Main Trends in the Development of China’s Missile and Nuclear Forces

In recent years, the missile and nuclear forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have undergone serious qualitative and quantitative changes. This causes concern in the United States and among its allies in the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, Beijing’s official nuclear doctrine continues to rely on the concept of “minimum deterrence,” with an emphasis on a guaranteed but limited retaliatory strike. However, it is impossible not to note the formation of a more complex and flexible architecture of China’s nuclear forces.

The entire nuclear arsenal of the country has undergone significant transformations— including silo- and road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), hypersonic systems, as well as cruise missiles and aviation delivery systems. Modernization efforts have aimed not only at a quantitative buildup of carriers but also at expanding the range of their tactical and technical characteristics: range, accuracy, ability to overcome missile defense, and providing several options for combat equipment. As a result, China has come close to establishing a fully functional nuclear triad, with each of its components showing signs of becoming more versatile and resilient.

As a result, the growing number of warheads and delivery systems has shifted the structure of China’s nuclear arsenal toward a configuration that enables the PLA to strike a much wider range of targets—including military facilities, command and control centers, and air/missile defense elements. This evolution introduces potential scenarios for limited nuclear use and, consequently, extends the “escalation ladder,” allowing for greater control over each step. At the same time, the presence of dual-capable missiles makes it more difficult for potential adversaries to interpret China’s intentions. Moreover, Beijing is clearly seeking to increase the vulnerability of its potential opponents—primarily the United States—to its nuclear arsenal.

At present, according to the most reliable open-source assessments—such as those published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists—China possesses roughly six hundred nuclear warheads. Even taking into account its ongoing buildup and the Pentagon’s alarmist projections, which suggest that China could field around one thousand warheads by 2030, this figure still falls well short of the arsenals maintained by the United States and Russia. Claims that China is on the verge of achieving nuclear parity with these powers are therefore exaggerated and will remain so in the short- and medium-term. At the same time, there remains a high degree of uncertainty in estimating China’s nuclear capabilities. The exact number of warheads mounted on Chinese missiles is unknown, as is how many of the new silos will actually be filled or how many dual-capable missiles are equipped with nuclear rather than conventional warheads.

For Russia, these trends carry significant implications. On the one hand, China’s expanding nuclear capabilities do not yet place it on par with the United States or Russia, but they are steadily narrowing the gap and making Russian-US interaction in the sphere of strategic nuclear deterrence increasingly complex. This raises the potential role of future trilateral negotiation formats in risk management and confidence-building measures, since China is strongly opposed to formalized treaty limitations in this sphere. Moreover, the accelerating US-China arms race increases the risk of escalation in the Asia-Pacific, which directly affects Russia’s interests in the Far East, including the security of its transportation and trade routes. Finally, China's development of civil nuclear capabilities is prompting Russia to intensify technical cooperation with China on nuclear fuel cycle issues.

In recent years, the missile and nuclear forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have undergone serious qualitative and quantitative changes. This causes concern in the United States and among its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, Beijing’s official nuclear doctrine continues to rely on the concept of “minimum deterrence,” with an emphasis on a guaranteed but limited retaliatory strike. However, it is impossible not to note the formation of a more complex and flexible architecture of China’s nuclear forces.

The entire nuclear arsenal of the country has undergone significant transformations— including silo- and road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), hypersonic systems, as well as cruise missiles and aviation delivery systems. Modernization efforts have aimed not only at a quantitative buildup of carriers but also at expanding the range of their tactical and technical characteristics: range, accuracy, ability to overcome missile defense, and providing several options for combat equipment. As a result, China has come close to establishing a fully functional nuclear triad, with each of its components showing signs of becoming more versatile and resilient.

