“Long Time No See!”: Why Lula da Silva Visited Moscow Twice in Just One Week

The visit of Brazilian president Lula da Silva to Russia has consolidated the nuclear sector as a driving force in their bilateral relations. Get the inside scoop on this landmark meeting between Lula and Putin, and why, after a long absence, the Brazilian president decided to visit Russia twice in just one week.

After his State visit to Moscow, President Lula flew to China, where he took part in bilateral meetings and in the multilateral China-CELAC Summit, a forum that brings Beijing together with Brazil's Latin American partners. Lula's delegation in Beijing was larger than the group that accompanied him to Moscow, leading the Brazilian media to make an inevitable comparison between Brazil's ties with Russia and China.

Trade between Brazil and China in 2024 reached US $160 billion, with a US $31 billion trade surplus for Brazil (equivalent to 41% of Brazil's total global surplus). During his trip, Lula announced Chinese investments in Brazil worth US $4.7 billion, while there were no investment announcements during his trip to Russia.

Yes, relations between Brazil and Russia may not have the trade and investment figures of those of Brazil and China, or even Brazil-US relations. However, the issues on the agenda for Brazil and Russia are strategic for both sides, political coordination, and involve the potential sharing of sensitive technologies.

The signed nuclear and space agreements could actually take Brazil-Russia relations to their best historical level, both qualitatively and quantitatively. After all, even if unbalanced, bilateral trade continues to break all historical records.

The resumption of CAN meetings shows that the Strategic Partnership between Brazil and Russia is solid, in a context in which Moscow is seeking to consolidate its influence in the Global South. After Putin told Lula during a meeting in the Kremlin that “it had been indeed a long time since we had seen each other,” the Brazilian leader decided not to let his colleague miss him any longer. As a matter of fact, Lula visited Russia not once, but twice this year: four days after leaving Russia to China, Lula's presidential plane returned to Moscow for a technical stopover. Before continuing his long flight to Montevideo, Lula and Putin spoke on the phone about the Ukrainian conflict. The stopover at Vnukovo airport lasted just a few hours, but it was clear that a single visit was not enough for the Brazilian and Russian presidents to catch up.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva undertook a state visit to Russia to take part in the Victory Day commemorations of the Patriotic War, between May 7 and 9^th, 2025. By including Russia in his Eurasian tour, which also passed through China, Lula honored the tradition he himself started, that every Brazilian president should visit Russia at least once during their mandate.

However, this was not the first time that the Brazilian president had prepared a trip to Russia during his third term in office (which began in January 2023 and is scheduled to end in December 2026). In October 2024, Lula's presence at the BRICS Heads of State Summit in Kazan had already been confirmed, when a domestic accident made it impossible for the 79-year-old president to travel. Lula's sudden absence from the BRICS Summit amplified rumors that Brazil was disengaged not only from the group, but also from its relations with Global South countries that directly challenge Washington's directives.

Indeed, during the first two years of Lula da Silva's third term, Brazil's foreign policy proved to be less aligned with the Global South than expected. Public disagreements with countries such as Venezuela and Nicaragua, the low engagement level in Latin American regional integration, and the resumption of its African policy surprised experts, who were expecting a swift return to the “active and haughty” foreign policy of Lula's first terms in office.

The strong influence of then US President Joe Biden's administration on the elections and the transition cabinet of the third Lula administration ensured a foreign policy sympathetic to global North countries. Even before his inauguration, Lula met with senior White House officials, such as then US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and suggested an alliance with Biden to combat the right-wing Bolsonarist movement in Brazil and Trumpism in the US.

The US has been far from modest about their influence on the electoral process that ensured Lula's victory over former president Bolsonaro. In the article “The discreet US campaign to defend Brazil’s election,” former US ambassadors in Brasilia, Thomas Shannon and Michael McKinley, seem not only to defend the results of their intervention in the electoral process, but also to demand gratitude and loyalty from the Lula government for the rendered services.

Brazil's foreign policy answered the call and maintained its affinity with the Biden-led White House, while reaffirming its ability to communicate with all the poles of power amid geopolitical transition. Brazil's G20 presidency in 2024 was a successful expression of this constant search for balance, which sometimes put the imperative of being welcomed by all ahead of advancing Brazil's national interests.

However, the arrival of a Republican president in the White House has changed the calculus of foreign policy makers in Brasilia. The clear ideological disagreement between Donald Trump and Lula da Silva is just one of the factors leading to the current estrangement in Brazil-US political relations. An advocate of an incisive policy towards Latin America, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is yet to establish contact with his Brazilian counterpart, Minister Mauro Vieira. However, if trade and investment relations are maintained, the distancing between the US and Brazil could guarantee more space for Brasilia to act in the international arena, particularly with Global South countries.

