mutually exclusive reasons why building Nord Stream 2 in impossible. The first reason is that the gas pipeline would lead to Gazprom having a majority stake in the European market – Russia would inflate prices and/or demand that the countries in Europe bend to its political will under the threat of cutting ...
... force will require an approval from all the countries involved, which doesn’t ensure its acceptance by Poland or Baltic states who seem resentful towards the «North Stream-2» pipeline construction or towards the gradual decline of Russian supplies via Baltic sea ports.
The EU investigation led by the European Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager, was based on the belief that Gazprom broke European Union Competition Law when supplying gas to eight countries of the integration unit - Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Estonia. In addition to overpricing, another alleged offense is tying gas contracts to the oil quotas and the prohibition of Russian ...
Less Pragmatism, More Strategic Cooperation
On October 10
th
2016, during 23rd World Energy Congress in Istanbul, Turkey and Russia finally signed an intergovernmental agreement to implement the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline project. The agreement foresees the construction of two parallel pipelines with 15.75 billion cubic meters of annual ... ... containment. Here the signing of the Turkish Stream project with Ankara is a solution. Russia gains new leverage vis-à-vis the European Union by officially incorporating the Turkish Stream into the picture. In that sense, Russia will be able to use Turkish ...
In May 2014, in the aftermath of Russia-Ukrainian crisis, the European Commission adopted European Energy Security Strategy, establishing two pillars of European security of supply: prevention and mitigation. The main goal was to prevent gas supply disruptions by implementing “gas stress tests” (modelled by ENTSOG) and to foster solidarity (Regulation 994/2010) between European member states regarding redistribution of storage capacity under Emergency plan. According to CEER,...
... either former Soviet republics or Soviet satellites, has undermined the influence of Russia over its shared neighborhood with the EU and has further complicated the energy... ... states: the first factor is the difference in development of the energy sectors and gas pipeline grid interconnectedness, and second, the perception of Russia as an energy... ..., 449–469.
Geden, O., Marcelis, C. & Maurer, A. (2006) Perspectives for the European Union’s external energy
policy: discourse, ideas and interests in...
... analysts and politicians consider the current political crisis between Russia and the European Union as part of a long-term negative trend that will lead to a further decrease... ... of relations between Moscow and Brussels, but does not damage the relations between Russia and individual member states that much. As history shows, an increase in cooperation... ... the two German states, the USSR and West Germany managed to establish the base of the gas interdependence model, which was to become a backbone of the contemporary EU energy...
... Turkmenistan, Iraq and Iran could appear to scale down the dominant position of Russia
[12]
. The logic of diversification is supported by the EU’s aspiration to change the European market rules in terms of distribution and transportation of natural gas. The European Union has already limited the possibilities of Russian exports by adopting the Third Energy Security Package (in particular, “Gazprom” had to give up the “South Stream” pipeline and “Nord Stream” could be used only at half of its capacity
[13]
).
Western sanctions ...
The quality of the commercial cooperation between Russian and Western European companies in the energy sector has remained significant, despite the sanctions regime. Strong economic ... ... complexity of the relationship through swap deals and favorable transactions, which encompass the entire value-chain of the natural gas sector. The pinnacle of recent collaboration has been the initiation of the Nord Stream-2 project, which has the potential ...