Alexander Yermakov:
The Three-Body Problem

A good example of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) development is the new-generation solid-fuel DF-41, first shown publicly during the 2019 military parade. According to open-source data and Pentagon estimates, the missile has already been put into service and deployed in at least two brigades of the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA). The DF-41 is fielded on a mobile launcher, although US reports also point to a silo-based variant; in particular, the silos identified in 2020 are believed to be intended for this missile type. China’s main ICBM prior to the DF-41, the DF-31, has been upgraded into several variants, including the DF-31A (with an extended range of up to 11,200 kilometers), the more all-terrain DF-31AG, and possibly a DF-31B (the existence of which remains disputed). Earlier silo-based Chinese ICBMs, the DF-5 family, were fitted with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles in the DF-5B and DF-5C modifications—reportedly three and five warheads respectively. Bridging the gap between intercontinental and medium-range missiles is the DF-27 system, with a range estimated at 5,000–8,000 kilometers and officially entered into service in 2023. It is likely a dual-capable missile that can also be fitted with a hypersonic glide vehicle and employed against both land-based and naval targets.

The backbone of China’s medium-range missile force is the dual-capable DF-26, whose production and deployment have expanded significantly in recent years, with new missiles being assigned to multiple brigades. The DF-26’s warhead can be replaced quickly, even without removing the missile from its launcher. There is also an anti-ship variant, the DF-26B (believed to be non-nuclear) which was tested against a moving target in 2020.

China is actively engaged in the development of hypersonic systems. In 2019, China became the first country in the world to adopt a ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle—the DF-17 medium-range missile with a DF-ZF warhead. The missile’s range is estimated at between 1,800 and 2,500 kilometers. While these systems were initially located in northeast China, later they were observed in southern regions as well. Although some US sources have suggested that the DF-17 could potentially carry a nuclear warhead, there is no reliable evidence to confirm this.

In addition, China is also notably expanding its arsenal of land-based nuclear weapons. In 2021, a group of US analysts led by M. Korda, studying commercial satellite images, discovered two positional areas of silo-based ballistic missiles in Gansu Province and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. A third positional silo field was later discovered in Inner Mongolia. As of 2024, those fields are estimated to contain roughly 120, 110, and 90 launch silos, respectively. Analysts suggest the silos are intended for a DF-41 variant, but it remains uncertain whether China plans to populate every silo or only selected ones—a decision that would complicate targeting for any potential adversary. Even if not all silos are filled, an opponent would still need to allocate a significant number of warheads to neutralize these fields, and many conventional strike systems would likely be unable to reach them because of their remote locations.

At present, the PLA Navy fields six Type 094 second-generation ballistic missile submarines, two of which are thought to be improved 094A variants. Each boat can carry up to twelve two-stage solid-fuel JL-2 SLBMs. In theory, this inventory permits the PLAN to maintain at least one of these submarines continuously at sea.
However, Chinese submarine propulsion is generally considered noisier than that of comparable Russian and US boats, and for that and other reasons these SSBNs are thought incapable of operating far from Chinese territorial waters. That limitation is partly addressed by the development of the longer-range JL-3 SLBM, reportedly capable of carrying multiple warheads, which is intended to arm the not-yet-commissioned Type 096 SSBNs.

The air component of China’s nuclear triad has traditionally been considered the least developed, but significant progress is also evident there. In 2019, China unveiled the H-6N strategic bomber—a modification of the H-6K—designed to carry air-launched ballistic missiles reportedly based on existing ground-launched systems such as the DF-21, with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. These missiles are believed to have already entered service. The H-6N is also equipped for aerial refueling, extending its operational reach. Further development of China’s airborne nuclear capability is tied to the next-generation H-20 stealth bomber, although its flight tests have not yet been officially confirmed.