In this context, the Brazilian president's visit to Russia and China seems to indicate a course correction, in which Brazil resumes its universalist foreign policy, rejecting Manichean divisions of the world into autocracies vs democracies,” which was promoted by the US State Department under the leadership of the Democratic Party. The choice to visit Russia during a national holiday with symbolic weight suggests Brazil's intention to reaffirm its autonomy in foreign policy.

Focus on Strategic Sectors: Nuclear and Space Cooperation

Viktor Kheifets:
Russian-Brazilian Relations: Political Context and Economic Cooperation

President Lula's visit to Moscow was markedly different from that of his predecessor and political adversary, Jair Bolsonaro. Embarking in Moscow in February 2022, Bolsonaro and his delegation carried out a strictly bilateral agenda with their Russian counterparts. In addition to the high-level meeting between the presidents, Bolsonaro's visit to Russia inaugurated meetings in the 2+2 format, attended by both the foreign and defense ministers. [1]

President Lula's visit, on the other hand, had a multilateral touch, with the Brazilian having to share his counterpart Vladimir Putin's attention with other leaders present for the Victory Day celebrations, including China's President Xi Jinping. Lula took advantage of the multilateral atmosphere to meet with authorities from other countries, such as the Prime Minister of Slovakia, Robert Fico.

The composition of Lula's and Bolsonaro's ministerial delegations also reveals the differences between the two state visits. While Bolsonaro was accompanied by a large delegation made up mostly of military officers, Lula opted for a more compact group, made up of civilians from various spheres, such as in high-tech, international relations and the legislative branch.

However, both Lula and Bolsonaro brought their Mines and Energy ministers with them. The coincidence reflects the importance of nuclear cooperation in their bilateral relations. Since Bolsonaro's administration, Brazil has been seeking a partnership with Russia to overcome bottlenecks in the construction of its first nuclear submarine and guarantee the certification of its fuel. On the civil side, Russian state company Rosatom has the interest and expertise not only to finish the construction of Brazil’s nuclear power plant Angra 3, but also to participate in other nuclear projects foreseen in its National Energy Plan for 2025 (PNE-2050).

During Lula's third term in office, Rosatom expanded its presence in Brazil's nuclear program by establishing itself as a supplier of converted and enriched uranium for the production of nuclear fuel at Brazil's Angra 1 and Angra 2 nuclear power plants. The contracts are unprecedented and guarantee Rosatom's participation in the Brazilian nuclear program at least until 2027.

Lula's trip to Moscow advanced relations in the nuclear sector by opening up space for small modular nuclear reactors produced by the Russian state-owned company. Faced with the self-imposed budgetary constraints, through very strict fiscal austerity packages, successive Brazilian governments have postponed the construction of large nuclear power plants. [2]

In this context, modular nuclear reactors have emerged as a viable solution for Brazil, which has set the goal of increasing the use of nuclear energy in the PNE-50. The installation of this type of reactor has been pointed out as a possible solution for supplying energy to the Brazilian state of Roraima, located in the far north of the Amazon rainforest, which remains the only federal entity not integrated into the national electricity grid.

During the bilateral meeting with President Vladimir Putin, President Lula da Silva reiterated Brazil's interest in small nuclear modular reactors: “We are very interested in creating a relationship with Russia for the supply of small nuclear units.” The meeting was also attended by the general director of Rosatom, Aleksey Likhachev, on the Russian side, and the Minister of Mines and Energy, Alexandre Silveira, on the Brazilian side.

Speaking to journalists after the conclusion of the presidential agenda in Russia, President Lula and his international relations advisor, Celso Amorim, referred to the nuclear sector as the highlight of their visit to Russia. Amorim noted the potential of small modular reactors as a stable energy supplier for datacenters, essential for the development of artificial intelligence in Brazil.

President Lula declared that “Russia is an important partner for us in areas such as oil, gas and small nuclear reactors, which is an extraordinary novelty, so that we can have guaranteed energy for ever and ever.” The president also noted that if Brazil wants to be the fifth largest economy in the world, it needs more stable energy than wind or solar power, “so that what happened to Spain and Portugal [during the recent electricity blackout in April 2025] never happens to us.

