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Igor Ivanov

President of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1998–2004)

So, the decision has been taken, with Russia officially recognizing sovereignty and independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. The establishment of diplomatic relations is followed by economic, humanitarian and military aid, as well as other measures necessary to formalize the statehood of the new subjects of international life.

This is an important decision that will undoubtedly have far-reaching ramifications—for the Russian-Ukrainian relations and, more broadly, for security in Europe and globally. It’s no exaggeration to say that another page of history, which began during the acute crisis in and around Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014, has been turned.

Moscow’s recognition of the DNR and LNR will be used to the maximum extent possible by the West for its information war against Russia. Our country will face difficulties in many multilateral forums and international organizations, from the UN to the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The issues of Ukraine’s “territorial integrity” will inevitably be raised in bilateral talks between Russia and its Western partners.

Speaking of the international consequences of Moscow’s decision, we should assume that we are entering a new phase of confrontation with the West because of the diplomatic recognition of the Donbass Republics. The scale and the specifics of this confrontation are yet to be assessed, but it is already clear that it will drag on for a long time and will encompass various areas of international politics and economy. One should hardly expect that in the foreseeable future such forces will prevail in the West that are disposed to a fundamental reappraisal of the current policy of "containing" Moscow and are ready to offer Russia some new option of détente or reset.

It is likely that recent developments around Ukraine will have longer-term strategic implications, including in the area of security. Western states have long ago abandoned the idea of establishing an indivisible security system in the Euro-Atlantic, which was much discussed at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Now we can expect them to speed up the strengthening of their own security, relying on NATO, which will be announced at the upcoming summit of the alliance to be held in Madrid this June.

Although the rhetoric of many Western leaders still contains the thesis that security in Europe cannot be built without, much less against Russia, NATO has—in fact—consistently moved to make “containing” Moscow the main goal and the main justification for maintaining NATO in the 21st century. Ukraine may be assigned the role of a shield against the “Russian threat” in these plans.

Today opens a new chapter of modern European history, with its challenges and opportunities, hopes and disappointments, victories and defeats, gains and losses. A lot of unexpected and unexplored things lie ahead, so one should not count on a quiet life in any case.

So, the decision has been taken, with Russia officially recognizing sovereignty and independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. The establishment of diplomatic relations is followed by economic, humanitarian and military aid, as well as other measures necessary to formalize the statehood of the new subjects of international life.

This is an important decision that will undoubtedly have far-reaching ramifications—for the Russian-Ukrainian relations and, more broadly, for security in Europe and globally. It’s no exaggeration to say that another page of history, which began during the acute crisis in and around Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014, has been turned.

If one speaks directly about the citizens of the DNR and the LNR, the ongoing turnaround offers them new hope for a peaceful life. Lack of confidence in the future prevented people from planning ahead, working properly, building families, and raising children for more than eight years. In the meantime, the prospect of stability and predictability opens up for the Donbass, the absence of which makes sustained development hardly possible. If diplomatic recognition from Moscow is backed by rapid and considerable progress on acute economic and social problems, which is what the inhabitants are counting on, their support for such a development will be maintained.

Igor Ivanov:
Is War Inevitable?

The Minsk agreements, designed to resolve the perennial crisis over “specific districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine” through negotiations, are rendered meaningless under these conditions. The much-hoped-for accords, around which such passions were running high, will now merely remain in the textbooks of modern history. Most likely, the same fate will befall the Normandy format, established to implement the agreements to include representatives of Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany. This does not mean that the negotiations around Ukraine should essentially be put paid. But if they are resumed under certain circumstances, they will most probably be held in a different format, with other actors involved, and with a different agenda.

Kiev’s reaction to the events is what has been “expected”. Ukraine is well aware that it is effectively unable to prevent Moscow’s decision from being implemented. Therefore, the Ukrainian leadership has set a course to derive the maximum benefit of this defeat in the long term. Politically, it is important now for Ukraine to enlist the support of as many states as possible for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This explains Kiev’s increased activity at the UN and other international organizations. Accordingly, one should not expect any succession of diplomatic recognition of the new states by the international community. In this respect, the DNR and LNR are unlikely to be more successful than Abkhazia and South Ossetia, recognized by Russia in 2008.

It is easy to predict that Ukraine will accord a particular focus on capitalizing on its image as a “victim of aggression” in order to increase economic aid from the West. And here Kiev may well succeed, since Western countries, which cannot stick up for Ukraine militarily, will be willing to make serious economic injections to demonstrate their solidarity with the Ukrainian leadership. It is still an open question how effectively this aid will be used, and to what extent it will be used to modernize the Ukrainian economy and social sphere.

As for the military aspects, Kiev and Western countries are likely to drown out the issue of NATO membership, as well as to rush the rebuilding of the entire military machine of Ukraine to the standards of the alliance. One can expect increased military and technical assistance to Kiev from certain NATO countries, including supply of modern weapons. The calculation of this whole policy is simple, which is to show the people of Ukraine—and not only them—the advantages of “friendship” with the West. However, Western countries will continue to have significant discrepancies over the specific formats and the level of military support for Kiev.

Obviously, Moscow’s recognition of the DNR and LNR will be used to the maximum extent possible by the West for its information war against Russia. Our country will face difficulties in many multilateral forums and international organizations, from the UN to the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The issues of Ukraine’s “territorial integrity” will inevitably be raised in bilateral talks between Russia and its Western partners.

Speaking of the international consequences of Moscow’s decision, we should assume that we are entering a new phase of confrontation with the West because of the diplomatic recognition of the Donbass Republics. The scale and the specifics of this confrontation are yet to be assessed, but it is already clear that it will drag on for a long time and will encompass various areas of international politics and economy. One should hardly expect that in the foreseeable future such forces will prevail in the West that are disposed to a fundamental reappraisal of the current policy of "containing" Moscow and are ready to offer Russia some new option of détente or reset.

Western states are more “prepared” than they were in 2014 for this stage of confrontation with Moscow. In recent days, weeks and months, an unprecedented information attack on Russia has been conducted, all possible means and methods to manipulate public opinion are being used. This campaign, whose target audience is not only Russian citizens but also their own, is becoming protracted. In practical terms, we should expect a gradual introduction of the already announced sanctions, designed to affect the most sensitive areas of the Russian economy. Sanctions pressure is coming to be one of the main instruments of Western foreign policy, and this pressure is becoming more sophisticated and more focused over time.

It is likely that recent developments around Ukraine will have longer-term strategic implications, including in the area of security. Western states have long ago abandoned the idea of establishing an indivisible security system in the Euro-Atlantic, which was much discussed at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Now we can expect them to speed up the strengthening of their own security, relying on NATO, which will be announced at the upcoming summit of the alliance to be held in Madrid this June.

Although the rhetoric of many Western leaders still contains the thesis that security in Europe cannot be built without, much less against Russia, NATO has—in fact—consistently moved to make “containing” Moscow the main goal and the main justification for maintaining NATO in the 21st century. Ukraine may be assigned the role of a shield against the “Russian threat” in these plans.

Today opens a new chapter of modern European history, with its challenges and opportunities, hopes and disappointments, victories and defeats, gains and losses. A lot of unexpected and unexplored things lie ahead, so one should not count on a quiet life in any case.

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Poll conducted

  1. In your opinion, what are the US long-term goals for Russia?
    U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements  
     33 (31%)
    U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity  
     30 (28%)
    U.S. wants to dissolve Russia  
     24 (22%)
    U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China  
     21 (19%)
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