... by the desire to undermine the Ukrainian authorities.
Ostensibly, the United States is using a two-level model of counteracting Nord Stream 2. The first part involves putting pressure on the project via third parties – the main conduit of the U.S. energy policy in Europe is Poland. Warsaw has been a staunch critic of both Nord Stream 2 and Gazprom, and its arguments are politically motivated. Poland threw the first spoke in the wheel of the Russian project in 2016, when Gazprom was counting on selling 10 per cent of its shares in the Nord Stream 2 operator,
Nord Stream 2 AG
, to five companies ...
... in more than 50 international and 20 domestic projects, Russia’s current position is shaky. Governmental favoritism of Gazprom, who has a privileged position with regards to controlling export routes, striped other companies such as Novatek and ... ... Stream-2 project to bypass Poland and Ukraine faces strong opposition from the European Commission given that it goes against Third Energy Package (and the values of the Energy Union in general) by devoiding the named countries of transit fees. Additionally,...
... are unable to establish long-term third-party-agreements with Gazprom who often refuses access to its pipeline technically justifying it by being ‘at full capacity.’ It is imperative to support the suggestion of Ministry of Industry and Energy of 2007 calling Gazprom to give APG priority in accessing its UGSS27 network, elaborating legal provisions similar to the Federal Law on Electricity of 2010 that ensures priority access of APG and its derivatives to national electricity grid. Oversight of Federal Anti-monopoly ...
... shipments from the EU.
Gazprom: too expensive for Ukraine?
Political turmoil, economic crisis, and armed conflict have led to a significant reduction in primary energy and natural gas consumption in Ukraine.
Between 2010 and 2013, the price charged by Gazprom to Ukraine’s national energy company Naftogaz - considered by Kiev as excessive and unjust – was used as a main argument for diversification away from Russia. According to Ukraine’s State Statistics Committee data, Gazprom shipped 37.5 bcm in 2011, while billing ...
... side, especially for the southern part. The main stumbling block is that the project did not – and does not – conform to the standards of the Third Energy Package ratified by the European Commission’s Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators with regard to European Union and third party states. More specifically, the European side was not satisfied with Russia’s unwillingness to allow other suppliers to use the project’s infrastructure, and the fact that Gazprom would be the main operator. All this despite the fact that Brussels had no qualms about making such demands while offering no financing of its own whatsoever. Russia had teamed up with a number of private European investors to front around $15 ...
... underselling top producer Kazakhstan by a big margin, which could be considered dumping by the World Trade Organization. But the uranium club doesn’t play by WTO “dumping” rules.
According to nuclear and mining trade publications Russian energy giant Gazprom and around twenty other international firms, including German operators, are active in mining or holding stakes to mine uranium in Niger. But the dominant organization is Areva.
Areva revenue last year was reported at around $13 billion, but ...
... exploration and production of hydrocarbons. This report is the first of its kind for LUKoil, allowing one to peek at the global energy landscape via the lens of a Russian oil major. As usual, I also add extra weblinks and interesting info. Hence, please ... ... where today it ranks 11th. It is quite a remarkable rank considering that it is directly below Rosneft and near to 5th placed Gazprom. It shows that gigantomania is not key to success as efficiency still strikes true, with 10th ranked Rosneft not performing ...
... Europe’s actions have created a possible financial risk for the region, as these special relations have been severed, so now any future relations will be priced on the basis of a deficit market. The question remains open, is the trade-off worth it?
Energy Weaponry Myth:
Pathological fear does exist, that Gazprom may in some way use its power to influence Europe as a dominant supplier. However, in reality, if we look retrospectively there are no real precedents to Gazprom applying its power, there were some threats issued, but not real actions. Also, it ...
... system. More specifically, Moscow lacks a clear strategic direction, as the ruling regime is increasingly divided between an official commitment to economic modernisation, on the one hand, and authoritarian consolidation, on the other hand.
Energy Calamity
It is argued by some that the Russo-European relationship has soured creating an anti-Russian stance. Has this occurred due to European attempts to lower gas import prices, or more serious underlining issues? Europe’s potential ...
... plan for “a pipeline from Kovykta… towards Chayanda and, in the end, gas from Kovykta will be transported through the Yakutia-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas pipeline… slated for 2016”. In February 2013, ITAR-TASS reported that Gazprom has started to consider bringing forward the 2016 aim – so has the Russian energy elite realised the need to hurry? Mareš and Laryš would caution, as the dynamic diversification into Asia is somewhat abandoning the traditionally lucrative European market, than actually providing additional customers. Nevertheless,...