The nuclear sector was also high on the agenda of Brazil's Minister of Science and Technology, Luciana Santos. During a meeting with the Russian Minister of Science and Higher Education, Valery Valkov, agreements were signed to strengthen Brazil's participation in the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR), located in Dubna, in the Moscow region. According to the minister's office, the agreement is a first step towards Brazil joining this important nuclear research institute.

Moreover, the Minister of Science and Technology seems to have achieved something that Bolsonaro's entire military delegation was unable to do on its visit to Moscow: agreements with Russia on the transfer of technology in the space sector. Minister Santos celebrated successful talks with Moscow on the joint development of satellite launch vehicles to be operated in Brazil. According to her, “Russia is willing to develop space launch vehicles with technology transfer to Brazil.”

Owner of the Alcantara base, one of the best located space stations in the world, Brazil currently relies on India to launch its domestically produced satellites. After years of developing its own launch vehicle development program, an explosion at the Alcantara base in 2003 – during the testing of its most advanced model – killed leading Brazilian scientists. Since then, the Brazilian satellite launch vehicle development project has never been the same again.

If the agreement signed by Brazil and Russia in the space sector is implemented, it will be a major milestone, not only in bilateral space cooperation, but also in Russia's willingness to transfer technology to Brazil. Brazil has a consistent policy of demanding technology transfers in equipment purchases for sensitive sectors, such as in defense. Russian reticence to make significant transfers has often led Brazil to opt for developing strategic projects with other partners, such as France, Sweden or China. If the parties find a mutually beneficial and secure model for the transfer of cutting-edge technology, a new horizon of possibilities will open up for the development of bilateral relations.

Trade Agenda and the Brazilian Deficit

Vladimir Likhachev, Elizaveta Lihacheva:
Nuclear Power and the Global South

From the Brazilian point of view, one of the priority topics on the bilateral agenda during Lula's trip to Russia was trade. Trade between Brazil and Russia has grown exponentially in recent years, reaching US$12 billion - two more than the target set by the parties when they signed their Strategic Partnership in 2002.

On the other hand, trade between Brazil and Russia remains very concentrated on a few products, with a low level of diversification on both sides. In addition, the agenda is focused on products with low added value: agribusiness products in the Brazilian case, and the energy sector and the chemical industry on the Russian side.

It is remarkable that, even with the imposition of international economic sanctions against Russia in 2022, trade between Brazil and Russia grew by 70.40% between 2021 and 2024. The most significant annual jump occurred from 2021 to 2022 (+34.67%), with continued growth in the following years. This success, however, is mainly due to Russia’s performance, which has been able to add a new relevant product to these trade relations: diesel.

In this context, Brazil's trade deficit with Russia increased by 5.40 billion dollars from 2021 to 2024, which represents an increase of 131.43 %. Brazil, which was the surplus party in bilateral trade until 2017, is finding it difficult to access Russia's agricultural products market. As Lula's advisor Celso Amorim acknowledged during his visit to Russia, Moscow is betting on import substitution policies in food products, aiming to guarantee food security. It seems that Brazil understands Russia's position, but regrets the loss of its exports in lucrative areas such as the meat sector.

During President Bolsonaro's visit to Moscow in 2022, Brazilian authorities played down the impact of the Brazilian trade deficit on bilateral relations. Statements by President Bolsonaro and the Director of the Brazilian Export Agency argued that the deficit with Russia was caused by Brazilian imports of fertilizers, an essential product for the good performance of agribusiness. Agribusiness, in turn, guaranteed Brazil a global trade surplus that far outweighed the losses in bilateral trade with Russia.

President Lula's delegation changed its stance and made the trade deficit a priority on the Brazilian agenda in Moscow. Brazil's demand for balanced trade was included in a fact sheet on Lula's visit produced by the Presidential Communications Secretariat for members of the press. Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira publicly insisted on this agenda, noting that “we are going to discuss this issue [...] because we want trade to be greater and closer to balance.”

President Lula, who invited the CEO of one of Brazil's largest meatpackers to take part in his bilateral meeting with Putin, said: “My coming here is to discuss trade, to try to balance it out, because we work with the idea that a good trade policy is a two-way street. We buy, we sell, more or less in the same proportion, so that no one is harmed.”

Despite the enthusiasm of Brazilian authorities, it is not clear what measures can be adopted to guarantee an increase in Brazil's share of bilateral trade. The success of the Russian agricultural sector in meeting its domestic demands may have permanently sidelined Brazil from some sectors, such as swine meat. Meanwhile, even before the imposition of sanctions in 2022, Brazil’s industrial sector had shown little willingness to leave its comfort zone and break into new Russian markets.