Aleksey Arbatov:
Nuclear Boomerang

The 2021 test of a so-called fractional-orbital bombardment system carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle caused a stir in US expert circles. In that test, a booster placed the glide vehicle into low Earth orbit, after which it attempted to strike a ground target but missed by tens of kilometers. Critics warned that a weapon of this type could, in theory, approach the United States from any direction, including from the south, and thus circumvent US early-warning radars concentrated in the north. However, some arms-control analysts, notably Jeffrey Lewis, stressed that the concept is essentially a Cold-War idea resurrected to exploit space for a strike option without an obvious breach of the Outer Space Treaty. In his assessment, the system appears technically excessive and of dubious military value: extremely poor accuracy and limited payload capacity make its practical utility questionable compared with China’s existing delivery systems.

Also notable is the expansion of China’s cruise-missile capability across land, air, and maritime domains. Of particular concern are land-based cruise missiles—the very category eliminated by the USSR and US in the INF Treaty—although the United States retains a small number of ground launchers capable of firing such weapons. Central to China’s ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) arsenal are the CJ-10 and its derivative, the CJ-100, first unveiled in 2019. The US Department of Defense estimates that the PLA operates roughly 150 ground launchers and more than 400 cruise missiles. Some US publications have speculated about the potential adaptation of Chinese cruise missiles to carry low-yield nuclear warheads; however, there is no substantive evidence that such plans have been implemented. An air-launched variant, the CJ-20, has also been installed on strategic bombers among other systems.

Also worthy of note are trends within China’s nuclear forces such as the establishment of new brigades, the recapitalization and re-arming of existing Rocket Force brigades, and the expansion of infrastructure to support dedicated exercises. The PLA Rocket Force currently comprises more than 40 brigades. It operates a bifurcated command architecture: formations equipped with nuclear and conventional munitions exist in parallel chains of command. Nuclear-armed brigades report directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC), which retains authority over employment of nuclear weapons, whereas conventionally armed rocket brigades operate under the Theatre Commands in both peacetime and wartime and receive orders through those channels.

With respect to the basing of Chinese missile and nuclear systems, strategic intercontinental missiles, including new silo complexes, as well as mobile DF-31 and DF-41 formations, are notably located deep in the interior regions of the country. Such placement increases their survivability by reducing vulnerability to potential pre-emptive strikes from the coast and by affording greater maneuver space for mobile launchers. Coastal areas are allocated for missiles of medium and shorter ranges. Fujian and Guangdong host brigades equipped with tactical and operational-tactical systems aimed at Taiwan and targets within the South China Sea. Northeastern China is the primary deployment zone for medium-range missiles capable of striking Japan and the Korean Peninsula, while western regions host medium-range forces oriented toward the Indian direction. The DF-26 occupies a distinctive role in China’s posture: deployed in northern regions, it is positioned to be capable of striking US military facilities in the Indo-Pacific (for example, Guam). The naval component is concentrated at the Yulin base on Hainan Island, which hosts Type-094 SSBNs that are being progressively rearmed—transitioning from JL-2 SLBMs to the longer-range JL-3. The air component is represented by H-6N bombers, stationed at the Neixiang air base, and are reportedly capable of carrying air-launched ballistic and cruise missiles.

Moreover, China is actively expanding its production of nuclear materials—primarily within its civilian nuclear sector, which nonetheless possesses latent potential for military applications, including the development of nuclear warheads. A key example of this trend is the construction of two fast-neutron reactors at the Xiapu Nuclear Power Plant in Fujian Province. In 2019, an agreement was concluded with Rosatom for the supply of nuclear fuel for these reactors.

Dmitry Stefanovich:
What Will Follow Russia’s Exit from Moratorium on INF Deployment

China is also actively developing its command and control (C2) systems, as well as establishing a comprehensive missile early warning architecture. In recent years, several large early warning radar installations equipped with phased-array antennas have been deployed. These radars are designed to detect missile launches and track ballistic trajectories, and they can operate in conjunction with early warning satellites. According to the US Department of Defense, China currently possesses at least three dedicated early warning satellites, while other satellite constellations—such as the “Yaogan” and “Tianjin” series—are believed to perform similar functions. In parallel, Beijing has prioritized the construction of hardened and deeply buried command centers and the enhancement of C2 network resilience against electronic warfare (EW) and cyberattacks. These efforts fall under the responsibility of specialized units within the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF).

