Working Paper #66, 2022
Although the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which is now unfolding before our very eyes, can be seen as a primarily European crisis of regional dimensions,... ... of other equally important crises and upheavals, such as the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, exacerbated tensions in the U.S.-China relations, political regime change in Afghanistan, instability in the Sahel, the ongoing civil war in Yemen, intensified ...
... China would want to increase its foothold was arms sales. With significant number of countries set to spurn Russia after its military operation in Ukraine, and unwilling to face consequent sanctions, new sales opportunities could arise for Beijing. China is currently the world’s fourth-largest military equipment exporter in the world behind USA, Russia and France. Russian defence industry’s growing plight may open door to some countries changing allegiance from Russia to China when they next go about buying military equipment. Prominent Russian Sinologist Alexey Maslov recently stated that ...
... Kremlin both under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. He is still considered close to Russia’s president and foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. His recent proposals on Russian-speaking... ... we had to destroy it. Not by force, but through constructive destruction, through refusal to participate in it. But after the last demand to stop NATO was again rejected... ... existential war».
Sanctions are getting tighter. Will Russia become more dependent on China?
«There is no question about that: we will be more integrated and more dependent...
... de-dollarization and the use of national currencies in financial transactions. One of the cases in point was the discussion between China and Saudi Arabia on the possibility of using Chinese Yuan for settlements in lieu of Saudi’s oil deliveries to China. ... ... R5 concept, “the “R5 initiative” targets the use of the respective national currencies of BRICS countries – Rouble (Russia), Rand (South Africa), Real (Brazil), Rupee (India) and Renminbi (China) – within the BRICS+ circle and more broadly ...
... question of the balance of losses and gains of key participants, as well as global players. Such a balance has yet to be struck for Russia and Ukraine. Hostilities continue and a political settlement has not been reached, which means that it is still difficult ... ... and in terms of enormous damage to the economy. The contours of the balance for global and regional players—the EU, the US, China, Japan, Iran and others are more clearly visible.
The European Union bears the most serious losses and costs. They are associated ...
The U.S. felt that it needed to reshape European perceptions to revive the “Russian threat”, galvanizing the West under its hegemonic influence
Experts are scrambling to explain why the U.S. prioritized containing Russia over China despite most prior indicators very strongly suggesting that it would prioritize the second scenario. U.S. President Joe Biden largely continued his predecessor Donald Trump’s muscular approach towards the People’s Republic up until around last ...
... of the US development institutions such as “the Development Finance Corporation, USAID, EXIM, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the U.S. Trade and Development... ... can build more resilient connections with the world.”
Across the Global South only China has a globalization vision of similar ambition, namely the Belt and Road Initiative... ... the development institutions of the developing world.
What could be the response from Russia and the developing world? The experience of the past several decades suggests...
... bulk of the text is devoted to a largely defensive statement of principles and rebuttal of selected elements of the Western agenda. Notably, its first section is devoted to de-Westernizing the concept of “democracy”, claiming this status for both China and Russia, and seeking to deny the U.S. its usage as a moral high ground and dividing line in world politics. This critique is clearly triggered by the recent U.S.-sponsored “Summit for Democracy” and expanding on an earlier joint
response
by Russian and Chinese ambassadors to the U.S. Its ...
... surpassing the last defense budget of Donald Trump. It is inevitable that the U.S. will press forward to modernize its nuclear triad. Russia to a large extent has already done so. It is a reverse situation in comparison to the Cold War era. This time NATO has ... ... nuclear technologies, which is an obvious risk inherent in the AUK–U.S. adventurism. The U.S. strategy of a new cold war with China envisages the creeping involvement of India in the anti-Beijing military alliance, which will inevitably spur a nuclear ...
... perceived as a distant power (in international terms), even if it has invested billions, for example, only in the education of thousands of students in the region. As a result, for both Russia and the United States, Central Asia is a sphere of strategic influence from a commercial, economic and political point ... ... principles, different definitions of terrorism, and the duration of the existence of US military bases. The surprise element (?) China Central Asia has always been important to China’s imagination of and action toward its neighbors and the larger world ...