One possible scenario is for Brazil to suggest that Russia compensate its deficit in areas other than trade, for example by enhancing cooperation in strategic areas such as nuclear, space, technical and scientific cooperation. From the perspective of Brasilia, the transfer of technology and cooperation in sensitive sectors for its economic development could mean more to Brazil than simply balancing these booming trade relations.

The Great Diplomatic Victory

Ilsur Metshin:
Fill Urban Diplomacy with Practical Meaning

Lula's visit to Russia made it clear that the two sides have a lot to talk about. To do so, they took a decision long awaited by experts on Brazil-Russia relations: the resumption of Bilateral High-Level Commission meetings, known by the Portuguese anacronym as CAN.

The Commission is the main coordinating body for bilateral relations, chaired by the Vice President on the Brazilian side and the Prime Minister on the Russian side. It was established by the Strategic Partnership Action Plan approved in 2010. However, the CAN has not been convened since 2015.

During President Jair Bolsonaro's visit to Moscow in 2022, Russia insisted on the resumption of CAN meetings. According to the Final Declaration published after the meeting between Bolsonaro and Putin, the CAN should meet in the first four months of 2022 in Rio de Janeiro.

However, the convening of the CAN in 2022 did not take place. An analysis of telegrams from Brazilian diplomatic authorities on the subject, authorized by the Brazilian Access to Information Law, indicates that for Brazil, a high-level visit by a Russian official to Brazil in 2022 would be a breach of its position of neutrality regarding the Ukrainian conflict. Although Brazil has maintained bilateral and multilateral contacts with Russia after 2022, the Itamaraty authorities have shown a more cautious approach to high-level meetings in Brazil, in a strictly bilateral format, as would be the case with the convening of the CAN.

Fortunately, Brazil’s calculus seems to have changed in 2025. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mauro Vieira, “Later this year, we plan to receive a Russian delegation to hold the 12^th meeting of the Bilateral High-Level Commission, the CAN, the main bilateral coordination mechanism, chaired by the vice-presidents of both countries, and which has not met since 2015.” Whether in Rio de Janeiro or Brasilia, all the indications are that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin will be packing his bags to meet Brazil's Vice President Geraldo Alckmin, an authority very much in tune with economic and trade issues.

The Long Journey Back Home

After his State visit to Moscow, President Lula flew to China, where he took part in bilateral meetings and in the multilateral China-CELAC Summit, a forum that brings Beijing together with Brazil's Latin American partners. Lula's delegation in Beijing was larger than the group that accompanied him to Moscow, leading the Brazilian media to make an inevitable comparison between Brazil's ties with Russia and China.

Trade between Brazil and China in 2024 reached US $160 billion, with a US $31 billion trade surplus for Brazil (equivalent to 41% of Brazil's total global surplus). During his trip, Lula announced Chinese investments in Brazil worth US $4.7 billion, while there were no investment announcements during his trip to Russia.

Yes, relations between Brazil and Russia may not have the trade and investment figures of those of Brazil and China, or even Brazil-US relations. However, the issues on the agenda for Brazil and Russia are strategic for both sides, political coordination, and involve the potential sharing of sensitive technologies.

The signed nuclear and space agreements could actually take Brazil-Russia relations to their best historical level, both qualitatively and quantitatively. After all, even if unbalanced, bilateral trade continues to break all historical records.

The resumption of CAN meetings shows that the Strategic Partnership between Brazil and Russia is solid, in a context in which Moscow is seeking to consolidate its influence in the Global South. After Putin told Lula during a meeting in the Kremlin that “it had been indeed a long time since we had seen each other,” the Brazilian leader decided not to let his colleague miss him any longer. As a matter of fact, Lula visited Russia not once, but twice this year: four days after leaving Russia to China, Lula's presidential plane returned to Moscow for a technical stopover. Before continuing his long flight to Montevideo, [3] Lula and Putin spoke on the phone about the Ukrainian conflict. The stopover at Vnukovo airport lasted just a few hours, but it was clear that a single visit was not enough for the Brazilian and Russian presidents to catch up.

1. Окунева, Л. С. Визит президента Бразилии Жаира Болсонару в Россию / Л. С. Окунева // Латинская Америка. – 2022. – № 4. – С. 23-41. – DOI 10.31857/S0044748X0019315-5

2. Эстевес, А. Бразильская ядерная программа - включение в режим ядерного нераспространения и основные вызовы режиму гарантий (Диссертация- МГИМО МИД России).

3. Before returning to Brazil, Lula flew to Montevideo to take part on the funeral of his colleague, the former Uruguayan president Jose Mujica.