The PRC also shows a strong interest in developing quantum communication systems. In 2020, China conducted an experiment involving quantum key distribution via satellite — a technology that, in theory, provides physical-level security for communication channels. Analytical assessments describe quantum communications as a promising means of securing strategic command and control links, although there is currently no clear evidence that such systems have been operationally deployed in China. In addition, Beijing has established an extremely low-frequency (ELF) communication complex initially presented as part of earthquake early warning and geological exploration efforts. However, foreign analysts believe that this infrastructure could also be employed to maintain one-way communication with China’s ballistic missile submarines.

***

As a result, the growing number of warheads and delivery systems has shifted the structure of China’s nuclear arsenal toward a configuration that enables the PLA to strike a much wider range of targets—including military facilities, command and control centers, and air/missile defense elements. This evolution introduces potential scenarios for limited nuclear use and, consequently, extends the “escalation ladder,” allowing for greater control over each step. At the same time, the presence of dual-capable missiles makes it more difficult for potential adversaries to interpret China’s intentions. Moreover, Beijing is clearly seeking to increase the vulnerability of its potential opponents—primarily the United States—to its nuclear arsenal.

The development of radar and space-based early warning systems for missile attacks indicates the Chinese military's desire to enhance the rapid response capabilities of the PLA's nuclear forces in the event of a potential crisis. The Pentagon’s assertions that China is moving toward a “launch-on-warning” posture are not well substantiated, as such a strategy would require an automatic nuclear response upon detection of an enemy missile launch—regardless of the circumstances. Although China’s technical capacity to conduct this type of response appears to be improving, confirming such a shift is impossible without an official announcement of a change in nuclear doctrine.

In this regard, US assessments draw on several Chinese academic studies that discuss a set of measures collectively termed “early warning counterattack” (预警反击). According to the studies, the term corresponds to the logic of “active defense” and implies that, upon receiving reliable information from the Missile Attack Warning System (MAWS) about an enemy strike, the missile forces, on the orders of the command, carry out their own launch before the enemy warheads reach and detonate. These studies describe the notional architecture of such a system, encompassing a space-based component, ground-based radar installations, command centers, and missile force units, while also assessing the system’s potential effectiveness and current level of logistical support. However, these works are academic analyses rather than official policy documents, and they do not reflect the formal position of China’s military or civilian leadership.

At present, according to the most reliable open-source assessments—such as those published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists—China possesses roughly six hundred nuclear warheads. Even taking into account its ongoing buildup and the Pentagon’s alarmist projections, which suggest that China could field around one thousand warheads by 2030, this figure still falls well short of the arsenals maintained by the United States and Russia. Claims that China is on the verge of achieving nuclear parity with these powers are therefore exaggerated and will remain so in the short- and medium-term. At the same time, there remains a high degree of uncertainty in estimating China’s nuclear capabilities. The exact number of warheads mounted on Chinese missiles is unknown, as is how many of the new silos will actually be filled or how many dual-capable missiles are equipped with nuclear rather than conventional warheads.

For Russia, these trends carry significant implications. On the one hand, China’s expanding nuclear capabilities do not yet place it on par with the United States or Russia, but they are steadily narrowing the gap and making Russian-US interaction in the sphere of strategic nuclear deterrence increasingly complex. This raises the potential role of future trilateral negotiation formats in risk management and confidence-building measures, since China is strongly opposed to formalized treaty limitations in this sphere. Moreover, the accelerating US-China arms race increases the risk of escalation in the Asia-Pacific, which directly affects Russia’s interests in the Far East, including the security of its transportation and trade routes. Finally, China's development of civil nuclear capabilities is prompting Russia to intensify technical cooperation with China on nuclear fuel cycle issues.