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Whatever the case may be, maintaining security in the Central Asian region, and indeed in Eurasia as a whole, requires collective efforts in order to solve the most serious problems in individual SCO member countries. Expanding multilateral cooperation in Central Asia will also help strengthen the SCO itself and allow it to adapt to the new geopolitical reality, which calls for tighter partnerships to jointly counter external challenges.
The Role of the SCO in Ensuring Water and Energy Security
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... would lead to political and economic consequences. However, Central Asian oil and gas – an alternative option – have no direct way to the EU members, and the transportation of lithium batteries from the region costs more favorably as a part of green energy programs.
As a response to the trends, governments of Central Asian states are initiating projects to enhance lithium mining or to construct lithium-ion battery capacities. In October of 2022, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, President of Kazakhstan, asked the Geological Service to intensify exploration and development ...
... Turkey the least reliable partner of the 3.
The path forward
Michael Lambert:
Nuclear Energy is not Dead! Understanding the Drivers Underpinning the Ongoing Nuclear Renaissance
Overall, measuring the risks and opportunities that arise in this major energy crisis of the Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan possesses greater cooperation flexibility, as it is involved in the majority of the regional cooperation frameworks and maintains great relations with all three key global players in the region. Its significantly high ...
... energy efficiency on the supply side, for example, reducing gas flaring, decentralised production in the form of off-grid installations, and the development of non-hydrocarbon sources of energy. But for the resource rich and landlocked countries of Central Asia energy efficiency and the green economy are at best secondary concerns. Their plans are centred above all on the development of resource based and transport corridor economies which requires enormous capital investment in production and processing capacity,...
... debate over energy security. So to put it crudely China is not allowed to buy firms so that it can import high-end technologies to better its domestic production (even if a firm like Unocal accounts for a mere 1% of the US output), nor can land adjacent Central Asia support its growing energy demand fully or Russia be prepared to play on its terms. In effect, China is left with investing in second-tier opportunities and the Malacca Dilemma persists with just a balancing effort trying to minimise rise in dependence. Li & Cheng (2006) ...
... regional stability should be a key task for Moscow's foreign policy. No major power would like to share borders with a region immersed in fighting not merely for water but for survival. Therefore it appears reasonable for Russia to take part in researching Central Asian climate change and green energy production. At the same time, Russia's engagement in restoring the Aral Sea or modernizing the irrigation system is unlikely to be worthwhile. Outright financing of such projects is doomed to failure, while Moscow still lacks the experience needed ...
... Russia, although as Yergin highlighted at IMEMO RAN the environmental fallout from coal is now among the leading energy issues as it has gone too far and cannot be used so excessively (2/3rd of primary energy mix right now).
China's Main Energy Sources & Central Asian 'Ace of Spades':
The main energy source for China will be domestic production, with coal still accounting for the largest share even though its environmentally damaging as underlined. In terms of import, China conducts ...
Euro-Russian relations have strained over the recent years in energy matters as certain vested interests shifted perceptions into the realm of what I would express as logical fallacies – technically making sense to a degree, but only when numerous caveats are applied. In this post issues like energy weaponry ...
.... Like Beijing and (to a much lesser extent) Ankara, it operates a tributary system with smaller neighbours, providing “security” in exchange for market outlets and inexpensive imports. Indeed, Russia sells military equipment and buys up central Asian energy to export it to the West, while it also imports cheap labour to compensate for its declining population.
In this new “Great Imperial Power Game,” the geo-economics of energy security matters just as much as the geo-politics of indirect ...
... perhaps one of the biggest challenges in the upcoming decade as its economy is overly dependent upon natural wealth, but our main European market is quickly becoming less accessible raising the question: where to go? Aside, long-term diversification from energy export dependence, Russia has a relatively shorter-term option: to expand into Asia, but this option is far from easy and requires tricky manoeuvres.
Personal Note: I should have uploaded this particular post on RIAC from the start to make ...