... power competition
1989 heralded a unique prospect for an enduring global peace, as harsh ideological divisions and conflicts began to be resolved. Now, three decades on, that peace has been lost. With war in Ukraine and increasing tensions between China, Russia, and the West, great power politics once again dominates the world stage. But could it have been different?
Richard Sakwa shows how the years before the first mass invasion of Ukraine represented a hiatus in conflict rather than a lasting accord – and how, since ...
... Chinese government's effort in "integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China's specific realities and fine traditional culture"?
I find the Chinese experience very interesting, primarily because China does not seek to smash or disprove Western political theories. China does not seek to show that there are bad Western ones and good Chinese ones. China seeks to analyze the intellectual heritage of the West, to adopt what it considers appropriate for itself. And here we are talking not only about Marxism, which, ...
... bipolarity. This is clearly not what most of us hoped for earlier this century, but this trend cannot be ignored and it affects both Moscow and New Delhi.
Year after year, Russia is moving farther east, strengthening and developing its multiple ties with China. Year after year, India is shifting further west, increasing various forms of cooperation with the United States. This is the reality we have to acknowledge before moving any further.
This trend contains considerable risks. If it continues in the medium term, the two friendly nations may eventually ...
... and this will certainly have important repercussions for the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
***
A more accurate definition of China’s positioning in the Russia–Ukraine conflict is
constructive intervention rather than neutrality. Unlike the US and the West, China’s policy is not based on choosing a side, but oriented toward constructive results.
At this stage, China’s understanding of constructiveness can be summarized in the
twelve-point proposition of the Ukraine peace plan it proposed in February ...
... off from its historically close relationship with Moscow. Yet, while India—which has set the goal of becoming the world’s third largest economy by 2040 (it is currently fifth)—is most interested in economic and technological cooperation with the West and is also wary of China, Delhi has been balancing carefully in order to avoid harming its solid relationship with Russia. Much needs to be done by both Delhi and Moscow to bring their “privileged partnership” closer to the scope and intensity of the Russia-China ties,...
Working Paper No. 74 / 2023
Working Paper No. 74 / 2023
The working paper seeks to analyze constitutive voting patterns of Sub-Saharan states of Africa at the UN General Assembly. The methodology proposed in this paper offers an opportunity to explore this issue topic-wise as well as in a broader sense. The paper considers a number of indicators that help assess the involvement of the continent’s different countries in the voting processes, builds on the various types of strategic behavior in the...
... Europe, Russia will play the role of North Korea, but at the same time it will have much greater potential. Whether Ukraine has enough strength, will and resources to become a European South Korea is a big question. The conflict between Russia and the West will strengthen the role of China as an alternative financial centre and source of modernisation. The rise of China will only accelerate its growing rivalry with the United States and its allies. “The End of History” ended with a return to its usual course. One of the usual ...
... the first place.
But the recurrence of systemic unipolarity is not unique to the West. For example, the threat of secondary sanctions by the US has in many cases proved to be a decisive factor in determining the opportunities and constraints for non-Western countries to develop economic and other cooperation with Moscow. Under US pressure, Turkey decided to refuse to service Russian Mir payment cards, and China’s Huawei was forced to begin winding down its activities in Russia.
The new US National Security Strategy recently signed by Biden is steeped in outright restorationist pathos. The document speaks of the indispensability of American leadership,...
... with the key features of the commenced consolidation within the ranks of the Collective West. Is current Western unity incidental or strategic? Is it transient or long-standing? How much do the interests of the major power centers of the Collective West diverge? How likely is this unity to extend to subsequent engagement with China as a major strategic adversary? What are the prospects for a significant number of states in the Global South to join the Western consensus? The author’s analysis aims to outline a possible interdisciplinary discussion that could provide answers ...
... politicians have been actively using the term “democracy” in their official rhetoric and stressing that democracy exists in China too. They do this in defiance of the West and its “monopoly on deciding where there is democracy and where it is absent.” China realizes that the West uses this monopoly to exert pressure on foreign policies of its opponents and seeks to demonopolize this function and achieve parity in the struggle for control over the information discourse at the very least.
This is most evident not in the concept ...
